Justice and the good life : an analysis and defense of a communicative theory of ethics by Meehan, Mary Johanna
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (1964-2011)
1990
Justice and the good life : an
analysis and defense of a






/rusTICE AND THE GOOD L~: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE 
OF A COMMUNICATIVE THEORY OF ETHICS 
by 
MARY JOHANNA :MEEHAN 
q 
B.A., Brandeis University, 1977 
M.A., Boston University, 1982 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 






Bernard Elevitch, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Philosophy 
Boston University 
Thomas A. McCarthy, 
Professor of Philosophy 
Northwestern University 
s;ylBenhabib, Ph.D. 
Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies 
Stat~ University of New York at Stony Brook 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Thanks to my mother, whose support was limitless; to my aunt, 
for her uncritical love; to my father, for his many kindnesses; and to 
my sisters and their partners for their respect, confidence and love. 
This Dissertation is dedicated to Maura Irene Strassberg, who 
was always there when I needed her. 
iii 
WSTICE AND TIIE GOOD LIFE: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE 
OF A COMMUNICATIVE THEORY OF ETHICS 
(Order No. ) 
MARY JOHANNA :MEEHAN 
Boston Univer~ity, Graduate School, 1990 
Major Professor: Thomas A. McCarthy, Professor of Philosophy 
Abstract 
The central question of this dissertation 1s whether Habermas's 
discourse ethics can successfully take account of the kinds of 
criticisms of Kantian formalism, first raised by Hegel, without at the 
same time abdicating the universalism of the Kantian conception of 
justice. Specifically, it considers whether the universality of moral 
principles can be maintained while recognizing the particularity of 
our experiences and values. This question is pursued in the context 
of a discussion raised by contemporary Anglo-American ethicists. 
Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre 
argue that . our notions of the right and the good are derived from a 
notion of the good life which defines the character of any given 
community. This would seem to undercut the force of Habermas's 
quasi-deontological position, which asserts that norms are only 
legitimated by universally valid criteria. This dissertation maintains 
that Habermas's theory of moral character accounts for both our 
historical rootedness and our ability to adopt a universalistic 
standpoint from which to question and assess our culturally 
mediated beliefs. When Habermas's position is considered in light of 
IV 
the arguments of critics such as Carol Gilligan, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Larry Blum, who criticize neo-Kantian tendencies to characterize 
morality as moral argument and the consequent failure to develop 
concepts of moral character, moral perception, moral emotion, and 
moral judgment, it becomes clear that Habermas needs a general 
moral theory that extends to the private sphere. It is posssible to 
reformulate Habermas's ethical theory so that the distinction 
between norms and values issues from an ideally regulated discourse 
that at the same time defines the boundary between public and 
private. The gap between norms and values also can be bridged by 
incorporating the notion of symmetrical reciprocity as a meta-norm 
of discourse, which would ground both principles of justice and a 
notion of the good without privileging any historically specific vision 
of the good life. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Habermas's 
discourse ethic in light of two discussions in contemporary Anglo-
American philosophy. My treatment is divided into four chapters. 
In the first, I lay out Habermas's theory of rationality and examine 
the foundations of his discourse ethics. Habermas uses a critical 
reading of Weber as a starting point for the development of an 
alternative theory of rationality that identifies an emancipatory 
potential in practical reason which Weber had failed to recognize. 
Modernity brings with it both the advancement of technical reason 
and the possibility of organizing the social world in accordance with 
norms of practical reason. On this basis Habermas reworks 
Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development to clarify the cognitive 
development necessary for individuals to adopt the moral point of 
view. In particular, he argues that Kohlberg's monological model of 
moral reasoning must be replaced by an intersubjective one. In the 
final section of Chapter One, I lay out the internal structure of 
Habermas's discourse theory of ethics, which is based on a 
reconstruction of presuppositions implicit in communication. 
In Chapter Two, I consider criticisms of deontological ethics 
that have been raised by neo-Aristotelians such as Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Though Sandel and MacIntyre focus 
on different criticisms, they agree that the traditional liberal 
preoccupation with abstract criteria of justice fails adequately to 
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memberships communities. In their view, the model of the moral 
individual employed by deontologists is, so abstracted from time and 
place as to have little relation to real individuals. Macintyre's argues 
further that enlightenment deontologies relied upon a naturalistic 
view of what human beings are and a religiously derived view of 
what they should be. Once this understanding of human nature was 
abandoned, normative conceptions of human nature were left 
without theoretical grounds. Sandel argues that contemporary 
deontologies create a subject that lies beyond politics, making the 
conception of the self a premise of politics rather than its 
achievement. This conception is too "thin" to be morally meaningful. 
In the concluding section of Chapter Two, I argue that Habermas's 
discourse ethics is not beset by the shortcomings that MacIntyre and 
Sandel claim are endemic to deontology. Habermas treats the 
constitution of the I as profoundly social. As participants in moral 
discourse, we are particular individuals whose identities are 
profoundly affected by our experiences, relationships and 
memberships. As modern subjects, however, we can abstract from 
our particularity and reflect on the values important to the formation 
of our identities; we can seek to rationally assess these values. on 
the one hand, I argue that Maclntyre's and Sandel's criticism is 
appropriate insofar as Habermas lacks a theory of moral character, 
the virtues, or moral judgment. These shortcomings both spring 
from and exacerbate his tendency to define moral reasoning strictly 
in terms of justice reasoning and to associate morality with linear 
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philosophical reasoning. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that, 
with some effort, · Habermas's theory could be expanded to include a 
fuller account of moral personality while at the same time avoiding 
problems that MacIntyre and Sandel associate with deontology. 
In Chapter Three, I. discuss aspects of morality not accounted 
for by Habermas's theory of moral reasoning: moral perception, 
moral judgment and moral emotions. I begin by considering the 
traditional characterization of thought as rational and the emotions 
as irrational. Using Lawrence Blum's distinction between rational 
and irrational emotions, I argue that some emotions can serve as 
rational motivations for action and thus can be appealed to as 
justifications for action. The typical dichotomization of the public 
sphere as rational and the private sphere as emotional breaks down 
in relation to a phenomenon as complex as morality. Though we may 
wish to retain some distinction between the public and the private, it 
is clear that we act or are expected to act as moral agents in both 
spheres and that emotion and intuition play some part in constituting 
our moral character as a whole. Indeed, in some circumstance the 
failure to experience the appropriate emotion can signify a moral 
failing as serious as not acting or acting in the wrong way. 
Furthermore, to know when one should act morally requires a 
sensitivity to the potential moral nuances of situations. I refer to 
this sensitivity as moral perception and argue that it is an essential 
part of a theory of moral character. Moral perception is learned from 
others, just as we learn to understand the meaning and importance 
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of norms from others. It is a skill developed through the process of 
moral socialization. At this point, I take up the work of Carol Gilligan; 
her research on gender differences in moral responses both 
illuminates the significance of moral perception in general and 
uncovers a moral perspective entirely ignored by Habermas. 
Gilligan's research indicates that while boys tend to adopt a moral 
perspective characterized by fairness, girls tend to adopt a moral 
perspective characterized by care. She offers a theory of moral 
socialization to account for this gender difference in moral perception 
by focusing on early childhood experiences of attachment and 
detachment. Justice thinking, marked by an emphasis on 
impartiality and fairness, results when ego organizes its affective and 
cognitive responses around the experience of detachment. A moral 
outlook marked by an emphasis on care results when ego organizes 
its affective and cognitive responses around the experience of 
attachment. I argue that neither of these two moral perspectives 
can, in themselves, describe the entirety of morality. 
In the last section of Chapter Three, I take up moral judgment 
because it is in the moment of moral judgment that moral perception, 
moral character, and moral emotion coalesce. Following Aristotle, 
Martha Nussbaum describes moral judgment as practical wisdom 
rather than theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge can 
produce universal rules because it does not have to take into account 
the complexities of varied circumstances. Practical reasoning, 
however, requires flexibility; because moral issues are changeable, 
.. 
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indeterminate and particular, they cannot be decided simply by 
applying any set of universal rules. Practical wisdom comprises not 
only the ability to apply rules to particular situation but also the 
ability to· apply these rules in accordance with the virtues typical of 
the wise and the good individual. Thus, it reflects the ongoing moral 
commitments central to the formation of moral character. These 
commitments must be internalized so that they can come into play 
when a moral situation arises. 
The last issue I discuss in Chapter Three is the failure of 
deontological theories to distinguish between the kinds of moral 
relationships we have. There is no one model of moral obligation 
which can adequately determine the appropriate conto~rs of all 
moral relationships. Each such relationship is different; what is 
morally owed in its context cannot be described universally. I argue, 
in particular, that universalistic moral theories ignore moral conflicts 
that arise in our everyday lives and focus instead on public disputes 
concerning rights. 
In Chapter Four, I argue that with some revisions Habermas's 
ethics can be expanded to include a more adequate account of moral 
judgment, the role of attachment and detachment in the adoption of 
a care or justice orientation, an elaboration of the social 
interpretation of needs, and a theory of the process of moral 
character formation. Habermas's theory of self-development is social 
all the way down; however, he focuses almost exclusively on the 
co~nitive skills children require in order to identity, act out and 
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question social roles. He does not adequately consider the self's 
emotional responsiveness within a role. I argue that if he were to 
complement his stage theory of the cognitive development of 
individuals with the account of attachment and separation Gilligan 
has developed, he would be better able to trace the emotional-cum-
cognitive development necessary for acquiring moral character. 
A further problem for Habermas is his inability to explain 
needs, which he regards as a legitimate subject matter of political 
discourse, without referring to values, which he excludes from such 
discourse. Needs are in a certain sense always particular. When we 
attempt to persuade others through discourse of the legitimacy of 
our needs, those discourses must also be about values, for needs 
reflect values. Consequently, discourses cannot, as Habermas 
believes, be reserved strictly for disputes about norms. It 1.s because 
of his neglect of moral emotions and moral character that Haber~as 
is unable to characterize values in such a way as to allow them to be 
the subject of political discourse. 
Nancy Fraser's discussion of needs is useful in this context. Her 
analysis focuses on the function of needs talk in contemporary 
welfare-state democracies. The important question to ask about 
needs, Fraser argues, is who has the right to voice them , interpret 
them and to demand that they be fulfilled. Needs are not universally 
generalizable at all; they are specific to interpretive contexts. Since 
neediness is socially produced and socially interpreted, what counts 
as a need in one time and place may not count as a need in another. 
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Unlike norms, which we can at least imagine to be right for all 
agents, needs cannot be generalized in that way. Yet needs and their 
interpretations are increasingly the subject matter of political and 
moral disputes. 
Habermas attempts to resolve this tension by insisting that 
only needs which fulfill generalizable interests can be recognized as 
normatively valid. But this makes it difficult for him to recognize 
that the generation and interpretation of needs takes place in 
particular contexts and thus needs vary greatly. There are multiple 
forms of discourse, and values, which inform needs, are properly the 
subject matter of some of them. In particular, values must be 
discussed in the sphere of we might call, after Hannah Arent, "the 
social." It is through political discourse that needs which are initially 
viewed merely as "wants" come to be seen as a legitimate normative 
claims. Thus, what is at one time taken to be an issue of private 
dispute, can come to be recognized through political struggle 
recognized to be matter of public concern. 
In Chapter Four, I suggest that the decision as to which type of 
discourse is suitable for considering the rightness or wrongness of 
proposed norms is itself a result of political and social processes. 
Political discourses, particularly legislative discourses, may not 
always be the most suitable arena for considering the legitimacy of 
certain ·values. The separation of the public from the private sphere 
1s always open to renegotiation as political beliefs and values shift. 
Finally, I evaluate the status of Habermas' discourse ethics m 
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light of the problems raised. I argue that despite his definition of 
morality in terms of justice thinking, his theory might be expanded 
to include the aspects of moral judgment and moral character 
discussed in Chapter Three. Along the way, I raise the question of 
whether it is possible to .outline a deontological, universalistic 
concept of justice without presupposing some historically specific and 
culturally substantive notion of the good. My answer is "both yes 
and no." On the one hand, it is neither possible nor desirable to set 
forth one version of the good life as morally definitive. On the other 
hand, it is possible and desirable to adopt a theory of justice that 
elevates standards of universality to normative status, thus refusing 
to privilege one particular way of life over any other. This strategy 
does not free moral theory from all values because universality must 
itself be valued for certain purposes. A theory of justice, then, 
cannot stand alone; it must be seen as part of a more general theory 
grounded in some notion of the good abstract enough not to favor a 
particular way of life, but particular enough to reflect some 
commitment to the good. I conclude by suggesting that the norm of 
symmetrical reciprocity which can be derived from the normative 
presuppositions of communication might serve as a meta-norm, 
which could then be used to test both proposed norms of justice and 
conflicting values adopted m the private realm. While recognizing 
that this strategy has its own theoretical problems, I see it as a 
promising way to create a bridge between neo-Kantian approaches to 
moral theory and approaches that stress neo-Aristotelian elements. 
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CHAPTERONE 
As I argued in the introduction, Habermas' discourse ethics is 
grounded upon an analysis of the norms embedded in 
communicative action. By reconstructing the norms which any 
competent speaker employs in the course of communicating, 
Habermas claims we can begin to lay the ground for a defense of a 
cognitivist and universalist ethical proceduralism. Such an ethics 
would provide us not with specific norms, but rather with a 
description of how norms can be morally determined by real people 
in real situations. Habermas's theory privileges no specific social 
group. All competent speakers must decide on the norms which will 
govern our behavior. The philosopher's job task is limited to 
providing a description of the conditions which make the 
determination of a norm just. As an ethical theory, Habermas' 1s a 
minimalist one, proclaiming no specific injunctions or rules, and 
includes the recognition that it's claims are always open to the 
questioning of any competent speakers who must marshall 
arguments that are acceptable to all and most specifically to those 
who would be most directly affected by the implementation of the 
suggested norms. Not only are the norms generated through 
discourse open to questioning, but truth as it is defined in the theory 
of discourse ethic is also tentative though not therefore relativistic. 
With its awareness of the historicity of truth claims as well as its 
sensitivity to the distorting effects of ideology, Habermas' 
epistemology attempts to incorporate a recognition of the possiblity 
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of change as well as a basis for its criticism into its very structure. I 
will take up the question of whether he succeeds in this attempt in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
Another significant aspect of discourse ethic that will be 
important for my discussion is Habermas' claim that the scope of his 
ethic is limited to the kind of moral claims we have come to call 
justice claims. Though this will be taken up as one of the thorniest 
problems of this dissertation, the reason for this limitation involves 
Habermas' consensus theory of truth and the belief that only claims 
which can be framed in the language of justice or fairness can rightly 
be said to embody norms and to express interests· which can be 
generalized. According to Habermas, this is not the case with notions 
of the good life which reflect not norms but values, which are 
personal in nature and not susceptible to moral justification. 
These arguments and Habermas' discourse ethic as a whole 
cannot be explained without clarifying his understanding of 
rationality and the role it plays in his theory. In order to shed some 
light on the nature of the concept of rationality that serves as the 
underpinning of much of Habermas' earlier work and on all of his 
latest work, I will discuss the origins and development of his · theory 
of rationality and its relation to the discursive justification of norms. 
Since Habermas' earlier work, his discussion of rationality and 
of norms has been most often expressed in the course of his critique 
of positivism and in his break with the Frankfurt School's 
condemnation of rationality. Habermas argues that the criticisim of· 
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the Frankfurt school is directed at the form of rationality which the 
Enlightenment was most sucessful in defending, that is instrumental 
rationality. It is a morally uncomitted rationality that Weber was to 
describe as resulting in goal-directed activity. This species of 
rationality is normatively neutral but came to be seen as the only 
forms of reasoning that could be thought of as rational as all value 
oriented thinking came to be seen as resting on norms which could 
not be rationally justified. One's moral beliefs were squeezed out of 
the realm of the moral and into the private realm of an essentially 
irrational decisionism perhaps best expressed in Weber's famous 
shibboleth, "Here I stand, I can do no other." According to this 
interpretation reason has been understood as exclusively 
instrumental reason and morality has been relegated to the irrational 
personal choice of principles . Having accepted this description of 
reason, the Frankfurt School and especially Adorno and Horkheimer, 
depict rationality as a technological tool gone wild, leading to the 
ever-increasing domination of inner and outer nature. Whatever 
emancipatory potential Enlightenment thinkers had seen in the 
rational overcoming of predjudice and superstition, has been lost m 
the mad creation of a world of managers and experts, lost in the 
materially- motivated destruction of the earth , lost in the inexorable 
stripping away of the humanity of social relations in the endless 
quest for profit. Voltaire's battle to replace superstition with reason 
has been superceded by the commodification of truth, the self, and 
the political world. Habermas' reinterpretation of Weber's theory of 
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rationality allows for his critical reading of the positions of Adorno 
and Horkheimer and the opening of a space once again for the belief 
that the progress of reason can bring with it a new hope for 
emancipation and viewing the spread of rationality as the way to 
more democratic, more moral way of life without at the same time 
falling prey to the naive and dangerous view that the contemporary 
world is in any sense of the word ideal. The real is in Habermas' 
view not the rational, and in order to end the dominance technical 
reason, the concept of rationality must be expanded to make room 
for an understanding of a rationality whose end is not the mastery of 
the physical and social world but rather a rationality understood as 
communicative action whose immanent telos is understanding. A 
theory of a ratiionality which is communicative can offer a way to 
justify those moral norms as rational though not rational in the same 
sense as instrumental rationality. It is this reconceptualization of 
practical reason in terms of communication that motivates the 
linguistic turn in Habermas' work. In the course of this chapter I will 
clarify what it means for Habermas to argue that norms must be 
understood- in terms of rationality and that rationality must be 
understood in terms of communication. With this linguistification of 
rationality Habermas tankes up the project of defending moral norms 
as rational and lays the ground for their justification. 
From his earliest writing, Habermas has argued that the 
methodology of philosophic investigation must be revamped. 
Philosophers can no longer conduct theor investigations and make 
J • 
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their claims in an intellectual vacuum. First philosophy must give 
way to reconstructive theories akin to the developmental theories of 
Piaget and Kohlberg . Its claims must be tentative and must always 
be reconsidered in light of any contradictory empirical evidence 
which turns up. Philosophy must be viewed as one project among 
many, constituting a research program that will involve the synthesis 
of research conducted in a multitude of areas, linked by a 
hypothetically-posed thesis that requires correcting and adjusting as 
new claims are brought forward, tested and either incorporated into 
the theory or shifting the focus of the theory altogether. The image 
of Neurath's boat comes to mind and though Habermas does not 
think that we are epistemologically speaking, altogether at sea, he 
nonetheless does believe that our boats will always be in need of 
plank-replacement and it is this process and not the results which 
are epistemologically most interesting. The questions that this 
dissertation raises requires focusing on Habermas' theory of practical 
reason, the reason that guides human action and more specifically 
the reason that guides human choice and action in the sphere of the 
moral. For Habermas this aspect of rationality must be understood m 
terms of the norms embedded in communicative action and I will 
devote a good part of this chapter to a discussion of what this means 
and why it is that Habermas argues that practical reason is best 
understood as communicative rationality. I will also point to why he 
argues that an analysis of communicative action can lead us to a new 
way to understand and justify the claim that some moral claims are 
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universally binding and carry with them the sense of the ought that 
Kant described so well. 
In. the course of trying to solve difficult problems and 
addressing shortcomings which have arisen in the course of the 
development of Habermas' theory of discourse ethics, Habermas has 
not only revamped his argument from time to time, he has also 
found it necessary to pursue related lines of research which gives his 
theory a depth and scope which are necessary for the sucess of his 
ethical theory as a whole. These arguments are integral to the 
theory though Habermas at times seems to leave the task of this 
integration to his readers. There are two particular lines of discussion 
which I will argue are as important as the theory of discourse itself. 
These are the theory of the psychological development necessary for 
aquiring communicative competence and an analysis of the 
structures of the social world in which the agent develops and 
functions. The skills of communication must be learned and the 
question of how one masters the moral code of the language of norms 
reqmres Habermas to investigate how it is that communicative actors 
develop their ability to raise and to defend normative claims. 
Because communication is an intersubjective phenomenon and 
morality an essentially social one, Habermas must provide a 
description of the individual's acquisition of discourse skill in the 
context of a particular historical setting. While he argues that the 
process of justifying norms has a universal structure, he is quite 
aware that all cultures are different . In order to cope with the issue 
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of particularity while at the same time defending moral norms as 
universal Habermas has developed a very controversial theory of 
social evolution and contends that learning processes occur on the 
social and the individual level. 
Recognizing the shortcomings of Kant's monological model of 
the subject, and attempting to incorporate both Hegel's critique of 
Kantian ethics and Marx's critique of modernity, Habermas has 
developed a discursive theory of ethics that begins with the 
intersubjective constitution of the self, and includes a developmental 
theory of rationality, both at the individual and social levels, as well 
as a critical assessment of the rationality potential of postliberal 
social and political institutions. Habermas's discourse ethic can only 
be understood in the context of this larger discussion. With this in 
mind, I will divide my discussion into three parts, talcing up three 
essential threads in Habermas' theory. I shall begin with his 
argument that the social world in which the modern subject finds 
him or herself is not as completely dominated by an amoral 
purposive-rationality as Weber had thought. Weber's pessimism, 
Habermas suggests, is in part due to his failure to appreciate the 
normative grounds of modern law, grounds which point to a form of 
rationality at odds with the means-end rationality that Weber 
ascribed to it. After discussing the social structures of normative 
reasoning and their institutionalization, my analysis will turn to the 
process of the intersubjective socialization of individuals. Here my 
central concern will be on those aspects of socialization that 
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contribute to the human capacity to recognize norms and to act in 
accordance with them. Finally, at the end of this chapter I shall 
critically reconstruct the structural complexities of Habermas's 
discourse ethics, keeping the earlier discussions of the chapter in 
mind. 
A. Habermas, Weber and Modernity 
Habermas claims that contemporary society,for all its ills, is not 
entirely without redeeming features. He argues that the structures 
of modernity carry with them the potential for the realization of an 
ideal of political and psychological emancipation. It is this vision that 
motivates all of Habermas's work, from its earliest to its most recent 
formulations. He views the process of modernization as one of the 
increased rationalization of the life-world, where spheres of 
discourse once unified in mythological world views are separated out 
for reflective elaboration. He is convinced that the fragmentation 
that has resulted from the breakdown of traditional worldviews 
derives not from the intrinsically negative quality of rationality, but 
rather from its one-sided development. What is at fault our 
misguided belief that the Qil.U form of rationality is a strategic 
rationality that is by definition devoid of any normative force. 
Habermas develops this thesis in the context of a critical 
reading of Weber's analysis of modernity. His understanding of 
rationality and its potential signifies a significant break with the 
interpretation of earlier members of the Frankfurt School who had 
taken to heart Weber's theory of the disenchantment of society. This 
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reading led them to the view that the possibility of rationally 
defending any ethical claim at all was thoroughly undercut by the 
advance of a means-end rationality criticizable only in terms of 
efficiency. All other value criteria have been lost in the wake of 
consumerism and mass culture. While recognizing the importance of 
this view, Habermas mounts a criticism of Weber that results in a 
more optimistic diagnosis of the modern world. 
Why does Habermas turn to Weber to develop his own view? 
Though Weber's view of modernity is hardly the stereotypical 
enlightenment account which touts the spread of rationality as the 
solution to all life's ills, he retains the view that gauging the 
development of rationality is essential for any analysis of the social 
structures of modernity. By re-working Weber's· theory of 
modernity via a theory of communicative rationality, Habermas 
hopes to be able to distinguish purposive-rationality (the form of 
rationality that Weber designated as specifically modern) from other 
forms of rationality with which it either co-exists or could co-exist. 
The thrust of Habermas's argument is that Weber's identification of 
rationality with means-end rationality, which leads him to the 
conclusion that the sphere of the moral cannot be defended as 
rational, can be countered by demonstrating that Weber adopted a 
too limited definition of rationality as the result of flaws in his 
theoretical approach. If Habermas's move is successful he can make 
the argument that rationality is not essentially incompatible with 
morality. For the purposes of this dissertation, I shall be interested 
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only in the conclusions that Habermas draws from his reappraisal of 
Weber, and will not take up the question of whether Habermas's 
reading of Weber is an accurate one. 
The obvious question to ask is where Habermas thinks Weber's 
analysis went wrong, and . how and why he thinks his own argument 
is an improvement. The bare bones answer to the first part of this 
question is that Weber defines rationality too narrowly by restricting 
his account to that embodied in purposive action, thus he is unable to 
explain the normative character of modern institutions and 
behaviors. The institution of modern law, Habermas argues, 1s a key 
example of one such phenomena; another is the com~on conviction 
on the part of modern individuals that advancing a moral claim 
involves being prepared to defend it by providing intersubjectively 
understandable reasons for it when one is challenged. 
While the development of capitalism is central in Weber's 
analysis of rationalization in the West, the process of modernization 
involved much more than the transformation of economic relations. 
The shift to capitalism was accompanied by a differentiation 
between, and a development of, the spheres of modern art, science, 
law, and state administration, and an ethic guided by rationally 
determined principles 1. Each sphere in.volves an independently 
defined logic, goal, and method of justification. Weber believed that 
the process leading to the differentiation of conflicting social and 
cultural spheres is, once begun, inexorable. He also held · that each 
stage of development resulted in increased alienation from a world 
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increasingly stripped of any moral meaning and is comprehensible 
only in empirical and causal terms. In Habermas's view, Weber's 
famous description of modernity as an iron cage in which we are 
trapped is too gloomy, and results from his failure to grasp the 
emancipatory potential of a rationalized modernity. 
In order to understand Weber's pessimism it is necessary to 
return to his theory of the rationalization of the social and cultural 
world, especially to his analysis of the development of capitalism and 
the motives which are required if capitalism is to flourish. Unlike 
Marx, Weber does not believe the rationalization and capitalist 
expansion in the West to be wholly explicable in terms of the 
development of forces of production responsive to the technical 
demands of capitalism, nor in terms of the relations of production 
that regulate the distribution of power, ownership, and goods. 
Weber sees the : 
institutional framework of the capitalist 
economy and the modern state in a 
different way - not as relations of 
production that fetter the potential for 
rationalization, but as subsystems of 
purposive-rational action in which 
Occidental rationalism develops at a 
societal level.2 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism , Weber takes 
up the question of why the the rise of social, legal, and economic 
rationalization in the West was so rapid. He argues that the rise of 
capitalism and the rationalization of the state apparatus, of social 
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institutions and moral behavior are, to a significant extent, indebted 
to the Protestant ethic, which inculcated in individuals a set of 
specific values and moral behaviors congenial to the demands of a 
capitalist economy. In the first paragraph of the Protestant Ethic, he 
notes that: 
business leaders and owners of capital, 
as well as the higher grades of skilled 
labour and even more the highly 
technical and commercially trained 
personnel of modern enterprise, are 
overwhelmingly Protestant.3 
This is no accident. In order to comprehend the pervasive spread of 
purposive-rationality and the capitalist economy it makes possible, 
one must understand how the religious tenents of Protestantism are 
related to the spirit of capitalist acquisition and expansion. 
By "the spirit of capitalism," Weber means a particular set of 
motivations and behaviors whose description one finds in their 
quintessential form in the writings of Benjamin Franklin. In 
Franklin's work, the ideals in question have been uncoupled from the 
Protestant religious framework in which they had first been 
articulated, and the moral view they embodied is recast in a secular 
moral language. This situation Weber viewed as tenuous at best, as 
it lacks the motivational basis previously supplied by Protestanism 
upon which to stake claims to normative truth. When one asks why 
Franklin's precepts should be followed, the only response is a 
va~iation on Weber's own description of behavior which cannot be 
rationally justified: "Here I stand, I can do no other." A central 
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aspect of the capitalist spirit that Franklin exhorts all morally 
aspiring citizens to take up is the belief that the expansion of capital 
is in and of itself an end: 
In fact, the summum b on um of this 
ethic, the earning of more and more 
money, combined with the strict 
avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment 
of life, is above all completely devoid of 
any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic 
admixture. It is thought of so purely as 
an end in itself, that from the point of 
view of the the happiness of, or utility 
to, the single individual, it appears 
entirely transcendental and absolutely 
irrational. 4 
1. Protestantism and Ascetic Protestantism 
What is there about this world view that recommends it to 
anyone? Why would any human being willingly live a life marked by 
incessant labor and a dearth of pleasures? Because, Weber argues, 
material success is linked to the achievement of salvation for the 
Protestant. The pursuit of profit with moral living encouraged a 
form of behavior consonant with the needs of developing capitalism. 
In explaining this link, Weber categorizes religions as "world 
accepting" or "world rejecting." In either case, there is the possibility 
of adopting a passive or an active attitude toward the world. Ascetic 
Protestantism both negates the value of the world and believes that 
one must act in the it as an instrument of God. It is this attitude 
which led to the world's "disenchantment"; 
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World rejection leads to an 
objectification of the world under ethical 
aspects only when it is connected with 
an active mode of life turned toward the 
world and does not lead to a passing 
turning away from the world.5 
Weber argues that it was the Protestant commitment to duty, 
as the highest expression of one's morality, which led to the belief 
that material success is a sign of one's moral character. Material 
success indicated that God was pleased with an individual's diligence, 
and thus that one was likely to be a member of the elect. No one 
could be absolutely sure that s/he was a member of the elect, and 
thus no one could ever be sure that s/he would be "saved" from 
damnation. Material success could reassure one, however; having 
worked hard, having avoided temptation, and having succeeded in 
one's "calling" could be read as an indication that one was a member 
of the "elect" and thus one of the saved. 
In addition to viewing life as a test, Protestantism held that 
one's earthly existence is part of a divine plan. One was "called" to a 
profession and practiced it with a duty born of the conviction that 
one's choice was divinely ordained and that failing at the occupation 
to which one was called was failing to live a Christian life. The 
economics of capitalism was not exactly what Luther had in mind 
when he argued that salvation was a matter of faith alone and could 
not be attained through charitable works6, and Weber suggests that 
the capitalist economic practices which came to be ethically 
sanctioned by Protestants evolved as Luther's theological theory 
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evolved. As Luther became more immersed in the world in his role 
of religious reformer, he came to recognize the importance of work 
and saw it as part of the div~ne plan. He argued that God "called" 
individuals to their professions and thus their occupations were 
determined by God. Wh~n the understanding of one's occupation 1s 
considered to be part of a divine plan and when it is coupled with 
the belief that material prosperity can be read as a positive sign 
from God, it encouraged a methodical conduct of life that in turn 
contributed to the flourishing of capitalism. On that view, it is not 
wealth that is sinful, but the idleness which prosperity might bring 
with it is. As Weber writes: 
The real moral objection is to relaxation 
in the security of possession, the 
enjoyment of wealth with the 
consequence of idleness and the 
temptations of the flesh, above all, of 
distraction from the pursuit a righteous 
life.7 
Every waking moment must be spent laboring in order that one 
should succeed in one's divinely ordained calling. Labour becomes 
an end in itself, and an unwillingness to work an indication of a lack 
of grace. 
Thus, though Weber was primarily interested in the process of 
societal rationalization he recognized that it was spurred by a process 
of cultural rationalization which had its roots in Protestantism. The 
process of cultural rationalization led, in his view, to the 
development of several different cultural spheres, more often than 
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not in conflict with one other. This is behind his diagnosis of the 
modern lifeworld as splintered and modern consciousness as marked 
by alienation from self, from others and from nature. In the 
following lines from Economy and Society. Weber points to the 
growing sense of modern subjects that we are caught in conflicting 
action systems without any Archemedian point to serve as an 
arbitrating principle: 
The rationalization and conscious 
sublimation of our relations to the 
various spheres of goods - internal and 
external, religious and secular - have 
pressed toward making us conscious of 
the inner logics of the individual spheres 
and their consequences, thereby letting 
them come into those tensions with one 
another that remain hidden in the 
originally naive relation to the external 
worlds 
For Weber the only choice left to us is the adoption of an "ethic of 
responsibility" which, unlike an "ethic of conviction", is based on a 
sense of moral dignity not grounded in a commitment to any 
religious dogma. 
Countering this pessimistic argument, Habermas claims that, 
though Weber was right when he described the process of 
disenchantment, he failed to see that the process of cultural 
rationalization has also brought gains of theoretical, practical and 
aesthetic rationality. He attributes Weber's failure to grasp the 
positive significance of cultural rationalization to his identification of 
rationality with strategic rationality. In order to grasp Habermas' 
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point, it is important to remember that Weber's original question was 
why capitalism was more completely realized in the West. Thus 
Weber first identified the rationality necessary for the success of 
capitalism and, having done so, sought to discover its roots in the 
methodical way of life of Protestantism. Having begun with a 
predetermined definition of what constitutes rationality, he failed to 
recognize the simultaneous development of non-instrumental forms 
of rationality. As Habermas puts it: 
Weber's empirical investigations are 
focused directly on the problem of the 
rise of capitalism and the question of 
how purposive-rational action 
orientations could in fact be 
institutionalized in the phase of its 
emergence. He thereby relates societal 
rationalization from the start to the 
aspect of purposive rationality; he does 
not view the historical profile of this 
process against the background of what 
was structurally possible .9 
Though Weber defined societal rationalization in terms of 
the expansion of purposive rationality, he did recognize that as 
capitalism became ever more entrenched the lifeworld was fractured 
into conflicting value spheres. As these spheres are rationalized, 
they come to prescribe specific attitudes and criteria of judgement 
appropriate to them. The purposively-rational attitude in the 
objective world leads to the adoption of a cognitive-instrumental 
attitude> iri the social world it leads to the entrenchment of cognitive-
strategic behaviors, and in the subjective world the perception of the 
·• 
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self is objectified. With the ever increasing spread of purposive-
rationality, not only 1s the ethic of brotherly love rendered 
meaningless, so too 1s any other normatively guided behavior. 
Though the means of achieving ends can be rationalized, the ends 
themselves remain irrational. The more planned, bureaucratized, 
and managed the objective and social world become, the more 
alienated modern consciousness becomes. There is an increased 
sense of a loss of control over the development and use of 
technology, a sense of being politically removed from 
bureaucratically managed governments, and a dependence on 
experts to make strategic decisions in all areas of modern life. 
Weber saw little reason to hope that what he called the "iron cage" of 
modernity could be unlocked, and thus he counseled us to look truth 
in the eye and live with what dignity was possible in a social world 
that was essentially inhumane. 
Habermas too recognizes that the lifeworld of modernity is 
frequently dehumanizing, but he uncovers a source of hope in the 
development of forms of rationality that Weber could not recogmze 
because of his identification of rationality with purposive rationality. 
In his radical reformulation of Weber's theory, Habermas argues that 
modernity brings with it a decentered and reflective moral view 
expressed and embodied in a communicative form of reason which 
must be distinguished from strategic or purposive rationality. In 
pointing to the need to distinguish purposive rationality and 
communicative rationality, Habermas is explicitly breaking with not 
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only Weber, but with the Frankfurt School's model of the "dialectic of 
enlightenment" as well. 
At the methodological level, Habermas 
rejects the implicit functionalism of the 
Frankfurt School model. According to 
this model, rationalization is an all 
encompassing process in which the 
organization of the productive forces, 
societal institutions, and personality 
structures all submit to the same logic of 
ever-increasing fragmentation, 
atomization, efficiency and formalism. Io 
In the Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas takes up 
this argument again, on the context of an analysis of the conflicts 
between "system" and "lifeworld " endemic to the modern capitalist 
state. His strategy there is to join conceptualization of the market 
and the state systems imperatives to an account of the normative 
underpinnings of social action, so as to discern the effects of the 
expansion of capitalism on different structures of the life-world. 
This analysis has a twofold significance for Habermas's discourse 
ethics. First, in arguing that social action does have a · normative 
ground, Habermas hopes to counter Weber's, Adorno's, and 
Horkheimer's contention that the anomie experienced by modern 
individuals is the inevitable result of the increased rationalization of 
the world. Disproving their argument would give rise to an 
understanding of how the life-world must be structured if we are to 
be able to secure a place for normativity. Second, an assessment of 
the socially necessary prerequisites for the possibility of norm-
28 
guided action and interaction provides a basis for a critique of the 
encroachment or, as Habermas refers to it, the colonization of the 
life-world by systems imperatives. 
2. The Differentiation of Value Spheres 
Raising the counter(actual question of the kind of theory Weber 
would have had to offer if he had envisioned the rationalization of 
the world as having a non-selective pattern, Habermas argues that 
the three spheres of rationality Weber recognized would each have 
to have been connected to a different action system, with 
corresponding forms of acceptable argumentation supporting claims 
raised in the context of that sphere. In addition, the form of 
argumentation recognized as valid in the context of a given sphere 
has to be recognized not only by a class of experts , but must 
become part of the common communicative parlance. Each sphere 
also must be institutionalized in such a way that it remains 
autonomous in the face of competing action systems.1 1 It is the 
autonomy of each sphere which prevents the hegemony of 
instrumental rationality. Not seeing the potential of the rationality 
embedded in the moral-practical, or in the aesthetic-expressive 
spheres, Weber described the rationalization process of modernity as 
paradoxical. Habermas argues that while the process of 
rationalization has been decidedly one-sided, dominated by the 
spread and institutionalization of instrumental rationality, it does not 
intrinsically lead to paradox if the cognitive potential of non-
instrumental reason, that is, of communicative rationality, is mined. 
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Weber's intuitions point m the direction 
of a selected pattern of rationalization, a 
jagged profile of modernization. Yet 
Weber speaks of paradoxes and not of 
the partial character of societal 
rationalization. In his view, the real 
reason for the dialectic of rationalization 
is not an unbalanced institutional 
embodiment of available cognitive 
potentials; he locates the the seeds of 
destruction of the rationalization of the 
world in the very differentiation of 
independent cultural value spheres that 
released that potential and made that 
rationalization possible.12 
According to Weber, when religiously grounded ethical views came 
into conflict with the demands of capitalism and the empirical claims 
of modern science, the sphere of the moral-practical was cut off from 
its religious anchoring and was set adrift. Its only remaining ballast 
was the character of people who act humanely, with an eye to the 
effects of their actions upon others. Their sense of right and wrong 
remains intuitive, however, and is therefore ultimately irrational. 
The loss of meaning we experience in a world where no single moral 
paradigm is rational leads to action founded in a courage that rejects 
despair although despair is reasonable. It is action with the kind of 
desperate hope that arises when one knows that there really is no 
hope. 
As progress meant the eroding of the value orientations and 
action dispositions necessary for moral action, the ethical autonomy 
of the individual could not be passed on as part of a moral heritage. 
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Habermas argues that Weber's thesis of "warring gods", that is, of 
irreconcilable and competing spheres, cannot be derived from the 
mere existence of such multiple spheres. While modernity is marked 
by the presence of multiple spheres, Habermas argues that it is also 
marked by a process of social learning which enables us to more or 
less juggle the demands and beliefs of these different spheres and 
which leads us to assign different weights to the claims they raise 
and to determine to which sphere it is appropriate to turn and when. 
The qualification of more or less is important here, for although 
Habermas does not believe that we do make, or ought to make, these 
decisions whimsically, there is no theoretically predetermined way to 
figure out which action-context we should apply in particular 
historical situations. It is true that there may be institutionalized 
guidelines to which we may refer, but even these are open to 
political questioning and argument and no answer can ever be final. 
Habermas suggests that Weber described the modern world as 
a place of unresolvable conflicts because of the inadequacy of his 
comprehension of the nature of modern law. In discussing the co-
optation of the ethics of ascetic Protestantism, Weber claims that the 
institutionalization of a secular moral-practical consciousness is 
impossible; thus when he turns to discuss the development of 
modern law, "he reinterprets modern law iri such a way that it is 
detached from the evaluative sphere and can appear from the start 
as an institution.al embodiment of of cognitive-instrumental 
rationality." l3 For Weber, modern law is the codification of a set of 
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rules needed for playing the game of capitalism. It sets the rules for 
the administration of a capitalist state and codifies the regulations of 
the capitalist economy. Habermas argues that Weber's treatment of 
law as an instrument of strategic capitalist rationality could only be 
justified if there was an internal connection between modern formal 
law and the legal requirements of a capitalist economy. Without this 
connection, law may be an instrument used to protect and enhance 
capitalism, but this is the result of political circumstance and not 
theoretical imperative. 
Though Weber's description of modern law most often divorces 
it from any normative foundation, curiously he also saw the law as 
the secular embodiment of the moral-practical consciousness of 
Protestantism. Modern law, Weber argued, is the institutionalization 
of the Protestant notion of calling, it provides for the secular 
anchoring of the structures of moral consciousness. This description 
of law is inconsistent with Weber's claim that law is intrinsically 
strategically rational. If Weber is to maintain his thesis that 
Protestantism leads to the expansion of capitalism and the 
establishment of strategically determined modern law, he must give 
up the claim that a commitment to Protestantism involves a form of 
religious morality. If Protestantism is viewed as having a moral-
practical intent, its secular institutionalization in law would reflect its 
moral nature. This does not mean that modern law would not lead to 
the expansion of capitalism. It does mean, however, that its 
establishment is at least to some extent morally motivated by the 
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ethical demands of Protestantism. Given this moral motivation, both 
particular laws and the legal system in general must be morally 
justified. Such justification is necessarily normative, not strategic. 
Weber's empiricist reconstruction of the law leaves no room for its 
normative justification and contradicts his claim that it embodies the 
ethical thrust of Protestantism. 
Habermas argues that there 1s an additional incoherence in 
Weber's understanding of mod~rn law. As law evolves, it takes on 
its specifically modern shape, which Weber argued was a shape 
characterized first,by an increased positivity which relies on a 
legislated authority supported by a judiciary, second,by an increased 
legalism which regulates behaviors rather than. addressing the 
morality of motives, and third,by an increased formality which 
proscribes what cannot be done, not what should be done. 14 As 
these features of modern law become more pronounced, Habermas 
claims that the legal sphere becomes more and more detached from 
the authority of traditions. This detachment from traditions means 
· that an autonomous foundation must be provided in order to ground 
the normative validity of the legal sphere. According to Habermas, 
only at the postconventional level of moral consciousness is such a 
foundation possible. 
Moral consciousness can satisfy such a 
requirement only at the 
postconventional level. It is here that 
there first emerges the idea that legal 
norms are in principle open to criticism 
and in need of justification; the 
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distinction between norms and 
principles of action; the concept of 
producing norms according to principles; 
the notion of rational agreement on 
normatively binding rules(as well as that 
of a compact that first makes contractual 
relations possible); the insight into the 
connection be~ween the universality and 
justifiability of legal norms; the concept 
of the abstract legal subject's general 
competency, that of the law-giving 
power of subjectivity; and so forth. 15 
Once the legal sphere is separated out from the religious sphere or 
even from ethical claims that are based and defended by traditions, 
the entire legal sphere requires a justification which does not rely on 
the authority of a church, of custom or, if the law is understood to 
apply to all equally, on domination. 
In his discussions of natural law theory, Weber seems to 
suggest that this need for justification can be satisfied by appealing 
to a notion of legality. If a law comes about through legitimate 
procedures, then it can be considered to be legitimate, for it is the 
correctness of the procedure enacted the law which confers its 
legitimacy. As Habermas points out, this is not a very happy 
argument as it is definitely circular: "The belief in legality can 
produce legitimacy only if we already presuppose the legitimacy of 
the legal order that lays down what is legal." 16 Belief in the legality 
of a law is simply not enough to satisfy a demand for legitimacy. 
Weber thought habit or custom supplied the lack, like many of the 
things that we do habitually for long forgotten reasons. With this 
argument,however, the possibility for justification of laws disappears 
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like a rabbit in a wizard's hat. 
This critique of Weber's characterization of modern law 1s 
crucial for Habermas's reevaluation of the moral potential of 
modernity. At the heart of his critical appropriation of Weber's 
theory of modernity is the claim that though the modern spheres of 
the legal and the moral are distinct, nonetheless, "the law must be 
complemented by a morality grounded on principles." 17 Thus the 
evolution of modern law also involves the evolution of a moral-
practical rationality characterized by the ability to offer, to 
understand, and to be guided by abstract and universal principles. It 
is only when Weber's theory of social rationalization is recast in 
terms of a communicative model of rationality that the moral 
underpinnings of modern law appear. Social institutions and 
interactions can only be adequately comprehended if their normative 
bases are recognized and reconstructed, and Habermas argues that 
these norms are to be found embedded in language which is the 
medium of all social action. 
While Weber, Adorno, and Horkheimer share an unrelentingly 
negative view of modernity, Habermas's is more sanguine, though in 
no sense naive. Habermas locates norms in the structure of linguistic 
interaction and derives a communicative ethic from an analysis of 
these norms, but never forgets that both moral consciousness and 
legal institutions in which norms are embedded are open to change 
and are fragile; the autonomy of the moral is never completely 
secure and might at any time be co-opted by the encroachment of 
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money, power, or bureaucracy. In order to better describe the 
multiple spheres of reality of the modern world, Habermas replaces 
Weber's model of strategic action with a theoretical framework 
integrating Piaget's genetic structuralism with a communicative 
model of action. Considered in this light the process of the 
disenchantment of the world 
can be seen as structurally parallel to 
the shift which Piaget observed rn 
children from an "egocentric" 
consciousness to a "decentered 11 one. 
Disenchantment thus signifies a 
breakdown of a II sociocentric 11 
consciousness of a seamless magical-
mythical world and the construction of a 
decentered consciousness which 
recognizes clear demarcations between 
the natural, social and subjective worlds. 
The demarcation of formal world 
concepts also means increasing 
recognition of the differentiated system 
of validity claims corresponding to the 
three worlds. I 8 
The modern world that Habermas describes is multi-dimensional and 
complex. It is a world unlike mythical or religious worlds in that no 
single paradigm can render it meaningful. While Weber saw the lack 
of a theoretically and practically unified world as an ironic tragedy, 
Habermas views the process of the differentiation of spheres, 
particularly those of law and of morality, and the cognitive 
structures they reflect, as having an emancipatory potential. 
The potential for emancipation is rooted in the increased 
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reflexivity of social and political norms. At one point in time, the 
authority of religion or myth could be appealed to in support of a 
normative claim. When these traditional sources of authority are 
vacated, other grounds for asserting the truth or rightness of a claim 
must be found. Modernity's disentangling of the three worlds of the 
natural, the social and the subjective forces us to determine to which 
world the claim corresponds, and then to seek to substantiate the 
claim with the criteria appropriate for that world. Part of what the 
learning process which results from the increased rationalization of 
the world involves is the ability to recognize that empirical questions 
about the way the world is are answered by an appeal to an ideal of 
scientific truth; questions about the social world must be answered 
by appeals to an intersubjectively legitimated and rationally argued 
set of norms; and questions about the character of individuals must 
be answered by references to the sincerity and the authenticity of 
self-presentation demonstrated in past and future behaviors. The 
collapse of a monolithic world view and the distinction of different 
spheres with different value systems which the process of 
rationalization brings about allows for a greater reflexivity and, 
Habermas argues, an enhancement of individual and social learning 
processes. 
It does this because it provides actors 
with the .conceptual means of 
constructing a reflexive or self-critical 
perspective; that is, the "categorial 
scaffolding" constituted by the system of 
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three world relations and corresponding 
validity claims makes possible an 
articulated consideration and evaluation 
of alternative interpretations of what is 
the case, what is legitimate and what is 
authentic self-expression. It is this 
complex, multidimensional learning 
potential of modernity that Habermas 
wants to emphasize, not just the 
mastering of formal, operational modes 
of cognition, leading to the capacity to do 
science and technology_ 19 
By expanding Weber's concept of rationalization so that it includes 
moral development as well as technological advances, Habermas can 
argue that the evolution of modern societies involves a series of 
learning processes which lead to the institutionalization of a 
rationally grounded notion of law and an increased potential for 
post-conventional moral thinking. 
In sections two and three I will specify what Habermas means 
by post-conventional morality, as well as taking up the question of 
how this morality shapes Habermas's concept of justice. In this 
section, I have attempted only to show how, by returning to Weber's 
theory of rationalization and re-working it, Habermas has opened up 
the possibility that the process of rationalization brings advances in 
the moral-practical realm as well as in the scientific realm. In his 
description, the rationalization of modernity can be thought of as "a 
bidimensional learning process (cognitive/technical and 
moral/practical) the stages of which can be described structurally 
and ordered according to a developmental logic."20 While modern 
societies carry with them the potential for realizing a more rational 
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and thus more moral social order ,21 that potential must be realized 
by individuals in their private lives as well as institutionalized in 
law, state administration, and politics. Habermas is very aware that 
there are enormous obstacles to be overcome in order for modernity 
to realize its moral potenti_al. These arise not so much from the fact 
that we are, as Kant thought, a race of devils, but rather because the 
subsystems of money and power are often on a collision course with 
the ideals of emancipation. In order for morality to remain 
autonomous, it must be freed from the functional imperatives of the 
social subsystems steered in the direction of increasing the wealth 
and power of an economic and political elite. The more .the demands 
of the market determine social policy, the more unlikely it is that 
these policies will reflect the generalizable interests which are the 
mark of justice.22 
A complete exposition of Habermas's complex analysis of the 
tendency of the modern state to be exclusively motivated by the 
need to secure the conditions necessary for continued economic 
growth would be a dissertation in itself and will not be undertaken 
here. What can be noted here is his diagnosis that the modern 
industrial states' effort to secure continued growth, while at the same 
time legitimating its economic. policies in the language of a universal 
justice, forces the state to administratively intervene in the lifeworld. 
Political decisions, uncoupled from moral practical considerations, are 
then recast in a non-political language and are presented as 
essentially technical issues, best dealt with by a league of "experts," 
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whom Weber so memorably referred to as "Specialists without 
spirit. "23 These administrative incursions prompted by the economic 
or administrative crises of the welfare state become more frequent 
and more extensive; the distinction between public and private 
constantly shifts and the bureaucratic arm of the state grows longer. 
While state intervention is not necessarily undesirable, when the 
public perceives the government as an entity over which they have 
little control, and as a bureaucracy not responsive to its perception of 
its needs, its increasing presence is often felt to be oppressive and 
the public's alienation from it increases. Habermas recognizes that 
while there is no easy solution to the problems which face the 
modern welfare state, a re-working of the ideal of participatory 
democracy and its attendant notion of justice is essential if we are 
not to give way to a political nihilism. In pointing to the lopsided 
development of rationality which favored technological advance and 
neglected the potential for the institutionalization of higher forms of 
morality, Habermas points to the basis for a hope that the modern 
state can be not only technically proficient, but morally legitimate as 
well. 
B. Habermas' Theory of Moral Development: Kohlberg and Mead 
Obviously, much rests on Habermas's ethics., on what he means 
by morality at the personal as well as as the social level. I now 
examine Habermas's theory of the individual's social and moral 
development, returning to the question of how morality is socially 
institutionalized in the final section of this chapter. In the preceding 
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section, I argued that Habermas's reconstruction of Weber's theory of 
rationality is part of a massive theoretical undertaking ·which, if 
successful, will lend credence to the argument that the legitimacy of 
moral-practical claims can be grounded in a theory of communicative 
rationality. He argues that the social evolution of the West includes 
developments in moral thinking; just as individuals progress through 
cognitive stages, moving from less adequate to more adequate ways 
of moral thinking and acting, so too societies embody different levels 
of moral thinking in their political institutions and in the 
intersubjective relations that typify the general level of their moral 
development. In this section I will take up Habermas's claim that 
the evolution of morality is essentially linked to communicative 
action governed by intersubjectively constituted and recognized 
norms. I will then consider his view that the norms operative in a 
society, and the way they are justified, can be used as a measure for 
assessing the general moral level achieved by any given society. 
Habermas must first persuade us that moral development is 
essentially social. that social interaction and role-taking skills are 
essential for the evolution of a sense of self and an awareness of 
others. Obviously he must also be able to persuade us that the 
criteria he uses to assess the moral competence of an individual, or 
the general level of moral development of a society as a whole, do 
not merely reflect a white male, Western preoccupation with 
rationality and are not merely the ethnocentric formulations of an 
heir to that specific and dominant tradition. 
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Habermas's argument must convince us that moral thinking is 
marked by a progression through stages which reflect ever more 
adequate moral thought and are truly universally valid, i.e., valid for 
individuals in all cultures. In addition, Habermas must persuade us 
that morality and the conception of rationality as abstract thought 
favored since Plato are essentially related. In the Kohlberg section of 
this chapter, , will take up specific questions about the i·nternal logic 
of moral stage theories and consider as well problems encountered 
by theories which focus exclusively on moral thinking and exclude 
concepts of moral feeling and character from their characterization of 
morality. Before turning to these questions, however, it is important 
to take up the question of the social component of the development 
of the moral self. 
1. Mead's Theory of the Social Formation of Identity 
Habermas's theory of moral identity is, in part, the result of his 
critical appropriation of Mead's account of the intersubjective 
constitution of self-identity. Habermas's rereads Mead through the 
linguistic lens of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, a philosophical 
viewpoint with which Mead would have felt comfortable, 
emphasizing as it does language as the medium of socialization. 
Habermas's linguistic turn, as it has been called, signifies a break 
with philosophies of consciousness which, from Augustine on, have 
focused on the intellectual and spiritual attributes of the individual. 
Juxtaposed to this intellectual self has been a physical self that acts 
by appropriating the natural world and re-fashioning it to suit 
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convemence or to satisfy an aesthetic impulse. Habermas maintains 
that neither the technical or the aesthetic model of appropriation 
adequately captures the significance of social interaction which 
requires us to step outside the. model of the monological self and 
recognize that not only our identities, but our cognitive capacities, 
including those relevant to moral decision making, are socially 
constituted. We are not first individuals and then social agents who 
relate to others; personal identity is es sen ti ally social identity and 
thus the constitution of the self is concomitant with the establishment 
of relationships in the context of a shared lifeworld. Habermas shares 
Mead's belief that we become an I through social interaction or, as 
Benhabib puts it, "The philosophy of consciousness puts the cart 
before the horse: it attempts to ground sociation (Vergesellschaftung) 
on individuation, whereas individuation proceeds under conditions of 
sociation alone. "24 
Mead reconstructs the structures of consciousness by analyzing 
first the symbolically and then the linguistically mediated interaction 
of individuals. Language, Mead argues (as does Habermas), is the 
medium of the socialization of individuals. We come to understand 
our selves and others through language, and it is language which 
coordinates social activity. Mead traces the evolution of linguistic 
interaction, beginning with an analysis of the use of gestures and 
ending with an account of symbolically mediated interaction. The 
account of Mead which follows will focus on its significance for 
Habermas's theory of communicative action. 
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Habermas is interested in Mead's work for several reasons, 
most importantly, however, because of Mead's insistence that the self 
is formed not only in a web of social relations, but throu2h a 
relationship with other selves. Our interpretive systems, our use of 
language, our socially constructed notion of what it means to be a self, 
and our customs and values all point to the intrinsically 
intersubjective character of identity formation. We become who we 
are through the process of learning to take up roles, especially by 
taking up the role of what Mead calls the generalized other. The 
generalized other is an abstract self that we learn to construct as we 
interact with specific others based on what we learn to be the 
distillation of what is essentially human. We learn to understand the 
beliefs and claims of others by reconstructing an already socially 
constructed world from the perspective of a neutral observer, 
distancing ourselves from our particularity m an attempt to see the 
world from a more universal perspective. 
Mead's analysis moves from the beginnings of language in 
gestures to the employment of a grammatically complete language. 
As language evolves, so too do complex social roles and contexts 
which require that both speaker and hearer, or ego and alter, 
understand not only the meaning of words, but also the social context 
in which the meaning of utterances are embedded. Gestures become 
symbols as they are transformed from having merely a particular 
meaning for a single individual to having a meaning which both 
participants in a conversation share. Responses are no longer 
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automatic reacti~ns to stimulus, but are the result of communicating 
in a way that can be understood by both , or, as Habermas puts it, 
reflect the communicative intent of both speaker and hearer, ego and 
alter. The transition to symbolically-mediated interaction makes it 
possible for participants in conversation to "take up the attitude of 
the other" in the sense of anticipating that the hearer will share the 
speaker's understanding of the meaning of the gestures or words 
used. Communicative partners view each other as social beings who 
have acquired the competence required for understanding the 
meaning of words and the rules for linguistic interaction, and who 
have mastered a complicated set of actions and reactions. 
In order to grasp what this means, one need only think of a 
small child playing at speaking on the telephone, alternatively taking 
up the role of speaker and hearer. In order for the child to play out a 
telephone conversation, he or she must have more or less mastered 
th~ turn-taking a conversation requires, must have some grasp that, 
in order to find out something from the other, one must ask a 
question and then allow for the question to be answered_ and. Even 
by the age of two or so, if one listens to a child play telephone, the 
extent to which she or he observes the conventional etiquette of 
telephoning is astonishing. Even a young child grasps that typical 
telephone conversations are begun with the initiator of the call 
speaking first, issuing a greeting of some sort, and ended by either of 
the conversants with some kind of socially recognized closing. At a 
certain level of development, the child will also be able to take up the 
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position of an observer, relating to a· playmate the content of the 
telephone exchange, while maintaining an identity distinct from the 
two fictitious characters, or, to put it in Habermas's idiom, the child at 
this point is able to take up the role of "the neuter." Obviously, the 
abilities displayed by children in their games of telephone are the 
rudimentary skills needed to actually engage in successful 
conversations. 
Mead and Habermas do not claim that the social skills they 
describe are the only ones necessary for a child to play telephone. 
There are also essential cognitive skills which a child must have 
mastered in addition to the social skills involved in role taking. In 
order to use language effectively, the child must have learned at least 
some part of an objective meaning structure which assures that their 
use of language is a socially shared use, i.e., which assures that they 
are speaking a form of the language which meets at least minimal 
standardization requirements necessary to speak in a way that can be 
generally understood. While acknowledging the extensive cognitive 
structures that successful language use involves, Mead and Habermas 
are more interested in the the relation of language acquisition to the 
constitution of an intersubjectively defined self than they are in the 
cognitive mechanics involved in learning how objects, concepts and 
words are related. That is, they focus their attention on the 
intersubjective context in which the cognitive ability to relate words 
to objects, and to connect objects with ideas, takes place. 
It is in a world of multiple selves that egos are formed as the 
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child recognizes the boundaries between the self,the other, and the 
world. The developing child learns to take up the attitude of the 
other, understanding this other to be a member of a social group who 
understands and uses language m the context of that group. The 
meaning of the other's utterances must be interpreted through the 
social context to which the meaning of his or her utterances are tied. 
The child learns to expect that the other will respond to a situation in 
a particular way, not because it is simply customary that he or she do 
so, but because they ought to respond in a particular way. We learn 
to attach significance not only to what is said, but to who says it 
because there are social roles which confer the right upon the 
individuals who hold them to demand certain kinds of behavior. 
Learning to understand, to use, and to respond to language requires 
not only the ability to decipher the meaning of words, and the 
behavior which these words call for, but it also means learning how to 
recognize and take up social roles. These roles range from the 
already quite compJex speaker-hearer roles which we alternatively 
take up in conversation, to the nuanced roles affected by social 
rankings based on legal status, power, prestige, class, force, racial 
distinctions, gender roles and so forth. 
This ability to take up and recognize social roles is essential to 
Mead's theory of identity formation and is at the center of his theory 
of language. Habermas notes that Mead's principal concern is with 
the role playing crucial for identity formation, especially to the extent 
that mastering social roles and engaging in social discourse involves 
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recognizing and putting forward normative claims. Furthermore, as a 
competent social being, one is expected to recognize the basis for the 
legitimacy of normative claims and to be ready to defend any 
normative claims that one raises. In early stages of development, 
children learn to obey their caretakers because it fulfills a pattern of 
mutual expectation along the lines of "I'll scratch your back and you 
scratch mine." Eventually, the child comes to recognize that both 
caretaker and child are acting in the context of a socially defined 
relationship which to some extent dictates the behaviors of those 
involved. That is to say, actions in a relationship are seen as 
complimentary, and as socially determined. The caretaker expects 
certain behavior from a child and the child eventually learns that 
these expectations can be discovered by taking up the attitude of the 
other towards him or herself. It is also in the course of this process 
that children learn to articulate their desires and interpret their 
needs. Children learn what it means to want something as well as 
learning to express their desires to those who might be in a position 
to fulfill them. 
The relationship between adult and child is not an equal one. 
Caretakers are in a position of authority and children in one of 
dependence. As the child comes to be aware of a generalized set of 
expectations that define caretaker-child roles, the child also comes to 
see that the sanctions which accompany failing to meet the 
expectations of the caretaker are also generalized. The child learns to 
think of the caretaker as a parent or guardian whose actions can be 
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understood as appropriate to the role of a caretaker or guardian. The 
child learns to internalize these socially generalized sanctions, as 
Freud and Mead both realized : 
these patterns of behavior become 
detached from the content-bound 
intentions and speech acts of individuals 
persons and take on the external shape 
of social norms insofar as the sanctions 
connected with them are internalized 
through taking the attitude of the other, 
that is to say, to the degree that they 
are taken into the personality and 
thereby rendered independent of the 
sanctioning power of concrete reference 
persons.2 5 
In other words, we first learn to fulfill the demands of another 
because they have the authority to invoke sanctions against us if we 
do not fulfill their demands. At a later stage, we come to have a 
sense of the normative quality of the relationship between adults and 
the children in their care and come to recognize that these roles are at 
least in part, socially defined. Having recognized this, we are 
eventually able to imaginatively switch sides, to analyze the 
caretaker's behavior, first from the perspective of a child in a socially 
prescribed relationship, and then imaginatively take up the attitude 
of the adult toward the child (children learn to play that they are 
their caretakers and they address themselves as such). 
Following Mead, Habermas argues that is is only when children 
extend the potential of their role taking skills to include all members 
of a social group that they can be said to have truly grasped the 
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concept of a socially generalized pattern of behavior. It is only then 
that a child is capable of taking up the position Mead calls the 
generalized other. Taking up the role of the generalized other 
requires children not only to take up the perspective of other 
participants, but also to objectify the reciprocal interconnections 
among them by taking up the role of an uninvolved observer. 
It is only when a child is able to take up the position of the 
generalized other that he or she can begin to grasp the 
intersubjectively grounded character of norms and their affect on 
behavior and to realize that social roles involve normative 
expectations about behavior. In the course of learning that there are 
generalized expectations which define social roles, children come to 
understand that behaviors are socially regulated and involve socially 
shared norms which delimit what is acceptable in our r~lationships 
with others. As we mature socially and morally, we come to see that 
norms represent the collective will of a group, and when we comply 
with a norm because we think it legitimate, we in effect subordinate 
our will to that of the social collective, accepting that the validity of 
norms is collectively decided. As we come to understand the public 
nature of norms, we view a failure to heed a norm as a violation not 
only the interest of the persons directly affected, but of the interest 
of the social group as a whole because norms reflect the generalized 
interests of the group and thus transgressing a norm negatively 
affects the group. 
Though recognizing social norms and acting in accordance with 
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them is part of what is involved in adopting a moral point of view, it 
is not the whole of it. So far, I have emphasized the complicated 
cognitive process involved in role taking which leads to the ability to 
take up the attitude of a generalized other. In taking up the attitude 
of the generalized other, morally mature actors consider norms, not in 
relation to particular individuals who are invested with some 
-
authority, but rather as derived from "the sanctioning power of the 
group as a norm-giving entity. "26 Thus the legitimacy of norms is 
now seen to be derived from the sanctioning power of the group. At 
this stage, there is no way to question the rightness of these socially 
derived and validated norms, they are experienced as legitimate 
merely because of the authority of the social group which 
promulgates them. When norms are successfully internalized in the 
process of taking up the role of the generalized other, the right to 
sanction is replaced by the individual's assent that the norm is 
legitimate. This assent is not yet the "yes" of a criticizable validity 
claim. It is only when the power of tradition weakens that 
individuals can step back from the traditions and norms which 
prevail m their society and question the legitimacy of a norm. 
Only when the power of tradition is broken to 
the extent that the legitimacy of existing 
orders can be viewed in the light of 
hypothetical alternatives do the members of a 
group dependent on cooperation, that is, on 
comm.on efforts to attain collective goals, ask 
themselves whether the norms in question 
regulate the choices of members in such a 
way that everyone of them "can see his 
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interests protected.2 7 
The morally mature agent has learned to adopt multiple roles and can 
take part in normatively regulated interaction. He or she has 
comprehended the structure of social institutions and recognizes that 
norms are embedded in institutions to regulate and coordinate 
actions in the interests of the community. Morally mature individuals 
~ challenge the legitimacy of a given norm , but this is only possible 
because they know what an institution is and because they can orient 
their actions to validity claims. In short, in order to question a norm, 
to claim, for example, that a particular law is unfair, we must already 
understand the institution of law, the criteria by which we determine 
laws are legitimate, and, most importantly, recognize that there are 
conditions which must be met if a norm is to be legitimate. 
Grasping the concept of normativity involves cognit~ve ability, 
but equally essential is the process of identity formation and the 
structuring of behavioral dispositions. As we have seen, the process 
of becoming an 'I' is a socially mediated one, very much affected not 
only by the ·internalization of specific norms, but by a general 
recognition that norms are a certain kind of claim requiring a specific 
kind of warrant. Relying on Freudian categories, Habermas argues 
that the internalization of social roles results in "an integrated 
superego structure which enables the actor to orient himself to 
normative validity claims. "28 The generation of such an 'I' involves 
the ability to step back and view oneself and one's action with the 
attitude of an other. Children also eventually learn that they alone 
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have access to an interior domain of thought, imagination, feeling, etc. 
that they come to recognize as the subjective world which 
differentiates their identity from those of other people. Grasping the 
idea of normativity includes recognizing that norms can or perhaps 
should motivate particular behaviors. Habermas describes the 
process whereby behavior comes to be normatively regulated in the 
following terms: 
The transition from symbolically 
mediated to normatively regulated 
interaction means not only a transfer to 
a modally differentiated way of 
reaching understanding, and not only 
the construction of a social world; it also 
means that motives for action are 
symbolically restructured. From the 
standpoint of socialization this side of 
the process of socialization presents 
itself as the development of an 
identity .29 
Children develop internal behavioral rules by taking up the 
normative expectations of, first, their primary caretakers and, then, 
the general norms of the social group in which they are raised. It is 
only after children have internalized conventional norms that they 
can begi,n to question the validity of those norms using universalistic 
criteria. 
Having explored and accepted much of Mead's argument about 
identity formation and th~ recognition of normativity in general, 
Habermas turns to Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of the 





2. Habermas and Kohlberg --"The Moral Point of View" 
Habermas turns from Mead to Kohlberg in search of an account 
of moral development that more specifically describes how and why 
at some point we demand _the justification of social norms which at an 
earlier moral stage we accepted as de facto legitimate. Influenced by 
Mead's theory of ideal role-taking, Kohlberg incorporates the idea of 
taking the attitude of the other (or, as he came to refer to it, the 
ability to play moral musical chairs) into a stage theory of moral 
judgment. Though Habermas' discourse theory is quite different from 
Kohlberg's (more so than Habermas sometimes seems to think, as I 
will argue in some detail in Chapters Two and Four), Habermas argues 
that Kohlberg's empirical research and the psychological theory of 
moral reasoning which his work offers, can be used as an indirect 
validation of his philosophical analysis of norms. 
For Habermas, one of the most useful features of Kohlberg's 
work are the cross-cultural analyses that led Kohlberg to conclude 
that while the content of moral problems varies from culture to 
culture, the forms of moral judgment are universal and can be 
described by analyzing the logical structure of moral thinking at 
different stages of development. As Habermas notes in a strikingly 
direct way, if Kohlberg's claims can be maintained through further 
empirical scrutiny it will ease the task of the moral philosopher who 
is arguing against radical cultural relativism: 
the striking consonance between 
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psychological theory and normative 
theory boils down to this: Ethical 
universalism keeps running up against 
the stock charge that different cultures 
have different conceptions of morality. 
Now, Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development lends to opposing 
relativistic objections of this kind (a) by 
reducing the empirical diversity of 
extant moral views to a variance of 
content only (while the forms of moral 
judgment- are seen as universal) and (b) 
by explaining the remaining structural 
differences between moralities in terms 
of differential stages in the 
development of moral judgment.3 O 
Obviously, empirical evidence that indicates the presence of identical 
stages of moral thinking in all cultures, stages that can be identified 
and ordered hierarchically, would be a welcome verification that 
certain kinds of moral thinking are more adequate than others. This 
is a claim that Habermas and Kohlberg both want to make, though 
they designate different moral stages as highest. 
Despite this difference, Habermas argues that his and Kohlberg's 
understanding of the moral point view is essentially similar. He 
describes this similarity as a result of the fact that "all variants of 
cognitivist ethics take their bearings from Kant's categorical 
imperative. "31 This Kantian thrust that Habermas points to in 
Kohlberg's theory can be seen in his association of moral thinking 
with impartiality, universality, reversibility and prescriptivity. The 
presence of these features mean that Kohlberg's theory shares with 




universalism and formalism. What this technical description means 
in less technical language is that Habermas shares Kohlberg's view 
that the structure of moral thought can be identified in abstraction 
from any particular aim or conception of the good life. By identifying 
the structure of moral thinking in abstraction from its contents, 
Habermas and Kohlberg believe that they can isolate the criteria of 
what makes our reasoning moral; having done this, they can then 
determine that correct moral judgments will be those which can be 
agreed upon by all as free and equal moral beings, whatever personal 
feelings or beliefs we might have about what constitutes the good life. 
Having separated the content of judgments from the forms of 
reasoning about those judgments, we can use the structure of the 
judgment to determine whether the reasoning is moral or not. 
This kind of moral thinking is formal because it shifts the 
burden of the moral from the content of judgment to the form of the 
judgment, i.e., the cognitive structures involved in the process of 
reasoning. It is a cognitivist position because it holds that moral 
conflicts can be resolved through argument, which is viewed as a 
cognitive and interactive skill acquired through a developmental 
process marked by successive levels of competence. The 
universalistic flavor of the theory lies in its claims that the form of 
moral reasoning at the same stage in any culture is identical, i.e., that 
there are criteria for moral reasoning which hold universally. 
Despite the differences in Kohlberg's and Habermas's models of 
ethics, both hold the highest stage of moral interaction to be the point 
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at which persons cease to accept social norms as moral givens and 
begin to seek universal principals that could serve as moral 
justifications for them. Like Kohlberg, Habermas argues that the 
achievement of principled morality is the achievement of a justice 
orientation, though for Habermas this is achieved through discourse, a 
step he sees as an advance over Kohlberg's model. Both Habermas 
and Kohlberg employ a normative analysis of ego formation and both 
argue that adolescent identity crises are solved successfully only 
when they are resolved in the direction of postconventional morality. 
Though Habermas emphasizes the role of social interaction in this 
process more than Kohlberg does, both agree that the move toward 
postconventional morality involves a psychological process of 
detachment from the norms, values and affective ties of the family or 
peer group, and then from the conventionally regulated roles learned 
as one negotiated one's way into the larger social world. According to 
both Habermas's and Kohlberg's ethical theories, the individual 
successfully navigates his or her way to a new set of norms by 
recognizing that norms must be justified by universal principles. 
Those individuals who do not come to this recognition fall back into 
accepting norms as cultural givens and, according to Habermas and 
Kohlberg, fail to achieve the most desirable level of normative 
reasoning. 
Kohlberg's description of his moral stages, particularly the post-
conventional ones, as "hard" in the Piagetian sense has been 
challenged. The criticisms raised rest on several pieces of troubling 
Ii-
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evidence. First, it has been more diffi~ult to find subjects testing at 
stage five and six than it has subjects testing at an earlier stage, and 
some critics have used this lack to argue that there just is not enough 
empirical evidence to prove the existence of these two stages. 32 Some 
research has also indicated that, over time, subjects in these later 
stages show signs of regression, which contradicts one of Piaget's 
"hard stage" criteria.33 In addition, as Habermas has pointed out, 
Kohlberg's later stages seem to require that the moral subject engage 
in a kind of self-reflection which also contradicts Piaget's description 
of a hard stage. Habermas suggests that the later stages seem to owe 
a substantial debt to the philosophical or moral climate in which they 
are found and thus cannot be claimed to be generated solely in the 
process of cognitive problem solving.3 4 This criticism is one that 
Kohlberg claims to have accepted in his last writings, and it is 
important because it speaks for that interdependence of 
philosophical, sociological, or psychological theories which Habermas 
espouses. While Kohlberg cannot correctly claim to derive is from 
ought, neither can philosophers argue for an ought without pointing 
to an is; that is, they need empirical support for their theories of the 
kind which psychological or sociological research can sometimes 
provide. It follows from this dependence.that when philosophical 
theories conflict with psychological or sociological data, they must be 
reevaluated in light of that data. 
Kohlberg has come to accept Habermas's description of moral 
psychology as ·a reconstructive science which must be complemented 
-
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by philosophical arguments in order to produce a comprehensive 
theory of morality. He rejects, however, Habermas's reworking of his 
moral stages, arguing that Habermas over-emphasizes the role of 
social perspective-taking to such a degree that he reduces the "justice 
operations of our moral structures"35 to social-perspective taking, 
thus minimizing the cognitive operations themselves. Certainly 
·Habermas does emphasize the relationship between individuals and 
the ways they differ at various moral stages. It is clear that, in 
adopting Mead's concept of ideal role-taking, Habermas is insisting 
that morality is essentially linked to an ability to take up the role of 
the generalized other, which obviously includes taking up a social 
perspective. I think Kohlberg's criticism is off-base, however, for it 
fails to account for Habermas's insistence that the ability to take up 
and act out different social roles involves not only social skills but 
equally essential cognitive developments, including those necessary 
for the _increasingly abstract reasoning involved in moral thinking. 
Habermas makes this point explicitly when he argues that the 
cognitive skills involved in the social roles individuals take up at 
different stages of social and moral development can be formally 
assessed using the criterion of (a) reflexivity, (b) abstraction and 
differentiation and (c) generalization. He concludes this argument 
with a direct reference to Piaget's stage theory writing, "This provides 
initial grounds for the conjecture that a deeper analysis could identify 
a developmental-logical pattern in Piaget's sense. "36 I do think there 
is a tension between Kohlberg's and Habermas's position, but it is not 
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because Habermas does not want to recogmze structurally 
differentiated stages of moral thinking; rather it is because Kohlberg, 
despite his insistence that moral development is an intersubjective 
affair, almost exclusively emphasizes the cognitive aspects of moral 
development without really succeeding in depicting the social 
moment of moral development. 
In keeping with Kohlberg's reluctance to assign a truly 
significant role to the social processes involved in the formation of a 
moral self, he rejected an early suggestion made by Habermas in 
Communication and the Evolution of Society to the effect that a 
seventh stage beyond Kohlberg's sixth stage can be conceived where 
individuals no longer test the universalizability of norms, 
monologically, but where interests are debated and interpretations of 
needs are argued about, a stage where public discourse becomes the 
crucible in which we come to define our selves, our needs and our 
dreams. With this vision, Habermas is moving beyond Kohlberg's 
notion of moral reasoning in an attempt to connect the realm of moral 
discourse to that of social norms. Kohlberg agrees that most post-
conventional forms of moral reasoning cannot be explained without 
moving beyond isolated individuals to a discussion of how norms are 
justified in the public sphere. He draws back, however, from the task 
which he himself recognized as necessary when he says, "we believe 
that Habermas's derivation of a Stage 7 of justice reasoning 1s 
unnecessary since we understand our conception of Stage 6 as being 
consistent with his writing. "37 In an attempt to persuade his readers 
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that Habermas. has simply misunderstood the significance of a 
Kohlbergian stage six, he claims that, in his article "Justice as 
Reversibility," he introduced the notion of what he called "moral 
musical chairs," the notion that the claims of morality are universal 
claims so that what is right for you must be right for me and 
everyone else and vice versa. Kohlberg claims that this notion is 
"compatible" with Habermas's notion of discourse. 
In fact, Kohlberg is quite wrong to see his monadological process 
of moral musical chairs to be in any significant way akin to a theory 
of ethics which insists that even the process of one's identity 
formation, the process of coming to know and recognize one's needs, 
takes place in a social context of normative struggle. Unlike 
Habermas's discourse ethics, where identity, normativity and politics 
are united in the process of _discourse, there is no element of 
Kohlberg's work that involves the recognition that the formation of 
self-identity is a social process whereby we come to learn what it 
means to be a self in the context of social interaction: there is no sign 
that this sometimes has to be accomplished in a context of a social 
struggle, where the "right" definition of a claimed identity is 
contested, where members of a group search for a collective identity 
which can be used to forge powerful political bonds, while those 
outside a given group wish to identify it for the purposes of 
convincing the majority that it is immoral, unjust, or dangerous. 
In the last fifty years, we have experienced many instances of 
this phenomenon: yet we often fail to recognize identity formation as 
I -
6 1 
the social process that it is. If one considers the social processes 
involved in identifying oneself as member of the working class, as a 
Marxist, as a patriot, as a woman, as a person of color, as gay or as a 
lesbian, as a liberal, as politically correct, as an environmentalist, or 
even as an intellectual, it. becomes clear that these definitions, 
whether imposed from without or taken up from within, are a ·large 
part of politics and an essential element of social movements. Why is 
it so easy to forget that our current identities are not natural kinds 
determined by biology, but are the fought for, often violent 
achievements of social movements and counter-movements? Perhaps 
it is because, as British social theorist Jeffery Weeks said in a recent 
interview, "Social movements notoriously have a poor sense of their 
own history because what's important to social movements is their 
sense of today."38 What one does not see, or even sense a feeling for 
in Kohlberg's theory, is an awareness of the considerable role the 
social and political sphere plays in the constitution of self-identity 
and the very real role of public discourse which can persuade us to 
recognize needs or to reject them as unacceptable, immoral or unjust. 
Despite Kohlberg's acknowledgement that the social world in which 
one lives affects the speed of one's moral development, or the level of 
morality one can attain, there is no room for the Habermasian 
appreciation that the social/political world is the constant, 
unfortunately often violent, context in which we come to define the 
moral. 
Despite this striking and important difference, Habermas 
-
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believes that at the core of his moral theory and that of Kohlberg 
there is an essential similarity. Kohlberg argues that the focus of 
moral theory should be the structure of justice reasoning; he delimits 
the scope of his theoretical research by what he considers to be the 
appropriate scope of moral theory. At the core of what he defines as 
morality is a deontological model of justice. In his now famous 
article, "From is to Ought," Kohlberg writes, "moral principals are 
cognitive structural forms of role taking, centrally organized justice as 
equality and reciprocity. "39 Habermas argues a similar point in the 
following passage from an essay in Moralbewusstsein and concludes 
that, in this regard, his theory and Kohlberg's are similar: 
Unless one operates with a strictly 
deontological notion of normative 
rightness or justice such as this (his 
discourse ethic), one cannot segregate, 
from the mass of practical issues, those 
questions that lend themselves to 
rational decision. Kohlberg's moral 
dilemmas fit this description.40 
He clearly believes that he needs to adopt a Kohlbergian justice 
model of reasoning in order to avoid falling into the pit of relativism, 
and his discourse ethics is an attempt to develop just such a 
deontological and, therefore, non-relative, moral theory. 
C. Discourse Ethics 
From his earliest works, Habermas has argued that the 
emancipatory potential which he identifies with modernity cannot be 
located in the advancements of technical reason alone, but lies as 
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well in the cumulative learning process of practical reason. Though 
he acknowledges with Weber and the early members of the 
Frankfurt School that the rationalization of the lifeworld brings with 
it a high price tag -- a lifeworld from which we are alienated because 
we experience it as meaningless and beyond our control he 1s 
more optimistic than they. His ultimate theoretical goal 1s to argue 
that the cognitive gains of modernity can be retained in the context 
of a truly emancipatory society. As I explained in section one above, 
Weber argued that modernity is synonymous with the spread of 
technical reason. It is this one-sided development of rationality and 
the retarded development of practical reason which Habermas 
argues must be corrected to make possible a way of life which is 
marked by its humanity. The advances of technical reason are not 
themselves necessarily a problem~ in fact, Habermas shares Marx's 
view that technology can be liberating by freeing us from drudgery 
and generally enhancing the quality of our lives. The 
dehumanization of the modern world is rather the result of the 
reifications and distortions of capitalism, the gobbling up of the 
public sphere of politics by the market and by administrative 
bureaucracies, and the relegation of the normative to issue·s of 
private taste or to questions answerable only by a technical elite. 
Seyla Benhabib describes Habermas's idea of a critical renewal of 
modernity in the following passage: 
r 
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It is the destructive dynamics of 
capitalism and not the rationalization of 
the lifeworld which must be reversed. 
The constituents of cultural modernity -
decentration, reflexivity, and the 
differentiation of value spheres - are 
binding criteria of rationality. The 
project of an emancipated society 
implies the fulfillment of 
communicative rationality, not its 
transfiguration: 41 
Habermas turns to an analysis of communication m his attempt 
to provide a philosophical grounding for his position that the claims 
of practical reason admit of truth and can be supported by argument. 
This analysis takes the form of a theory of communicative action and 
of discourse from which he attempts to derive a strategy for 
justifying norms that is based on universal principles inherent in 
communication. By combining the insights of social theorists with a 
pragmatic theory of language he attempts to provide a clarification of 
the criteria needed to determine the legitimacy of social norms. 
Turning first to our everyday communicative interactions, Habermas 
attempts to show that there are certain validity claims raised in the 
process of communicating which can serve as the basis for a general 
theory of normativity, which can in turn serve as the basis for a 
notion of justice. At the heart of his project, then, is a reconstruction 
of the normative claims embedded in communication. This 
reconstruction leads to an ethical theory which holds that the claims 
of practical reason can only be justified by offering reasons for them. 
Essential to Habermas's argument is his claim that the inherent 
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telos of communication, regardless of the way it can be abused and 
manipulated, is mutual understanding. As Habermas's analysis of · 
Mead revealed, learning to use and understand language is an 
intersubjectively acquired skill. In order for children to acquire that 
skill, they must recognize what it means to understand and to be 
understood. Learning to communicate means coming to recognize 
this goal intuitively, if not explicitly. We learn to distinguish 
reaching an agreement with others from manipulating them or being 
manipulated by them. Habermas analyzes the difference between 
the "original" use of language to reach understanding and other 
distorted forms of communication. He argues that the very 
possibility of social action rests on the intersubjectively constituted 
and recognized norms which come into play when we seek or reach 
an agreement with others about some problematized practical claim. 
Social action takes place, and is interpreted and understood, m 
a lifeworld shot through with norms. It is these norms which 
constitute the everyday backdrop against which individual actions 
take place. Habermas accepts Mead's insight that it is the normative 
structure of social roles which determines our motivations to act by 
shaping our identities, our expectations of ourselves, and of others. 
As he writes in Legitimation Crisis, "Motivations are shaped through 
the internalization of symbolically represented structures of 
expectation. "42 Though rejecting Durkheim's contention that the 
power of the normative must be derived from what a social 
collective accepts as the sacred, Habermas shares his belief that the 
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social world is always already normative. In a post-conventional 
social world, norms are backed by collective agreement about their 
validity. 
As we have seen, Habermas follows Weber in holding that 
modern consciousness is marked by a process of rationalization 
which leads to the differentiation of three spheres of values: the 
cognitive, the normative, and the expressive. These differentiations 
parallel the formal conceptual distinctions between the objective, the 
social and the subjective world; distinctions that are reflected in the 
kinds of claims we make. The process of cognitive development, on . 
the one hand, and .the psychological process of maturation, on the 
other, lead the modern subject to distinguish an objective world of 
things, a social world constituted by normative structures, and an 
inner world of self. In order to communicate successfully in a 
modern world, we must not only distinguish these three different 
worlds, but we must also associate with each the knowledge claim 
appropriate to it. We can, for instance, thematize claims about the 
objective world of external nature, we can raise questions about the 
legitimacy of the norms which constitute our shared social world, or 
we can seek to express the private world of our inner experiences. 
Any of these claims can be challenged, but they must be 
challenged according to the appropriate criteria. Claims about the 
external world must be challenged on the basis of their truth, claims 
about the social world on the basis -0f their rightness, and claims 
about the inner world of self on the basis of their sincerity. In order 
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to defend any one of these claims, we must be able to offer reasons 
for why they should be accepted. Claims made in reference to the 
first world, that is, the objective world, are based on knowledge of 
the empirically experienced world, and are paradigmatically 
expressed in the truth claims of science. These sorts of claims are 
resolvable through scientific debate which aims to produce consensus 
on the warrantability of the claims raised. Even in cases where the 
scientific community is divided on the merits of a specific empirical 
claim or the acceptability of an epistemological paradigm, the 
community typically agrees about the evidence which would be 
necessary to make a claim stick. As Fredrick Jameson points out m 
his introduction to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition, if there were 
not this shared belief about what it means to make a scientific claim, 
the study of alchemy, for example, would not be universally 
excluded from science curricula and someone like Immanuel 
Velikovsky would not be uniformly regarded by his scientist 
colleagues as an eccentric.4 3 
Habermas's point about the objective world is not that 
controversial; 44 few would dispute his argument that scientific claims 
admit of truth, and that the latter is determined in ongoing discourse 
in which the empirical world serves as a constant test of a theory's 
success. What is controversial is his view that the claims made about 
the inner world of the subject or about the social world of norms are 
analogous to, though not identical with, truth claims of science. The 
sincerity or the authenticity of a speaker's self-presentation is open 
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to our critical appraisal. For instance, should someone claim to be a 
sensitive, caring person and at the same time act in a way that belies 
this self-description, we can challenge their claim. We could argue, 
for example, that they must be lying to us, or possibly to themselves, 
and we can point to instances of callous and insensitive behavior to 
support our rejection of their self-description. 
Like claims about our experience of our subjectivity, normative 
claims can also be challenged, and reasons offered to establish their 
validity. When we make a normative claim, e.g. declaring the death 
penalty to be morally wrong, we learn to expect that there will be 
those who will demand an argument in support of that claim, 
because we have come to understand that moral claims require 
rational justification. Unlike matters of taste, moral claims can be 
and are disputed, and, in contemporary Western democracies, only 
certain kinds of reasons are considered acceptable for their defense. 
At the heart of Habermas's project is the clarification of the 
procedures employed in justifications of these normative claims. 
The discourse theory at which he arrives is not the result of the 
same type of empirical scientific analysis as is found in the natural 
sciences. It is what Habermas calls a "reconstructive theory:" 45that 
attempts to make explicit the intuitive knowledge of linguistically 
competent speakers, to transform a subject's unreflectively grasped 
know-how into a reflectively grasped know-that. When the 
competence that is reconstructed is common .to the human species, 
that is, if it "expresses a universal capacity," 46 the theory which 
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results has the status and scope of more traditional empirical 
theories. While acknowledging that there may be certain 
methodological difficulties with reconstructive theories, Habermas 
claims that their explanatory power is sufficient reason to pursue 
them. 
Reconstructing what is entailed in the recognition that language 
games involve raising and _redeeming validity claims according to 
different criteria provides Habermas with a framework for 
understanding the normative structure of communication. Among 
the interactive skills necessary for successful communication with 
others is the ability to assimilate norms which regulate behavior, 
delineate the obligations of social roles, stipulate what we can 
legitimately expect of others, and clarify the extent of our own moral 
obligation. Language not only serves as the medium through which 
these normative obligations are conveyed and justified; it is in 
learning how to speak with others, in learning how to exchange 
speaker and hearer positions, and in learning how the objective 
criteria of uninvolved observers must be applied to the claims of 
truth, truthfulness, or authenticity raised in the context of social 
interaction that we learn what norms are and what makes them 
legitimate. 
The general norms which are embedded in and regulating 
social interactions can be reconstructed to form the basis of a 
universal ethics which applies to any linguistic culture. It is not the 
specific language in which a claim is made that is important. What is 
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essential is the structure of the relationships between individuals 
that verbal interaction involves and the notion of social rightness 
that is reflected in what counts for us as a legitimate moral claim. At 
the crux of Habermas's argument is the insistence that raising and 
redeeming these claims involves competences which can be 
measured, and achievements which can be ranked without regard to 
the particularities of any given culture. This argument makes it 
possible to make claims such as, 11 genocide is wrong, 11 without a 
qualifying reference to the particular moral beliefs of a speaker or of 
his or her culture. Habermas argues that the content of moral 
disputes which are influenced by the vagaries of different cultures 
should not be the focus of the moral philosopher. Instead, the focus 
of moral discourse must be on the formal elements of that discourse, 
which includes the normatively regulated relationships between 
individuals in all social interactions. 
Habermas agrees with Kohlberg that adolescence is a time of 
crucial moral significance. It is during adolescence that we are 
inclined to call into question established standards of right and 
wrong. In my view, the real pathos of adolescent identity formation 
lies in the fact that during this period we not only question the 
legitimacy of norms but we also question our own values and those 
of the people we love, a time when we challenge the legitimacy of 
authority and the character of those who exercise it. Habermas 
holds this latter kind of questioning to be virtually impossible. 
Cultural values are, he argues, too basic to our self-understanding to 
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allow for the intellectual distancing which moral justification 
demands. They are too deeply embedded in the fabric of our lives to 
allow us to separate ourselves from them without the threat of ego 
disintegration. 
The process of seeking justification for norms can be 
accomplished quite dispassionately, whereas the questioning of 
values leads to a cataclysmic self-transformation; 
Cultural values, embodied in total life-
forms or total life-histories, pervade the 
fabric of communicative everyday life 
so thoroughly and are so important in 
shaping a person's life and in securing 
his identity as to make it impossible for 
him as an acting subject to distance 
himself from them. He can distance 
himself from institutions of his social 
world but not from values, at least not 
in the same way.47 
While recognizing that there are good reasons for Habermas's effort 
to distinguish norms from values (leaving for the moment the 
question of whether it can ultimately succeed or not), I would still 
argue that the storminess of adolescence springs from the painful 
reorganization of an independent identity which involves just the 
questioning of values which Habermas denies we can undertake. 
Perhaps he is right to say that one can not question every aspect of 
one's identity or call every value into question at the same time 
without the possibility of the disintegration of self. Indeed the high 
rate of adolescent suicides attest to the truth of his claim, but it also 
serves to indicate that adolescence involves something far more 
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painful than a dispassionate search for the universal principles which 
would justify norms. 
Although Habermas formulates his moral stages differently 
from those of Kohlberg, they both hold that principled morality is 
only achieved when a justice orientation is adopted. Both evaluate 
the process of moral character formation normatively and argue that 
adolescent moral crises are only successfully resolved when they are 
resolved in the direction of postconventional morality. This involves 
a psychological process of detachment from the norms, values, and 
affective ties of the realm of preconventional attachments, typically 
some version of a family unit, and then from the world of 
conventionally regulated social roles. According to Habermas, the 
ego successfully navigates its way to a new and more adequate 
understanding of morality by recognizing that what legitimates 
norms is that they can be justified through universal rational assent. 
They represent neither merely .the will of the individual or of a 
collective. The adolescent who fails to grasp this essential moral 
truth falls back into accepting norms as cultural givens, to be either 
habitually and thoughtlessly obeyed, or disregarded out of a 
cynicism springing from a recognition that rules grounded in mere 
convention may be broken without the murmur of conscience. 
Habermas draws his distinction between norms and values m 
an effort to defend a discourse theory of ethics which is universal, 
and thus is not partial to any particular version of the good life. The 
post-conventional moral level achieved by adolescents who resolve 
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their moral struggle by recogmzmg that valid norms must be based 
on universally applicable principles involves a strictly deontological 
reasoning about norms. These norms must be defended on the 
grounds of their intrinsic rightness and not because they bring about 
a the way of life that is desirable. Michael Sandel describes this kind 
of argument as follows: 
On the full deontological view, the 
primacy of justice describes not only a 
moral priority but also a privileged 
form of justification; the right is prior to 
the good not only in that its claims take 
precedence, but also in that its 
principles are independently derived. 
This means that, unlike other practical 
injunctions, principles of justice are 
justified in a way that does not depend 
on any particular vision of the good. To 
the contrary; given its independent 
status, the right constrains the good and 
sets its bounds.4 8 
Habermas adopts this deontological posture in an attempt to 
preserve the universality of his discourse ethic. An argument which 
can appeal to universally applicable principles is quite different than 
one which has to take into account the cultural specificity of values 
or affective attachments and the moral obligations which they create. 
Explaining the universalistic thrust of his moral theory, Habermas 
writes: 
an ethics is termed universalistic when 
it alleges that this ( or a similar) moral 
principle, far from reflecting the 
intuitions of a particular culture or 
epoch is valid universally. We must 
prove that our moral principle is not 
just a reflection of the prejudices of the 
adult, white, well-educated, male 
German of today.49 
Habermas describes post-conventional morality as involving 
the recognition that moral claims rest on justifiable universal 
principles. Usually these principles are part of the backdrop of daily 
life. It is only when a hypothetical attitude is introduced into the 
previously unquestioned given of our shared lifeworld and we begin 
to search for normative justification for ~eliefs that once seemed 
fixed that we begin to grasp the meaning of the ethical. As 
Habermas puts it, "the social world dissolves into so many 
conventions, all of which are rn need of justification. "50 It is only 
when the background consensus of our everyday beliefs is shaken by 
controversy and normal repair work cannot restore it to its usual 
rythmn that we must step outside our conventional form of 
communication. In such situations, Habermas argues, the only 
rational way to restore communication is to take up the disputed 
claim and settle it in an environment where the only force that 
counts is the rational force of the better argument. For Habermas, 
discourse represents a certain break 
with the normal context of interaction. 
Ideally it requires a "virtualization of 
the constraints of action" -- a putting 
out of play all motives except that of a 
willingness to come to a rationally 
grounded agreement and a 
"virtualization of validity claims" -- a 
willingness to suspend judgement as to 
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the existence of certain states of affairs 
(they may or may not be the case) or as 
to the rightness of certain norms (they 
may or may not be justified).5 1 
By turning to discourse Habermas believes we can neutralize 
irrelevant considerations in order to arrive fairly at a decision about 
the rightness of a questioned norm. In the discourse situation, the 
rightness of a norm is considered hypothetical and arguments must 
be advanced to support or deny its validity. Here only the strength 
of the better argument counts as decisive; we unpack the claims 
raised and evaluate them in terms of their normative rightness. 
Habermas uses the notion of an ideal discourse to illustrate 
what a collective rational decision about norms would involve.. On 
one level, like John. Rawls's original position, it is a thought 
experiment which allows us to isolate or neutralize factors which are 
irrelevant in a search for normative truth; on an other level, it is not 
a thought experiment at all. In fact, what distinguishes it from other 
deontological ethical theories is precisely Habermas's insistence that 
it is only through actual discourse about real issues between actually 
existing subjects that norms can be justified. One task of discourse 1s 
to distinguish those norms which express a generalizable interest, 
and thus admit of concensus, from interests and values which are 
express10ns of what particular individuals or groups believe to be 
essential to the good life. Habermas extrapolates a rule "U" for 
distinguishing universalizable normative claims from those that refer 
only to particular interests or values; 
76 
"U" works as a rule which puts to one 
side and eliminates all those concrete 
contents which are not generalizable 
because they are shot through with 
value orientations of particular 
. biographies or forms of life. What is left 
after these evaluative issues of the 
"good life" have been eliminated are the 
strictly normative issues of justice. 
They alone can be settled by rational 
argument. They alone constitute the 
field of moral action proper. By 
focusing on the normative validity of 
action norms, discourse ethics limits the 
scope of the concept of moral validity, 
setting it over and against all culturally 
specific value contents.5 2 
The beliefs whose validity we question come from the moral stuff of 
our lifeworld; as our understanding of what it means to justify a 
norm becomes more sophisticated, we learn to distinguish norms 
which express a general interest, and which can therefore be 
justified by an appeal to a universal principle, from values which, 
because of their particular nature, do not lend themselves to general 
consensus. 
Habermas's discourse ethics excludes the possibility of 
defending any specific version of the good life as normative. It sets 
up a testing procedure which is purely formal and therefore bars any 
substantive conception of the good. In fact, because of its status as a 
testing procedure, the ideal discourse situation cannot be thought to 
produce justified norms, for it can only test the validity of 
hypothetical norms. In addition, any norms decided upon in the 
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context of ideal discourse cannot be held to be inviolate, they are 
always open to later questioning and can be resubmitted for later 
discourses. Though the conditions of the ideal speech situation are 
arrived at as the counterfactual features necessary for reaching 
rational consensus, they are, as I pointed out above, also the guide 
rules for actual discourses between real peoples. Habermas's 
discourses are not meant to be merely thought experiments, they are 
to be understood as historically located. 
It is this feature of his theory that distinguishes Habermas's 
position from other cognitivist,universalist and formalist ethical 
theories. It lends a political twist to Habermas's theory, for it entails 
a political vision of a more humane world where decisions would be 
collectively made and the needs of all taken into account. In 
Habermas's view, the role of moral philosophers is quite limited, for 
they can only specify the formal conditions necessary for reaching 
rational consensus on normative questions and cannot claim any 
apriori superiority over substantive contributions by others in 
practical discourse. On the other hand, his theory also pulses with a 
utopian vision based both on a critique of the present state of 
democracy and a vision of a more perfect future. I will argue in 
chapter two that Habermas tends to over-emphasize the neo-Kantian 
aspects of the discourse situation and under-emphasize the politics of 
change that the institutionalization and continuation of discourse 
requires. Before the issue of the political ramifications of discourse 
can be discussed, however, the formal properties of ideal discourse 
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must be set out. 
Habermas's separation of the formal rules of argument from 
the content of discourse is, of course, a familiar Kantian move. In 
order to defend this strategy, however, he must maintain that norms 
and values can be distinguished absolutely. The commitment to 
discourse cannot be justified in terms of the value of a rational way 
of life or a belief that the discursive settling of conflicts will lead to a 
better world. Discourse must be defended not because of what it 
brings about, but because of its intrinsic rightness. I shall argue 
below that the view that one can separate the right from the good 
and defend the discursive settlement of normative disputes strictly 
in terms of the right is one that is fraught with difficulty. At this 
point I will only briefly mention some of the problems which beset 
Habermas's distinction between norms and values. Part of the 
difficulty arises because of his tendency to talk about norms and 
values as if they were "naturally" distinct. He refers to norms as if 
they could be identified prior to the discourses which he claims 
produces them. Before entering into discourse, we feel the pull of 
ethical claims upon us, but until we submit a claim to discourse we 
do not know whether it can be supported by universal principles and 
be defended as a norm, or whether we are responding to the non-
morally defensible sway of the mores of a particular culture. It is 
only through the process of discourse that we can test whether our 
ethical claims are truly. normative ones. 
Habermas contends that basic values, unlike norms, are too 
79 
integral to our own identity to admit of questioning. Some of the 
mores that guide our behavior may, as Habermas argues, never 
strike us as a claim at all because they are so deeply rooted in our 
understanding of ourselves and the world that we may never ask 
whether claims like these could be justified. On the other hand, it is 
not unlikely that some particular experience may cause us to doubt 
the validity of even the most deeply, perhaps even unconsciously, 
held of our own beliefs. This seems especially true in post-industrial 
societies where little remains of traditional ways of life, where no 
rule seems unbreakable, no value unquestionable, and no choice 
unthinkable. Habermas has himself acknowledged that the modern 
world. is such, that there is an ever-increasing questioning of 
traditional ways of life informed by traditional values that now seem 
provincial. He even identifies this phenomenon as a source of hope; 
it is after all also part of his argument that only when traditional 
beliefs are considered from a rationally questioning distance can 
mature moral thinking be achieved. Perhaps Habermas would 
respond to this criticism with the argument that there will always be 
a residue of unreflected upon values which are essential to our 
identities. There is an element of truth here which Bernard Williams· 
captures when discussing the attempt to achieve clarity about 
personal and social relationships: 
That these are two different things is 
obvious with personal relationships, 
where to hope that they do not rest on 
deceit and error is merely decent, but to 
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think their bases can be made totally 
explicit is idiocy.53 
But to recognize that not all we hold of value can or should be 
subjected to the scrutiny of rational judgment, is not to say that any 
particular value remains, by its very nature, excluded from rational 
reconsideration. The fact that it is impossible and undesirable to 
reflect on every value we hold does not clarify which values we 
ought to reflect upon and which not. There is no apparent reason 
why some values, by their very nature, cannot be reflected upon. 
Leaving these problems and others equally thorny to the 
second and third chapters of this dissertation, I shall continue in the 
remainder of this chapter to lay out the formal aspects of ideal 
discourse, describing the rules for discourse and analyzing the 
significance of the universalization thesis, "U", for Habermas's moral 
theory. 
Ideal discourse, as Habermas construes it, can be understood 
from three different perspectives: the logical level of the production 
of argument, the dialectical level of the procedure of discourse, and 
the level of the process of discourse. When these three aspects of 
discourse are considered, the rules which regulate discourse can also 
be divided into three corresponding kinds. 
1. There are, first, logical rules, examples of which are: 
1) No speaker can contradict himself or 
herself. 
2) Any one 
conditions A 
who claims F under 
must be willing to 
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claim F under a condition identical to A 
in all relevant respects. 
3) Different speakers cannot use the 
same 
expression in different ways.5 4 
These rules are necessary if there is to be any hope for successful 
communication. As such, they have no special ethical content but 
merely define the necessary preconditions which assure the logical 
possibility of argument. 
2. As examples of procedural rules, Habermas offers the 
following: 
1) Every speaker must maintain only 
what they believe. 
2) Anyone who draws upon a statement 
or a norm which is not the subject of 
discussion mustgive a reason for 
doing so.55 
These rules make possible the special form of interaction that a 
cooperative search for the truth require. Like the formal rules for 
procedure, they are not terribly controversial, but are necessary if 
discourse is to get off the ground. 
3 .. The rules which are most interesting are the more 
problematic rules which regulate the processual level of discourse. 
These are the rules which Habermas argues are anchored in 
communicative action and are intuitively recognized as valid by 
competent speakers. They are the rules which come to be recognized 
through the process of socialization as we learn to recognize and take 
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up normatively regulated social roles and recogmze what a 
normative claim involves. In discourse, these intuitively recognized 
rules are made explicit and serve in a special way to "immunize [it] 
against repression and inequality."56 They describe the essential 
moral conditions necessary for establishing an "ideal speech 
situation" in which only the force of the better argument can prevail. 
These rules, which Habermas refers to as "D" (for discourse rules), 
are not merely conventional rules of action, but are unavoidable 
presuppositions of argumentation. To deny their validity and at the 
same time engage in argument is to be involved in a performative 
self-contradiction because competent arguing means following these 
rules. 57 These rules Habermas lists as follows: 
3.1. Every agent capable of speech 
and action can participate in 
discourses. 
3.2 a. Everyone may problematize any 
assertion 
b. Everyone may introduce every 
assertion into a discourse. 
c. Everyone may express his or her 
wishes, attitudes and needs. 
3.3 No one may be prevented from 
enjoying her or his above out-
lined rights in virtue of 
constraints that may dominate 
within or without discourse.5 8 
Habermas holds that these rules can be logically derived from an 
analysis of what we mean by reaching a non-coerced understanding 
., 
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with others. If anyone were excluded from discourse, or prevented 
from making their feelings known, the argument that carried the day 
would not necessarily reflect the general interest, because the needs 
of some that might have influenced the direction of the argument 
would not have been taken into account. If, for example, I am afraid 
to voice my needs for fear of reprisals against me, it cannot be said 
that the decision reached reflects only the force of the better 
argument, for it also reflects an unequal power relationship which 
affects the outcome of the discussion. I may "agree" with your 
position out of fear, but, as Habermas writes,"Agreement can indeed 
be objectively obtained by force: but what comes to pass manifestly 
through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count 
subjectively as agreement. Agreement rests on common 
convictions. "59 
This claim seems relatively untroubling, even if it is often 
difficult in real circumstances to explain what it is that distinguishes 
free choices from coerced ones. We do intuitively recognize the 
distinction and it plays an important part in any modern legal 
system when, for example, the issue of culpability for an act arises. 
The problem, however, lies rn Habermas's argument that the ideal of 
equality and fairness which the discourse rules reflect can be 
derived from our intuitive recognition that genuine agreement must 
cannot involve direct or indirect coercion. One might grant his claim 
that the process of socialization involves recognizing social 
conventions, and even his claim that the postmodern legal system 
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presupposes that normative claims should be supported by rational 
argument; but these "facts" about contemporary culture do not, ipso 
facto,provide us with a justification for this procedure. 
Habermas opens himself to the same criticisms that have been 
raised against Kant's derivation of moral freedom from our 
experience of the moral law as a "fact" of practical reason, revealed 
to us through our experience of morality as a command. As Alaisdair 
MacIntyre has pointed out , Alan Gewirth offers a similar and 
equally flawed argument in his book Reason and Morality. Moving 
from a definition of rational agency, Gewirth argues that there are 
conditions which must be met if we are to conduct ourselves as 
rational agents. In order for humans beings to exercise their 
capacity for rational agency, they must enjoy a certain degree of 
freedom; since any act of will is an expression of this agency, no 
human being can will a loss of freedom. The next step in Gewirth's 
argument is to claim that logically following from this argument is 
the right to both freedom and equality for all rational agents. Like 
Habermas, Gewirth moves from an "is" to an ought. It may be the 
case that rational agency requires freedom for its exercise, but from 
that "fact" one cannot assume the "right" to such freedom. MacIntyre 
goes on to argue that the idea that we possess rights by virtue of our 
humanity is a historically relative claim, and that asserting a claim to 
rights in a society which does not recognize them is analogous to 
trying to write a check in a culture which has no system of 
currency. 60 
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When Habermas moves from the ideal of reciprocity which can 
be discovered in communication to the claim that an analysis of 
communicative action serves to justify the claim that we ought to use 
this ideal of equality and reciprocity to formulate an ethical theory, 
he is trying to get too much from his universal-pragmatic hat. In his 
early works and in his more recent appropriation of a modified 
version of Weber's rationalization thesis, Habermas employs a 
method of internal critique. Using the normative self-description of 
modern societies as his reference point, he outlines the disintegrating 
effect of the colonization of the lifeworld by systems imperatives. 
This theoretical strategy enables him to reveal the contradiction 
between our normative self-description and the reality of our ethical 
life in the post-modern world. In more recent works, however, 
Habermas has shifted his position and argues that a reconstruction of 
the norms inherent in communication can provide a quasi-
transcendental ground for a moral point of view which is most fully 
realized in the ideal speech situation. He infers from the fact that the 
natural telos of communicative action lies in a normatively regulated 
process of reaching agreement with others the normative claim that 
we ought to choos~ to realize this principle. Even if one concedes 
that reaching an understanding is the primary telos of 
communicative action upon which all others are parasitic, the claim 
that we ought to pursue this end requires additional argument. It is 
not enough to claim that because post-industrial societies do 
recognize that normative claims should be supported by appeals to 
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universal principles, that they ought to resolve ethical dilemmas 
discursively. 
At first glance, Habermas's argument appears gravely flawed m 
that it seems that he has committed a version of the naturalist 
fallacy, deducing a moral -ought from the fact that we distinguish 
norms from matters of taste in such a way that the former require 
justification, whereas the latter, as the aphorism suggests, cannot be 
disputed. This problem is exacerbated in Moralbewusstsein when 
Habermas argues that a uni versalization principle, "U", can be 
derived from the discourse rules and an understanding of what it 
means to justify a norm. Habermas defines this universalization 
thesis as follows: 
The consequences and side-effects 
which would foreseeable result from the 
universal subscription to a disputed 
norm, and as they would affect the t_he 
satisfaction of the interests of each 
single individual, could be accepted by 
all without constraints.61 
To what extent can this thesis be derived from the discourse rules? 
What does Habermas mean when he adds that one must have an 
understanding of what it means to justify a norm in order to 
recognize the validity of "U"? Isn't he assuming what he set out to 
prove? 
Any number of critics have made this point. Their responses 
range from the total rejection of Geuss, who claims that the discourse 
ethics is "a transcendental deduction of a series of non-facts, "62 to the 
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more sympathetic critiques of Wellmer and Benhabib, both of whom 
argue that Habermas's attempt to derive rules for regulating 
discourse from the pragmatic presuppositions of language is circular. 
The universal-pragmatic interpretations 
of rationality, justice, and freedom are 
indeed interpretations which 
presuppose the normative validity of 
communicative rationality, reciprocity, 
and truthfulness. But what grounds 
have been given to choose this 
particular normative interpretation, if it 
was first the outcome of the ideal 
discourse situation that would establish 
norms which we could consider 
binding? The ideal speech situation is a 
circular construction; it presupposes 
those very norms it was supposed to 
establish. 6 3 
While it is true that Habermas 1s not infrequently guilty of slipping 
into a transcendentalism reminiscent of Kant, a partial defense can 
be mounted for his concept of idea,! discourse. Originally, he argued 
that the notion of ideal discourse could be derived from a theory of 
rational agency. In more recent works, he moves away from this 
argument and claims that all those who put forth rational arguments 
intuitively recognize the difference between coerced agreement and 
agreement based on understanding. In addition, he also adopts Karl 
Otto Apel's argument to the effect that anyone who argues that 
normative issues are not open to rational resolution engages in a 
performative contradiction. By this Apel and Habermas seem to 
mean that arguing that one cannot argue rationally is necessarily 
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contradictory. By engaging rn an argument about the way norms can 
or cannot be justified, sceptics "commit themselves to the normative 
ideal of a community of discourse." 64 
The rules which constitute the framework of an ideal speech 
situation are the explicit translation of our intuitive recognition of 
uncoerced dialogue. Why does Habermas tack "U," the 
universalization thesis, onto the rules discussed above and why does 
it have such significance for him? If normative validity is 
determined by the outcome of a normatively regulated discourse, 
aren't the discourse rules enough to guarantee justified agreement 
about the validity of a norm? Benhabib suggests that Habermas 
finds himself in a position similar to any democratic theorist who 
believes that consent is essential to legitimacy.65 The shortcoming 
of this belief is that it leaves open the possibility that the majority 
might consent to principles which limited the rights of some minority 
or might even agree to contravene the discourse rules themselves. 
The universalization thesis protects all individuals by maintaining 
that the interest of those most affected by the implementation of a 
norm must be freely willing to ~gree to it. Can Habermas support his 
claim that all rational human beings who understand the universal 
and necessary communicative presuppositions of argumentative 
speech, and who know what it means to justify a norm, must already 
recognize the universalization thesis? In the final analysis I do not 
believe that this argument succeeds in its current formulation. There 
are too many questions. There is, for instance, the question of what 
.,, 
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it means to justify a norm? Isn't that identical to understanding "U"? 
If it is, then obviously it cannot be used as a criterion for arriving at 
"U" without falling into a circularity. The question of why is it 
important for all to speak also remains unanswered? Can the notion 
of equality implies by the right of all to speak be defended as a 
presupposition of discourse or is it the result of a history of 
emancipation whose ideals . find their roots in the Enlightenment? 
There remains as well the problem of why needs which can be 
universalizable are justifiable, why should non-generalizable needs 
be ignored? Is Habermas arguing that the normative aspects of the 
ideal discourse situation can be found in all communicative acts, or 
are these rules only embedded in the context of moral argument? 
How are we to define a moral argument? Is it only discursive 
argument which forces us to reconsider the claims of others or the 
rightness of our moral claims, or might not works of literature, art or 
film also have the same effect? 
While I think these questions cannot be answered by an appeal 
to the presuppositions of communication or the meaning of justifying 
a norm, I think there 1s an alternative interpretation of Habermas's 
project which can provide answers to some of them. I will develop 
this interpretation in the next chapter when I examine whether 
Habermas's ethical theory can deal adequately with the challenging 
problems raised by some of the Anglo-American criticisms of neo-
Kantian ethical theories. For the moment, I will only suggest that the 
discourse ethics that Habermas puts forth involves more than a 
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description of the procedure for the justification of norms. It also 
describes a process of discursive-will formation. It is with this in 
mind that Habermas reformulates the work of Mead and Kohlberg, 
arguing that identity formation 1s a social process which, in post-
industrial societies, entails the ability to recognize and challenge 
norms. The act of engaging in moral discourse is as essential to the 
process of becoming a moral being as is the ability to adopt different 
social roles. While it is true that Habermas's ideal speech situation 
picks out the normative elements of communication and uses them to 
define the conditions necessary for arriving at unconstrained 
consensus, his moral theory involves more than this. Unlike other 
procedural th~ories, Habermas's discourse ethics includes an 
awareness of the historical specificity of individual identities as well 
as sensitivity to the process by which we come to define and 
articulate our needs. In Habermas's ethical model, we do not first 
define our needs and then initiate discourse. It is only through 
normatively based communicative action with others that we 
construct an identity and learn to understand, articulate, and attempt 
to satisfy our needs. Benhabib describes ideal discourse as morally 
transformative; entering discourse, we set aside all force or coercion 
except the force of the better argument. As we listen to others 
voicing their needs and offering reasons for why they ought to be 
recognized, we can come to understand and perhaps even agree with 
them. 66 For discourses to have the significance which Habermas 
attributes to them, moral harmony cannot precede them, they must 
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themselves be the crucible in which that harmony is forged. 
If Benhabib's interpretation of the discourse situation as a 
morally transformative one is right, as I believe it is , the distinction 
Habermas draws between norms and values becomes a bit clearer. 
Both norms and values come from the lifeworld in which we live, and 
it is disputes in this life-world which provide us with the subjects of 
our moral discourses. When we enter into discourse, it is because 
our views of rightness have come into conflict. Through discourse, 
we attempt to arrive at a new agreement over a disputed moral 
claim. In the process of engaging in discourse, structured by the 
conditions Habermas lays out, we collectively consider reasons for 
granting or denying a claim normative status. In order for all 
participants to freely agree to the recognition and politic~! or legal 
institutionalization of the claim, it must satisfy some criteria of 
generality or it would be objected to by those negatively affected. To 
this extent, the adoption of "U" makes sense. Under this 
interpretation, "U" serves as a test of the degree to which a claim 
represents a generalizable interest as well as being a test of whether 
a claim can be the subject of consensus. What distinguishes norms 
from values then is how they will fare in a discourse where "U" tests 
for generality as well as protecting the interests of any minority who 
might be negatively affected by a simple majority decision. 
According to this reading, values are to be understood as normative 
claims which cannot satisfy the test of discourse and therefore 
cannot be accepted as genuinely normative. 
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Even this interpretation is not without problems. It makes "U" 
an almost pragmatic principle. If a claim cannot be accepted by all, 
if, to use a colloquial expression, it won't fly in Peoria, then it must 
be abandoned, even if its supporters are convinced of its moral 
rightness and can even produce good arguments to support its 
rightness. Perhaps the only way to rescue "U" from this theoretical 
quagmire is to argue that "U" is the principle ideal agents would use 
to determine norms. On this reading, discourse would become an 
ideal test guaranteeing that the basic principle of moral argument, 
that is universalizability,67 is met. Given Habermas's contention that 
normative argumentation 1s not dependent on ideal rational agents, 
this interpretation cannot be his. How can Habermas deal with the 
difficulties I raise without falling into either transcendentalism or 
consequentialism? I think his respo"nse should be that moral identity 
formation always involves interpretations of needs. If one takes 
seriously the morally transformative nature of moral discourse, it 
can be seen as an experience through which our ideas of our own 
needs can involve the recognition of the needs of others. In this 
view, identity formation is not a private matter which precedes 
discourse such that we come to discourse as self-contained 
unchangeable beings. Rather will-formation is discursive and plastic, 
influenced by the process of discourse itself. As Habermas made 
clear in his discussion of Mead, identity formation is always already 
social. Perhaps in light of his discourse ethic we could amend that 
and say that identity formation and the identification of needs is 
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always open to discursive reformulation m the light of the discourses 
in which we take part. 
Wellmer argues that Habermas's position is m essence a re-
working of Hegel's vision of the modern state as the embodiment of 
the unity of the particular and the universal. If the formation of our 
identity occurs in the context of a social world marked by discursive 
institutions, we will distinguish the rational and the irrational and 
understand the obligation to support moral claims with rational 
arguments. Wellmer describes the result of the formation of a 
rational identity as the reconciliation of the particular and the 
universal, an experience which can be understood by any reflective 
rational person.68 To be human means to born into a web of social 
relationships and institutions which are normatively regulated. One 
can escape this web only by removing oneself from society, 
withdrawing oneself from the normative world altogether. For a 
community as a whole, this escape is not possible because the 
existence of a community necessarily involves the ethical. 
When he retorts against the sceptic that 
only in an "abstract" sense can we 
choose between stepping in or keeping 
out of rational argumentation, because 
no form of life or identity can survive 
without recourse to communicative 
action, Habermas is speaking in a 
Hegelian tongue. In that context 
"abstract" means, as it did for Hegel, 
senseless because arbitrarily detached 
from the whole.69 
As members of human communities, we cannot escape normative 
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disputes or the recognition that they can be fairly resolved only 
when our collective decisions about them do not involve coercion, 
deception or even less obvious impediments. As members of a 
human community, we also have a history of our failures and our 
successes in attempting to institutionalize justice. For Habermas the 
measure of our success is the degree to which we have 
institutionalized discourse so that we may resolve disputes over a 
view of right that we must share, at least to some degree, if our 
social world is to retain the cohesiveness it needs to maintain itself. 
When we enter into discourse, it is because our shared view of 
rightness has broken down. Through discourse, we try to bring a 
certain kind of rational, moral, non-repressive order to our social life. 
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In the last several years, an interesting debate has ansen m 
Anglo-American philosophy about the shortcomings of ethical 
formalism. While the ethical theory of John Rawls is most frequently 
the subject of these discussions, it will be worthwhile to ask how 
Habermas's discourse ethic weathers the criticisms of 
communitarians who reject the formalism of deontological ethics. 
Alaisdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel raise questions particularly 
relevant to Habermas's theory. In what follows, I will review their 
questions and argue that, with some theoretical tinkering, 
Habermas's theory can embrace their insights while at the same time 
avoiding the political parochialism to which communitarianism in its 
worst moments seems inclined. 
The current communitarian movement has antecedents in the 
Hegelian emphasis on the moral role played by virtues embedded in 
communities in which the moral subject develops. Arguing against 
Kant, Hegel maintained that we cannot define justice outside the 
context of a given community's shared conception of the good life. 
Universalistic theories of justice of the Kantian variety, which 
distinguish theories of the right from theories of the good, are bound 
to be empty, for it is our ideas of the good life that gives content to 
norms. In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice , Sandel targets John 
Rawls's theory of justice in arguing that deontological liberalism is 
radically flawed and rests on a neo-Kantian metaphysics that must 
be abandoned. Macintyre's, whose discussion includes philosophers 
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from Aristotle to Alan Gewirth, attacks liberal theories of justice by 
arguing that they are based on an idea of human rights that is itself 
an ideological fiction. Though Sandel and MacIntyre offer different 
criticisms of deontological ethical theories, they agree that the 
traditional liberal preoccupation with arriving at abstract criteria for 
a theory of justice fails to adequately account for the role played m 
the formation of our moral beliefs by personal relationships and by 
membership in a social and political community. Furthermore, both 
argue that the model of the moral individual employed by 
deontological theorists is so abstracted from time or place as to have 
little relation to real individuals, whose identities are much more 
defined by autobiographical circumstance than abstract theories of 
justice allow. The central arguments of both philosophers represents 
a challenge for Habermas's discourse ethic, and it is that challenge I 
shall take up here. 
As Sandel understands it, deontological liberalism holds that 
justice has a special place in the pantheon of virtues. Unlike courage, 
or wisdom or kindness, all of which must be defended by some 
notion of the good, justice, according to arguments in this tradition, 
can be defended without referring to such a notion. Justice is, as 
Kant argued, a good in itself and need not be defended because of 
what it brings about. It is defined in terms of the right, and the right 
is prior to the good. With the principles of justice in place, we can 
govern ourselves morally and at the same time maximize the 
opportunity for individuals to pursue differing and often conflicting 
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notions of the good life. 1 Of this view Sandel writes, "justice is not 
merely one value among others, to be weighted and considered as 
the occasion arises, but the highest of all social virtues, the one that 
must be met before others can make their claims."2 
In the context of this tradition, what separates "justice" from 
other virtues is not orily that it takes precedence over all others, but 
the additional claim that justice claims can be deriyed from a 
different ground than can the other virtues. Rawls distinguishes th·e 
principles of justice and the grounds from which they are derived 
from other values we may or may not have. Habermas also makes 
this distinction, arguing that the norms which are constitutive of a 
theory of justice can be distinguished from values, which are 
particular in nature and therefore do not apply to all equally. Rawls 
and Habermas are motivated to make this distinction for the same 
reason. Both recognize that different people value different ways of 
life, that the modern world is marked by conflicting values or, as 
Weber put it, by warring gods. If there were no grounds on which to 
distinguish values that seem to be a matter of preference from those 
which strike us as being fundamental to morality, we would have to 
acknowledge that morality is ultimately a matter of custom and 
taste. Without a theory of justice supported by arguments 
independent of a commitment· to a particular way of life, there would 
be no context-transcendent principals or standards to appeal to in 
assessing different social arrangements .. We could not, at least as 
deontological ethicists such as Rawls or Habermas see it, offer 
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generally valid reasons for favoring one way of life over another. 
Sandel and MacIntyre challenge this line of thought on two 
different levels. First, they criticize the arguments which are offered 
to ground norms. That is, they question the success of the 
philosophical arguments offered in support of a liberal theory of 
rights. Second, they make the more radical claim that the liberal 
project is not only a philosophical failure but is the result of a 
misguided vision of what morality is and how it is socially 
institutionalized. Rights cannot be defended by philosophical 
arguments, for there are no "universal rights" of the kind desired. 
In what follows, I will first examine Sandel's and Maclntyre's 
claim that deontological ethical theories lack cogency and then 
consider the potentially more damaging claim that deontology is the 
wrong way to approach moral theory. As Maclntyre's critique of the 
deontological derivation of rights is more general and, if successful, 
more shattering than Sandel's, I shall outline his criticisms first and 
then turn to Sandel's more detailed account of the limitations of 
deontology. 
A .. MacIntyre - Morality. Community and Identity 
Maclntyre's After Virtue mounts a clever argument concerning 
the failure of the Enlightenment to discover a non-teleological 
grounds for justifying norms. He understands this project as the 
historically new quest to create a language of morals and a ground of 
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moral belief that were not theological, legal or aesthetic.3 Reviewing 
the ethical theories of Kant, Diderot, Hume and Smith, MacIntyre 
argues that their arguments had to fail because they were the 
"inheritors of a very specific and particular scheme of moral beliefs, 
a scheme whose internal incoherence ensured the failure of the 
common philosophical project from the outset." 4 Just where does 
the incoherence lie? According to MacIntyre, despite the fact that 
these theorists sought to provide rational arguments for the moral 
point of view they put forward, they simultaneously clung to a 
religiously informed view of human nature which is essentially 
teleological. This ·religious understanding included a view of what 
human beings should be, an assessment of what they are, and a 
directive for how they should behave if they were to realize their 
divinely ordained and rationally recognizable telos. Thus Kant, 
Hume, Diderot, et. al., despite their theoretical rejection of teleology 
and their commitment to rational argument, never abandoned the 
understanding of human potential that was their legacy from an 
earlier religious world view. The result of retaining earlier beliefs 
about what it was desirable for human beings to become, while 
rejecting the teleological arguments that had provided a context for 
those beliefs, led to a style of ethical reasoning in which the form of 
moral argumentation was cut adrift from its content: 
But the joint effect of the secular 
rejection of both Protestant and Catholic 
theology and the scientific and 
philosophical rejection of 
... 
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Aristotelianism was to eliminate any 
notion of man-as-he-could-be-if he-
realized-his-telos. Since the whole point 
of ethics - both as a theoretical and a 
practical discipline - is to enable man to 
pass from his present state to his true 
end, the elimination of any notion of 
essential human nature and with it the 
abandonment of any notion of a telos 
leaves behind a moral scheme composed 
of two remam1ng elements whose 
relationship becomes quite unclear. 
There is on the one hand a certain 
content for morality: a set of injunctions 
deprived of their teleological context. 
There is on the other hand a certain 
view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-
is. Since the moral injunctions were 
originally at home in a scheme in which 
their purpose was to correct, improve, 
or educate that human nature, they are 
clearly not going to be such as could be 
deduced from true statements about 
human nature or justified in some other 
way by appealing to its characteristics. . 
. . .Hence the eighteenth century moral 
philosophers engaged in what was 
inevitably an unsuccessful project; for 
they did indeed attempt to find · a 
rational basis for their moral beliefs in a 
particular understanding of human 
nature, while inheriting a set of moral 
injunctions on the one hand and a 
conception of human nature which had 
been designed to be discrepant with 
each other.5 
In Maclntyre's view, only within the context of a teleological. 
framework is it possible to derive "ought" statements from "is" 
statements, because one can there draw upon a concept of what 
104 
human nature should be. 
The traditional teleological framework required an 
understanding of an individual's appropriate function; describing a 
good individual involved assessing how appropriately that individual 
functioned in whatever social role s/he occupied. Such a description, 
as MacIntyre points out, is not so different from describing a good 
watch in terms of its capaGity to keep accurate time, as one that is 
conveniently carried, or with reference to some other functional 
criteria. On his account, when the ways we are supposed to live and 
the rules we are supposed to fulfill are not justified by a teleological 
conception of this kind, the notion of a human being ceases to have a 
functional meaning and the moral "ought" can no longer be derived· 
from the factual. 6 MacIntyre points to Kant as an exemplar of the 
breakdown of an intelligible moral paradigm. Despite Kant's attempt 
to ground morality in the very nature of practical reason, in the 
second Critique he has to acknowledge the impossibility of setting 
forth an intelligible ethics without a teleological framework. There 
Kant argued that it was necessary for human beings to suppose that 
the pursuit of morality would bring with it the attainment of 
happiness. As MacIntyre sees it, it was necessary to smuggle m this 
teleological vision to make sense of Kant's moral beliefs, because they 
are only coherent within that type of framework. Without this 
smuggled m and unacknowledged teleological schema, the criteria 
according to which moral claims are true or false would dissolve. 
MacIntyre argues that modern moral theories are as incoherent 
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as their eighteenth century counterparts, for their arguments too 
rely upon an unacknowledged teleology (e.g., justifying rights by 
appealing to the Christian notion of equa\ity without making that 
appeal specific). 
Up to the present in everyday discourse 
the habit of speaking of moral 
judgments as true or false persists; but 
the question of what it is in virtue of 
which a particular moral judgement is 
true or false has come to lack any clear 
answer. 7 
MacIntyre chooses the ethical theory developed by Alan Gewirth as a 
typical example of contemporary deontological theories, all of which 
in his view suffer the same disastrous shortcomings. Gewirth argues 
that human beings are beings with a capacity to act rationally. In 
order to act rationally, a certain freedom and well-being is necessary. 
Rational agents thus have a right to such freedom and well-being as 
is necessary for action. It is this last assertion, that is, that we have a 
"right" to whatever freedom and well-being necessary for action, that 
MacIntyre argues is problematic: "quite clearly the introduction of 
the concept of a right needs further justification. "8 The fact I may 
need X to do Y does not necessarily give me to a right to X. To talk 
about rights is to talk about something that is embedded in 
particular historical circumstances, understandings and rules. To 
claim rights, for instance, in a society which does not recognize rights 
is, MacIntyre argues, like trying to write a check in a society that has 
no money system. He argues that Gewirth attempts to attach a 
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notion of right not to human agency as it is found in a specific social 
situation, but to human agency qua agency. In so doing, Gewirth has 
attempted to claim rights as an entitlement due to all, regardless of 
the social situation in which they find themselves, without supplying 
the teleological background of Christian or democratic belief that 
would fill in the gaps of his argument. Gewirth's argument fails 
because rights, like witches and unicorns, do not exist: 
The best reasons for asserting so bluntly 
that there are no such rights is indeed 
of precisely the same type as the best 
reason which we possess for asserting 
that there are no witches and the best 
reason which we possess for asserting 
that there are no um corns: every 
attempt to give good reasons for 
believing that there are such rights has 
failed.9 
If MacIntyre is right, no defense of rights, including 
Habermas's theory of the justification of moral norms could succeed. 
MacIntyre recognizes the reality of heroes; he even believes that 
there are saints. These are social types whose identity is totally 
dependent on society that creates and venerates them. Heroes are 
no more natural givens than rights, yet MacIntyre accepts the reality 
of the former and denies the reality of the latter. Why are some 
social constructs real when others are not? I want to argue that just 
as surely as there are particular historical communities which 
believe in rights, strive to honor them and regulate their behavior m 
light of them, rights exist. Having recognized the reality of some 
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social constructs, it is a contradiction to deny the reality of a 
phenomenon simply on the grounds that it does not exist in nature. 
Social constructs, whether they are heroes, saints, monetary systems 
or rights, are part of the social world we inhabit. In our world, 
trample on them as we do, rights exist: 
it is reasonable for us to believe in 
human rights: many of the most widely 
accepted practices of our society --
equality of educational opportunity, 
career open to talent, punishment 
conditional on intent -- treat people as 
relatively autonomous moral agents. 
Insofar as we are committed to 
maintaining these practices, we are also 
committed to defending human rights. 1 O 
What is particularly perplexing about Maclntyre's argument is that 
it runs counter to his view that morality should be grounded in social 
practices. Different practices call for different virtues to realize the 
excellence associated with that practice. The culture of the hero 
requires courage, the cultivation of the arts requires creativity and, 
following on his own line of reasoning, it would seem that the 
flourishing· of democracy would require the fostering and 
preservation of rights. 
MacIntyre might respond to this by claiming that his criticism 
of Gewirth's argument focused on the claim that rights are universal 
and grounded only in our humanity. Given his own commitment to 
understanding values as generated from the excellences required for 
the continuation and institutionalization of social practices, however, 
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he has no grounds on which to reject a concept of rights grounded in 
democratic practices .. His firm insistence that rights have no reality 
at all -- an sich, as it were -- is inconsistent with his own position. 
Let us reconstruct Maclntyre's argument now, with reference 
to Habermas's position rather than Gewirth's. Like Gewirth, 
Habermas identifies a capacity which all subjects share. It is the 
capacity to communicate, which involves among other things the 
ability to offer reasons for one's choices and beliefs. In his view, this 
capacity for reason-giving is rooted in both species-wide capacities 
and in configurations of social interactions that make the acquisition 
and practice of the competence possible. The intrinsically social 
character of identity formation and language use make it impossible 
to isolate the social processes in which we learn to offer reasons for 
our beliefs (including what counts as a reason) from the internal 
cognitive process that the assimilation of this information requires. 
It also makes it difficult to isolate specific cognitive capacities, 
reflection for instance, from other more obviously social aspects of 
ourselves that we consider essential to our self-identity. We learn to 
communicate just as we learn to identify ourselves as individuals, in 
the contest of a web of social relations. All communicatively capable 
individuals have some capacity for reflecting on the reasons for their 
beliefs. 
MacIntyre did not object to Gewirth's move ascription of 
agency and the desire to exercise it to all rational agents, so perhaps 
he would not object to the similar strategy Habermas employs when 
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he describes the capacity to communicate and the skills it includes, 
including the ability to offer reasons for our choices and beliefs, as 
common to all communicatively competent subjects. But, of course, 
this is not the whole of Habermas's argument. As I explained in 
chapter one, Habermas believes that his commitment to a democratic 
form of discourse can be grounded in a reconstruction of what it 
means to justify a norm. MacIntyre might well respond to 
Habermas's argument as he did to Gewirth's, arguing that the 
capacity for reason-giving which Habermas ascribes to all 
communicatively competent subjects does not give those subjects to 
the right to exercise that capacity. But then we might ask MacIntyre 
to specify the the grounds for excluding certain subjects from moral 
discourse, that is, we could ask him to clarify his notion of normative 
discourse and the stipulations concerning who can or should engage 
engage in it. In other words, since MacIntyre argues that it is in 
social practice that we will discover workable concepts of virtue, he 
has to make a case against accepting the practice of discourse that 
Habermas claims is embedded in the notion of democracy. 
Macintyre's description of moral life does not include any 
mention of moral argumentation, except insofar as he points to it as a 
symptom of the moral decay of our society. Nonetheless, there are at 
least two reasons for requiring MacIntyre to provide some 
description of the criteria according to which normative disputes are 
to be settled. The first arises from the dubiousness of Maclntyre's 
ascription of moral harmony to the societies he chooses as exemplars 
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of a unified conception of how one ought to live one's life. Though 
the societies he focuses on are less marked by moral diversity than 1s 
our own, even a cursory reading of history is enough to indicate that 
the ideal of moral harmony MacIntyre describes is just that, an ideal 
rather than a real historical achievement. If one considers the case 
of classical Greece, of which MacIntyre is quite enamored, it is clear 
the questions Socrates raised would make no sense in a society as 
completely unified by a coherent and agreed upon set of values as 
MacIntyre suggests. If MacIntyre were to counter that Socrates's 
Greece was a Greece on the moral wane, there would be little 
difficulty in finding evidence of dissension in whatever society he 
settled on as exemplary. It is true that societies do exhibit 
differences in degrees of unanimity about what values are to be 
pursued, and there are differences in the sheer number qf competing 
versions of the good life from society to society, however, even with 
this concession, Macintyre's argument has some major shortcomings. 
Unless a society exhibits the absolute harmony of Maclntyre's ideal, 
there is no way , given his description of ethical life, to establish a 
peaceful and moral coexistence amid conflicting values. 
This brings me to a second aspect in which Macintyre's moral 
vision remains incomplete. In the opening pages of After Virtue, he 
describes contemporary Western society as bereft of a shared 
understanding of the good life and the norms and virtues it would 
entail. As he describes it, our moral world is so wracked with 
dissension that we cannot find a common moral language with which 
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to sort out our differences. We have "very largely, if not entirely, 
lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality." 1 1 
However, MacIntyre painfully fails to give us any indication of what 
we should do in the face of this loss. Indeed his depiction of the 
choices we face are at least as disquieting as his diagnosis. The 
image of utopia he evokes is not of a democratic republic freed from 
the authority of dogma, of government by managerial "experts", or of 
the fetishisms and distortions of capitalism, but one where the savior 
of our ethical life is envisioned as another, albeit different, St. 
Benedict. Do we really wish to look to a reflowering of Christianity, 
with all its patriarchal, authoritarian baggage for our image of the 
ideal future? Margaret Atwood's disutopia, graphically detailed m 
her novel The Handmaid's Tale. springs instantly to mind as a 
reminder of the horrors of a religiously informed politics. 
While this point calls for more extensive argument than I am 
prepared to offer here, there is another, less sweeping, but equally 
serious question raised by Maclntyre's suggestion: how we are to 
conduct our moral lives while waiting for this new St.Benedict? 
MacIntyre does not give us an answer to this question, though he 
recommends a posture of withdrawal into small enclaves of civilized 
men(?) in the face of the onslaught of the barbarians whom he does 
not identify, but who, he claims, already rule our lives. 
Though I have criticized the conclusions MacIntyre arrives at 
in After Virtue,, I consider many of his insights profoundly 
important for completing the , picture of moral life as it is presented 
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by Habermas and other deontologists. The latter have typically been 
rather short-sighted about including in their descriptions of ethical 
life the role that community plays in the constitution of individual 
identities and thereby in the formation of moral character. Though 
this is not true of Habermas, he often loses sight of his own political 
vision, crediting too much to the abstract rules of moral argument 
and too little to the normative transformations brought about by 
political struggle. 
In Macintyre's view, it is impossible to give an account of the 
virtues held paramount ancient and classical societies without also 
giving an account of the social circumstances in which they were 
embedded. In the heroic cultures MacIntyre describes, one's role 
and status is predetermined by one's gender, place in the family and 
by the status of the family itself. In this sort of society, social roles 
are predetermined, and they in turn determine the sort of actions 
people will be called upon to perform in order to fulfill their roles 
honorably. In such a society, abstract morality does not exist; it is 
existing social bonds that carry with them the ethical requirements 
of loyalty, courage, friendship, etc.. Evaluative questions, MacIntyre 
argues, are strictly questions of social fact.12 When they do arise, 
they are not generally hard to answer. 
for the given rules which assign men 
their place in the social order and with 
it their identity also prescribe what 
they owe and what is owed to them and 
how they are to be treated and 
regarded if they fail and how they are 
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to treat and regard others if those 
others fail. I 3 
Four centuries later, residues of this way of thinking about virtue 
became the subject of argument and debate amongst the Sophists, Socrates. 
Plato and Aristotle. Their beliefs were formulated in the context of the city-
state and its ideal of citizenship and thus, despite their differing beliefs 
concerning the nature of some of the virtues, they agreed that the virtues 
necessary to sustaining participation in the life of the city-state were 
central. The extraordinary significance of the role of citizen in a Greek city-
state also served to focus the notion of personal identity and to create the 
sense of a shared moral world, at least among the men who constituted the 
citizenry. Even among those excluded from full membership in the polis, 
either because of their race, gender, class, or status of birth, the city-state m 
which they lived fostered an identity that could be contrasted to those of 
other city-states. To be a Spartan was to have an identity distinctly 
different than that of an Athenian or a Cretian. To be without a city because 
of political exile or some other misfortune, was to be without an identity. 
MacIntyre makes this point by quoting from Plato's Philoctetes ,"You left me 
friendless, solitary, without a city, a corpse among the living."1 4Identity via 
membership in a polis involved far more than a geographic reference: to be 
a member of a certain city-state was to share, at least to some extent, the 
values and beliefs of that state. In this sense, one's membership in a city-
state was as constitutive of one's identity as is one's ability to will, to act anc 
to reflect. There is a specific bond of allegiance and loyalty owed to the 
other citizens of one's state. As an Athenian, for example, one was under a 
certain set of obligations to other Athenians not owed to the stranger. The 
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family also remained essential to identity, as citizenship was inherited 
through one's family. The socially constructed and preserved narrative of 
the family's accomplishments and failures become an essential part of one's 
own identity. 
Because identity was significantly constituted through membership in 
a particular political body and through a faqiily with a socially significant 
history, it was impossible .for individuals to consider themselves radically 
detached from these associations. To the extent that this was the case, the 
deontological focus on individuals who can be defined in isolation from the 
political community of which they are a part, or from the families to which 
they belong and the obligations and loyalties thereby incurred, necessarily 
misses much that is relevant in its identification of the moral subject. 
Because MacIntyre insists that for morality to exist at all it must exist m the 
identification of the subject with the values of his or her community and his 
or her family, he feels assured in his absolute rejection of the deontological 
description of the moral self. He does not specifically address the issue of 
the differences in the moral identity of the modern subject. After all, we 
live in a world quite different from the Greek city-state, and it follows from 
Macintyre's own argument that the constitution of our identities is affected 
by this. Though MacIntyre may look back nostalgically at that past, we 
cannot recreate it; not only is it the case that "we can't go home again", but 
there are those of us who do not wish to do so. 
While MacIntyre does not explore the specific constituents of modern 
identity, Michael Sandel does. Though he too rejects the deontological 
description of the self, he does so in the course of exploring what is 
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constitutive of the identity of the modern subject: It is to this discussion 
that I will now turn. 
B .. Sandel - The Moral Identity of the Subject 
Though Sandel and MacIntyre both reject the deontological description 
of the moral subject, they approach the issue in very different ways. 
Whereas MacIntyre offers an historical critique of the Enlightenment 
attempt to justify norms according to universally grounded criteria, Sandel 
chooses to examine John Rawls's Theory of Justice as an exemplar of the 
deontological approach. While Rawls, Habermas, and other deontologists 
argue that their ethical theories begin with an analysis of the process of 
moral justification, Sandel contends that hidden in the deontological 
approach is a conception of the moral subject which both serves to validate 
the principles of justice arrived at and to reinforce hidden assumptions 
about the nature of the moral subject: 
implicit in Rawls' theory of justice is a 
conception of the moral subject that 
both shapes the principle of justice and 
is shaped in their image through the 
medium of the original position) 5 
Sandel' s strategy is to ask about the nature of a subject for whom justice 1s 
the first virtue , and then to question the moral identity of that subject; 
I take myself to be tracing the 
lineaments of an argument of the 
following kind: assuming we are capable 
of justice, and more precisely, beings for 
whom justice is primary, we must be 
... 
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creatures of a certain kind, related to 
human circumstances in a certain way. 
What then must be true of a subject for 
whom justice is the first virtue?l 6 
The first aspect of the deontological self which Sandel points to 1s its 
"plurality." Justice, he argues, would not be applicable in a world 
with only one subject. It is a virtue only necessary when there exists 
a plurality of subjects who are in some way distinct from each other. 
Justice also implies a plurality of a specific kind, a plurality marked 
not only by the difference of subjects, but by their disagreement 
about the aims and values they should pursue. For justice to be 
realized, Sandel argues, "there must be the possibility of conflicting 
claims" 17 Any account of the moral subject must take account of the 
plurality of individuals and must consider their distinctness, 
including differences of opinions about norms and values. According 
to Sandel, Rawls believes the distinction between selves is an 
empirical one: each one of us is uniquely located in time and place as 
a member of a specific family and community and each of us is a 
unique concatenation of desires, thoughts, and dreams. In 
Maclntyre's view, each of us can construct a narrative about who we 
are which reflects the specificity of our identity. 
While it is true that the human condition necessarily involves 
plurality, what Rawls and other deontologists neglect to consider, in 
Sandel's view, is the degree of unity that it also involves. Justice is 
necessary, the deontologists argue, because of our essential plurality, 
but it is only possible because as distinct individuals we can be 
unified by a desire for justice: 
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the essential plurality of the moral 
subject makes human cooperation 
necessary, some essential unity of 
persons makes human cooperation 
possible. 18 
What Sandel objects to in this characterization of the subject is not 
the empirical distinction between subjects or the plurality of 
subjects, but rather the insistence that subjects are distinct selves 
prior to their experience of the subjectivity of others. Of this view, 
Sandel argues, "we are distinct individuals first, and then 
(circumstances permitting) we form relationships and engage in 
cooperative arrange men ts with others." 19 This antecedent 
individuation of the subject in deontological theories is no accident; 
Sandel argues it must be the case. 
Why is it, asks Sandel, that deontologists must regard the self 
as antecedently individuated? Answering this question requires us 
to take a look at Sandel' s discussion of the deontological self and its 
relation to its ends. 
The deontological self is conceptualized as prior to its ends and 
the possessor of its attributes. By this Sandel means that the 
essential identity of the self is thought to be independent of the ends 
it chooses and the values it cherishes. Because neo-Kantian 
deontologists do not want to follow Kant into the transcendental 
abyss, they are faced with the challenge of defining the self without 
reference to a transcendental ego that exists in a noumenal realm. 
Rawls, Habermas and other deontologists are thus faced with the task 
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of clarifying how the self is: 
distinguished from its ends, and also 
how the self is connected to its ends. 
Without the first we are left a radically 
situated subject; without the second, a 
radically disembodied subject. 20 
Sandel claims that Rawls resolves this problem by making the self a 
subject of possession, that is, the self possesses its ends. This allows 
the self to be distanced from its ends while at the same time not 
completely detached from them. To be a deontological self, Sandel 
agues, "I must be a subject whose identity is given independently of 
the things I have, independently, that is, of my interests and ends 
and my relations with others. "21 The upshot of this conception of 
the self is a distinction between what is mine and what is me. 
Insofar as I have a trait of belief, it is mine and can be distinguished 
from what is yours; but at the same time I can distance myself from 
my traits or beliefs because they are distinct from what is essentially 
me. This distancing of the self from its qualities means that if the 
self changes in some way, a continuity of_ identity can be preserved. 
Despite changes, the "I" that I am remains essentially intact. 
According to Sandel, there are two dangers facing this self and 
its relationship to its ends. On the one hand there is the danger that 
if the self is regarded as given prior to its ends, its boundaries are 
fixed such that the self cannot grow and change with experience. 
The self becomes disempowered, as it cannot identify itself with its 
ends and desires which, when woven together over time, form a plan 
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of life that is constituent of our identity. On the other hand, the self 
which is completely identified with its ends cannot sort out from the 
hodge-podge of various possible ends and purposes an essential 
identity. When the ends of the self dominate its identity in this way, 
I am "unable to distinguish what is mine from what is me, I am in 
constant danger of drowning in a sea of circumstance. "2 2 
Sandel suggest that there are two remedies for the problems of 
a self who is too identified with its ends or whose ends seem far too 
distant. One remedy is through the voluntarist dimension of agency, 
and the other is through cognition. When a self is detached from its 
ends, the voluntarist resolves the problem by means of a subjective 
act of will. In choosing ends as my own I identify myself with them. 
The relevant moral question the subject must ask is 'What ends shall 
I choose?', for identity is established through an act of the will. The 
second remedy for a self confused about what is mine and what is 
me is resolved via cognition. When the ends of the self are pre-given 
and the subject is uncertain as to what those ends are, or what 
weight they carry, the self can turn inward and reflect on the self it 
is or wishes to be. Reflection of this kind creates some space 
between the self and its ends and allows us to distinguish what 1s 
mine from what is me. The relevant moral question in this situation 
is 'Who am I?. Since in this second view the identity of the self is 
related to the ends it does choose and cannot be given prior to the 
choosing of ,those ends, 
the bounds of the self are not fixtures 
but possibilities, their contours no 
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longer self-evident but at least partly 
unformed. Rendering them clear, and 
defining the bounds of my identity are 
one and the same.2 3 
It is, Sandel argues, through the voluntarist conception of agency that 
deontologists like Rawls (and, I think he would argue, Habermas) connect 
the self with its ends while not identifying it with them: "In this way , the 
self is distinguished from its ends - it stands beyond them, at a distance, 
with a certain priority - but is also related to its ends, as a willing subject to 
the objects of choice. "24 
Still unanswered is the question of why, according to Sandel, 
deontologists must insist on the priority of the self and the consequent 
distancing of the self from its ends. In his view, this conception of the self 
stems from the deontological rejection of teleology, and this rejection 
derives froni the deontological concern for the absolute priority of justice 
over any other social end. If the principles of justice are based on the 
promotion of social welfare or on any other such end (as in Mill and the 
other utilitarians), it is conceivable that the demands of justice could be 
outweighed by some other consideration. In addition, any end a self might 
choose would be contingent on the empirical desires and the particular 
beliefs of that self and, therefore, could not serve to ground justice as non-
arbitrary. These considerations lead deontologists to ground the conception 
of justice in a notion of the self rather than in any particular end of the self. 
Thus the focus is on the selfs capacity to choose, and the construction of a 
situation that allows for the greatest freedom to choose within the limits of 
justice. It is in this sense that "the priority of the right over the good is 
grounded in the priority of the self over its ends." 2 5 
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Both Rawls and Habermas undertake to formulate a conception of the 
self that can serve as the basis for a theory of justice without falling into the 
unfortunate transcendentalism of the Kantian ego who exists only in the 
noumenal realm. Sandel contends that, despite Rawls' effort to strip away 
transcendental metaphysics, he merely reproduces a model of the self 
"associated with Kant's disembodied, metaphysically reified conception of 
the autonomous self. "26 The theory of the self which results when the self 
is conceptualized as radically distinct from its ends is, as Sandel contends, 
far too thin. Even if deontological theorists were to concede that in our 
private lives a thicker notion of moral identity is necessary to conceptualize 
the attachments to family, loved ones, and community, their conception of 
moral identity in the public sphere where justice ought to prevail as the 
first virtue, would remain inadequate. 27 According to Sandel, to take justice 
seriously. and adopt it as one of our ends, we must view ourselves as 
essentially connected with others and regard the pursuit of justice as part of 
what defines us as moral agents. When deontology grounds a theory of 
justice by conceptualizing the self as an independent willing agent, it fails to 
take into account the loyalties and convictions which constituitively define 
us: 
But we cannot hold ourselves as 
independent in this way without great 
cost to those loyalties and convictions 
whose moral force consists partly in the 
fact that living by them is inseparable 
from understanding ourselves as the 
particular persons we are as 
members of this family or community 
or nation or people, as bearers of this 
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history, as sons and daughters of that 
revolution, as citizens of this republic. 
Allegiances such as these are more than 
values I happen to have or aims I 
'espouse at any given time'. They go 
beyond the obligations I voluntarily 
incur and the 'natural duties' I owe to 
human beings as such. They allow that 
to some I owe more than justice 
requires or even permits, not by reason 
of agreements I have made but instead 
in virtue of those more or less enduring 
attach men ts and commitments which 
taken together partly define the person 
that I am.28 
To imagine a person without ends or attachments, Sandel concludes, 
is not to imagine an ideal rational agent, rather it is to imagine a 
person "wholly without character, without moral breadth. "29 
With this forceful indictment, Sandel points to what he sees as 
the limits of deontological liberalism. Motivated by a vision of 
political freedom, it creates a subject that lies beyond politics, or 
rather, it makes the identity of the subject a premise of the political 
instead of "its most precarious achievement. "30 The self that it must 
conceptualize, for epistemological reasons, is not a self that is 
changed or challenged by love, by friendship, by revolution, or by a 
dream of a more humane world. The deontological self is shrunken 
and disconnected from those relationships which might have defined 
tit more fully. In this shrunken-up self, Sandel argues, we cannot 
find ourselves, we find no reflection of what is constitutive of our 
identity and our moral personhood. This conception of the self is too 
"thin" to be morally meaningful . and must therefore be rejected as an 
,ll 
123 
inadequate model of the moral self. 
Even if we conceded that Rawls does employ such an 
unacceptably thin model of the moral self, the question remains 
whether this is an idiosyncrasy of Rawls's theory or the theoretical 
imperative of deontological theories. In my view, Habermas's model 
of the moral individual is not dogged by the shortcomings Sandel 
attributes to Rawls's too thin theory of the self. Consequently, Sandel 
is mistaken in his claim that the thin theory of the self is the 
necessary result of the deontological grounding of justice. 
1. Habermas and Sandel: Between the Thick and Thin Self 
How does Habermas depict the subject of morality? With 
Mead, Habermas believes that the constitution of self-identity is a 
profoundly social process; the child becomes an "I" in the context of 
interactions with other selves. Through this interaction children 
learn to distinguish themselves from others and learn how to take up 
and act out social roles. It would seem that Sandel would approve of 
this conception of the self as it is a conception which is social all the 
way down, in a way that Rawls's obviously is not. 
Habermas argues that children develop an ability to take up a 
reflexive stance toward their beliefs and desires. Individuals come 
to question conventional explanations of the distribution of power 
and seek to resolve clashes between conventional values by 
appealing to a notion of truth. We often speak of this ability using 
-
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the metaphor of distance; we say, "we have come to have a greater 
perspective on what we believe and why we believe it,"or, "now that 
I have some distance from what happened, I understand it in a new 
way." This metaphor of distance is distorting. Because he adopts this 
language of distance when writing about the selfs relation to or 
reflection on its ends, this leads to a great deal of unclarity in 
Sandel's argument. Our reflections about what we did in the "heat of 
passion" are just as "close" to us and just as real to us as the emotions 
involved in the passion itself. Reflection undoubtedly involves 
introspection characterized by not being wholly absorbed in the 
moment, but this does not mean that when we reflect we are 
somewhere else, or are someone else. The beliefs or claims we 
reflect upon are just as essential to us as those we do not take up m 
reflection. Indeed, having reflected upon a belief can help us to 
clarify the importance of that belief for our identity. 
C .. The Discourse Ethic and the Habermasian Subject Reconsidered 
At point, I shall undertake a slight reconstruction of 
Habermas's model of discourse, arguing that our ability to reflect and 
give reasons for our actions is just as much a part of our identity as 
is any other part. The cognitive and interactive skills which 
Habermas believes are essential to morality are part of what makes 
up the thickness of his conception of the self. In chapter· one, I 
mentioned Habermas's claim that norms and values can be 
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distinguished. After reflecting on norms, we can offer reasons for 
why they should be morally binding; values on the other hand, are 
too "close" to us, too constituitive of our identity to allow for the 
"distancing" that moral reflection requires. There is no way in 
Habermas's theory that the distinction between norms and values 
could be drawn -prior to a discourse that decides whether or not a 
claim can be universalized. This attempt to separate norms from 
values, and thus justice from competing conceptions of the good life, 
is connected with his belief that the form of moral argument must be 
made distinct from its content if the norms that regulate moral 
deliberation are to be deontologically legitimated. There are a 
number of problems with this approach. First, when Habermas 
argues that the structure of moral justification can be reconstructed 
from the norms involved in communication, he fails to recognize that 
implementing these norms by instituting discourses remains only a 
possibility. Additional justification is required to move to the 
conclusion that we ought to take advantage of this possibility, that 1s, 
conduct our moral arguments according to the rules derived from 
uncoerced communication. This justification would require 
Habermas to explain why we ought to be moral agents of a certain 
sort, i.e., the kind of agents who regard existing social or natural 
differences as irrelevant to moral agency. Habermas's likely 
response to this demand would be to argue that we are indeed such 
moral agents, or at least that we can recognize that this is what a 
truly moral agent would believe and that this achievement is the 
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result of a moral learning process described by Kohlberg. 
This claim however, is an appeal to fact -- the way we are --
rather than a justification of why we ought to be the way we are. . 
However, one might already take exception to the factual claim that 
we do define morality in this way, or argue that even if Kohlberg's 
stages were valid, most of us simply have not attained the level of 
morality Habermas ascribes to us. If the argument did proceed in 
this way, I think it would be fair to expect that those who deny the 
factual claim provide evidence to the effect that our understanding 
of justice does not in fact rely on universalist notions of impartiality 
and fairness. They might also argue that, unlike the obvious gains in 
science and technology and the learning processes they involve, what 
we know about morality and how we act do not reflect moral gains. 
These critics would also have to explain the legitimation of rule by 
law in modern society and the ever increasing pressure for the 
universal enfranchisement of all individuals as the result of 
something other than moral development. In other words, Habermas 
might throw the ball back to the court of his critics, forcing them to 
explain what seems to be a slow but certain spread of a belief that 
there are no good reasons for denying civil liberties to people on the 
basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, social class or physical 
limitations. 
A_ second problem that plagues Habermas's argument takes us 
back to the distinction between norms and values. Norms function in 
two different ways in Habermas's theory. First, they function as the 
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rules according to which moral discourse must be arranged. They 
provide the guidelines for discourse. In addition, there are norms 
justified through the process of discourse. The latter remains open to 
future discussion since the question of their justification can always 
be reopened. But is this is so, the distinction between norms and 
values begins to break down. The distinction between norms and 
values can be drawn only on the basis of whether a claim can be 
justified in the process of discourse, and this can only be decided 
through discourse, not prior to it. So discourse must involve a 
discussion of values despite the fact that Habermas argues that 
values are too constitutive of our identity to allow for discussion. 
In chapter one, I argued that what makes Habermas's discourse 
ethic distinctive is the potential role it gives to politics in changing 
our conception of what counts as a moral norm. Because Habermas 
calls for the actual participation of subjects in discourse, and because 
norms are arrived at through those discourses, it seems clear that as 
we change our minds about what norms are representative of our 
general interests, our moral views will undergo a similar change. 
There is a problem with this reading of Habermas. His insistence on 
a universalizability criteria seems to undercut the idea of discourse 
as a politically freighted historical process. It points instead towards 
a static neo-Kantianism. There are two questions here: first, why 
does Habermas feel the need to introduce the universalizability 
criterion in the first place, and second, why isn't a consensus arrived 
at in discourse an adequate test of the normative validity of a claim? 
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Seyla Benhabib reminds us of the paradox that plagues all consent 
theories: "by making consent the sole basis of legitimacy or 
normative validity, such theories also run the risk that the consent 
principle can be consensually violated."31 It therefore becomes 
necessary to define the rules of discursive argumentation in such a 
I 
way that the outcome of the discourse is limited by a principle which 
will protect the moral rights of all. In setting forth such a principle, 
Habermas's theory begins to looks more like Kant's than like a theory 
of a democratic participatory discourse. He defines the moral 
community to be inclusive of all communicatively competent 
individuals and suggests that this conclusion results from an analysis 
of the structure of moral argumentation: but as Benhabib points out, 
such universal inclusivity is not the result of conceptual analysis 
alone, but reflects the effects of a particular historical political 
struggle for the recognition of the right to universal suffrage. This 
"suggest[s] that the first premise namely the pragmatic rules 
which govern discourses -- leading to the incontrovertibility of U has 
already been preinterpreted in the light of material normative 
assumptions"3 2Jn other words, the principal "U" cannot be derived 
directly from the presuppositions of ideal discourse; it represents a 
step in a moral learning process that is rooted in the Enlightenment's 
pursuit of liberty and equality for all. 
Benhabib also suggests that the function of U is made 
redundant by the rule of discourse which states that participation m 
discourse should be open to all agents capable of speech and action. 
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Though U specifically addresses the issue of protecting the interests 
of minority participants from unfair decisions made by the majority, 
Benhabib argues there is no reason to believe that the minqrity will 
be unable to speak for themselves, shielding their rights by offering 
sound arguments for why their rights should not be infringed . In 
the case that the minority have fallen victim to an ideology which 
prevents them from recognizing their own needs and their right to 
have them recognized, clearing up these distortions is better left to 
the process of political awakening and the uncovering of the 
ideological nature of the make-up of the individual's self-identity in 
the context of the discourse situation. If the process of moral 
reflection I just described seems terribly fragile in the face of the 
ideological deceptions one finds everywhere, it is, but it is a fragility 
that is endemic to democracy and indeed, to morality itself. This 
complicated process cannot not be made easier by appealing to an·y 
computational model that could replace political struggle with the 
mechanical application of universal principles. 
Following this line of argument, Habermas might derive the 
right of all communicatively competent subjects to take part in moral 
discourses from what postconventional moral agents recognize as 
part of morality; he might combine that with the observation that 
modern legal institutions reflect the contention that we are such 
moral agents, that moral agency 1s to be attributed to all rationally 
competent individuals. The burden of proof would then be on his 
critics to argue that we are not such moral agents, and to offer 
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reasons for why certain individuals should not be considered to have 
a moral status. Adopting this strategy would allow Habermas to 
maintain that all have the right to participate in discourse because 
this is what we hold when we exhibit the highest stage of moral 
thinking of which we are capable, and it is what is exemplified by 
the best of our collective actions. There would then be no need for 
him to attempt to extrapolate U from a conceptual analysis of speech. 
Rather, 1 armed with a general stage theory of moral development, he 
could turn to our political and legal history and use that as the basis 
for the claim that, at this stage of our moral development, there can 
be no legitimate reasons for excluding people from the process by 
which norms are determined. When Habermas argues that U can be 
derived from what it means to justify a norm,he is obviously 
referring to what it means to justify a norm when we are being our 
best moral selves, not, for example, what it means to justify a norm 
when we are acting like bullies, resorting to threats of violence and 
reprisals to enforce our will. From the perspective of a moral agent 
at a higher stage of moral development, these appeals to force are 
disqualified as moral justifications. At a certain stage of 
development, we do intuitively recognize the difference between 
actions motivated by free choice and those motivated by coerc10n. 
Through reconstructing the conditions for noncoercive action, we 
arrive at the conditions necessary for making moral judgments as 
opposed judgments based on force. These conditions can then serve 
as a guideline for the institutionalization of moral discourse. 
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If Habermas were to develop an argument of this type, he 
could avoid the pitfalls of Kantian abstraction into which he more 
than occasionally falls. It would also put the burden of proving that 
we do not and could not recognize the rights to moral sovereignty of 
all other persons on the critics' shoulders. 
At this point I would like to return to the role of politics and its 
place in defining norms and values. I have argued that Habermas's 
distinction between norms and values is untenable. I now wish to 
argue that it is also unsupported by the actual process by which we 
come to determine what counts as being in our collective interest . 
As Habermas himself points out, if one looks at the history of the 
West one· can point to a moral learning process which reflects an 
increase in our capacity for more moral reasoning and for the 
institutionalizing that reasoning in our laws and social institutions. I 
want to claim that, as we undergo this process of moral learning, the 
distinctions we make between private and public, between norms 
and notions of the good life fluctuate as well. As an illustration of 
how such a process occurs, I shall consider the women's movement m 
the United States and its impact on our self-perception and our 
perceptions of others, and on the changes it fore es in our 
consideration of what is normatively valid. 
To have declared ~n 1776, as Abigail Adams did in a letter to 
her husband, that women would be under no obligation to obey any 
law made without their having a voice or a representative was to 
have advanced a claim to rights that was far too radical to be 
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accepted by most women of the time and certainly too radical a claim 
for most men.33 These conservative reactions reflected both 
religious and political values and norms typical of the colonists who 
brought the traditional beliefs of the European worlds from which 
they had come. At the time of the civil war and the flourishing of 
the fight for the abolition of slavery, arguments were being made 
that slaves too were human beings and as human beings shared the 
moral capacities of white moral agents and, thus could not be 
excluded on the basis of their color from the rights of free men, 
, 
including the right of political enfranchisement. Feminists were 
quick to see that the arguments made by the abolitionists could also 
be mounted on behalf of women. Pointing to the contradiction 
involved in rejecting color as an attribute relevant for determining 
moral and political agency, while at the same time accepting gender 
as relevant, many women and some men pushed for assigning moral 
and political rights on the basis of a sh,ared humanity rather than 
upon the irrelevant factors of race or gender. 
The process that led to the change in the norms accepted as 
legitimate involved radical changes in the way people understood 
themselves and others and in what they took to be essential to moral 
and political identity. It involved not only arguments raised in 
books, speeches, pamphlets, poems, novels, and newspapers, but 
political struggles in both the private and public arena. As the 
consciousness of men and women was awakened to the 
discrimination legitimated by the powerful ideologies that led to the 
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acceptance of the oppression of women, beliefs about what could and 
could not be normatively defended changed as well. Norms once 
defended in terms of rightness and justice gradually come to be seen 
as erroneous and ungrounded. 
Through the process . of political struggle, beliefs which once 
seemed to be supported by impregnable arguments came to be 
viewed as mistaken. This not only involved putting forth the kinds 
of arguments Habermas describes as appropriate to the discourse 
situation; it meant persuading people to change their views through 
a I variety of means, including personal relationships with those who 
had opinions different from one's own, art which forced one to look 
at the plight of another with sympathy, literature, film, dance or 
whatever.3 4 
These changes m attitude brought about in myriad ways were 
first necessary if political arguments for the equality of women were 
to be successful. Indeed, what counts as an argument is a question 
that Habermas has never taken up. His tendency is to imply that 
discourse involves only the kind of discursive arguments 
characteristic of philosophy or law. If one looks at the history of a 
political movement, however, it becomes clear that the "arguments" 
made outside of formal discourse through encounters with different 
views powerfully presented through art, literature, film, poetry etc, 
are just as essential for changing concepts of what is normatively 
valid as are discursive arguments. I would even say that they are 
more _important. for they motivate a shift in conceptions of the good 
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life as well. Until views of what it means to be a woman and of 
what part women should play in the private and public sphere are 
changed, normative arguments will most likely fail. Or if they 
succeed at the legal level, there is still the possibility that without a 
radical shift in values, the rights newly acquired by women will 
remain a cardboard victory, for their place in the social and private 
world will not have changed. In order for emancipation to be 
complete, it must take place at the personal, social and cultural level 
as well as at the political and legal level. In this sense, norms and 
values are intrinsically tied together and a shift in both is necessary 
I 
for real change to occur. 
A look at the women's movement also shows that there can be 
no firm distinction drawn between norms and values such that the 
former are relevant to the public sphere whereas the latter are 
associated with the private sphere. When one considers the claims 
and progress of the women's movement, it becomes clear that the 
boundaries between the public and the private sphere are constantly 
shifting as a result of political struggle. Never fixed, these 
boundaries are the result of endless negotiation and argument. A 
clear example of this can be found in our conception of and response 
to violence against women and children in the home, what we now 
refer to as wife battering and child abuse. There was a time when 
what went on in the home between a husband and wife or between a 
father and his children was considered a strictly private matter. 
Short of murder, the home and the family was not a public matter 
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and, therefore, norms like justice and fairness were legally, if not 
morally, inapplicable. This view, under attack by feminists, is 
gradually g1vmg way to the belief that the rights of a citizen must be 
protected within the family as well as outside it. A man's home is no 
longer his castle, ruled solely by his wishes and desires. My point is 
this: just as what we find normatively acceptable changes with our 
changing perceptions of what can be counted as a moral argument, so 
too our understanding of how to define the boundary between the 
public and the private realm changes. The values which Habermas 
identifies as appropriately associated with the private sphere and 
our idiosyncratic notions of the good life are never fixed. Choices 
which are accepted today as a matter of private choice, may 
' 
tomorrow, through the efforts of a political movement, be deemed to 
be appropriately regulated by law and its sanctions. That is to say, 
what today counts as a value and a private issue may tomorrow be 
held to be an issue of public interest and the subject of normative 
interpretation. 
Habermas argues that there are some values too close to us to 
allow for the kind of critical scrutiny which marks the process of the 
justification of norms. As I said in Chapter One, I am willing to 
concede that it may be impossible for us to call all our values into 
question at any one time, but I would also argue that we can and do 
question our values, often because we are forced to by some 
experience. I have discussed above· the role that political movements 
play in leading us to reconsider and often to surrender our 
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previously held beliefs, and indeed a political movement which fails 
to have this affect can only succeed in achieving its goals by dint of 
brute force. Political movements are not however our only impetus 
to identify, clarify and often to change the values we hold, even 
those we hold most dearly. This occurs perhaps commonly as the 
result of questioning prompted by moral dilemmas, or by 
encountering others who hold beliefs different than our own, thereby 
leading us to question what we once held as unquestionable, and in 
less catastrophic ways by examining novels, paintings, poems, or 
films which compel us to consider new ways of looking at ourselves 
or the world. 
I mentioned in Chapter One that Habermas identifies 
adolescence as a pivotal period for moral development. It is m 
adolescence, he argues, that we reorganize our moral beliefs and 
begin the search for a nonconventional grounding for norms. I have 
no quarrel with this argument except that it is incomplete. The 
pathos of adolescence involves not only the need to question the 
normative status quo, but the search for meaning in the values that 
have informed one's life and relationships. Adolescents tend to 
subject all their moral beliefs and values to an agonizing scrutiny m 
an effort to define themselves as adults, questioning much of what 
was readily accepted in childhood, including the integrity of their 
parents and the desirability and meaningfulness of the ways of life 
they have chosen.35 In short, the adolescent undergoes the painful 
challenge of questioning that which Habermas claims cannot be 
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questioned: their values and identity. In a troubling search for self-
identity, the adolescent calls into question competing conceptions of 
the good life, and tries on a multitude of personnae trying to find 
one that integrates the various aspects of a chosen identity. The high 
rate of teen suicide is a good indication of just how cataclysmic and 
frightening this search for identity and authenticity can be. 
On the cusp of creating an identity, formulating a conception of 
the good life and challenging the validity of the values he or she 
have been taught, nothing remains outside the critical purview of the 
adolescent. Certainly this search is not limited to an intellectual 
process of questioning the grounds for the moral justification of 
norms. As we mature, we become more secure in our self-identity 
and perhaps need to be jostled out of our complacent acceptance of 
who we are and what we believe by some experience which touches 
us deeply and calls into question values we may not even have 
realized we held; there seems little· question that we are often in 
situations where just this kind of jostling takes place. No identity is 
so secure, no set of values so entrenched that they are immune to 
contradictions or questions which may be disquieting, but are also 
vitally important if we are not to become rigid and inflexible. This 
questioning is more likely in modern pluralistic societies where our 
encounters with a variety of different beliefs about norms and a 
plethora of visions of the good life, forces us to continually reexamine 
our beliefs, even those which we hold to be most sacred to us. 
From these reflections I conclude that even matters which do 
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not allow for dispassionate consensus, because they do not represent 
universal interests, can be questioned; such questioning is endemic to 
the human situation and to our quest to grow as moral beings. We 
can and do question our values; we often feel uncertain that our 
vision of the good life is the right one. Thus, Habermas's claim that 
our values are too "close" to us for questioning is untrue, and cannot 
therefore be used as a way to demarcate norms from values. 
Having critically assessed and modified Habermas's conception 
of the moral subject, I shall now consider whether Sandel's criticisms 
of the deontological subject are applicable to the Habermasian self as 
modified. Sandel's central argument is that the deontological 
conception of the self is too thin becaus~ of the distance it puts 
between a self and its ends. Not only does this conception deny the 
crucial connection between a self and its ends, he argues, it also 
undercuts the significance of the relationships of the self to other 
individuals and to community. The reason that deontologists must 
make such a radical distinction between the self and its ends is to 
provide justification for. a notion of justice that does not rely on a 
teleological or consequentialist theory of ends. Rawls defends as his 
"Archimedean point" the selfs capacity to make a moral choice, thus 
relegating to lesser significance the choices it actually makes. 
Habermas, on the other hand, identifies the selfs ability to reflect on 
the ends it chooses, and its capacity to offer normative justifications 
for those choices, as what is essential in his construction of a moral 
theory. The ends a subject chooses are not morally irrelevant to 
139 
Habermas because they are essentially connected to the reasons 
offered to justify them. 
The process of moral discourse as Habermas describes it 
involves the participation of actual subjects who bring to discourse 
the totality of their identities, including their attachments to their 
projects and aspirations, their relationships with others and their 
commitments to certain ideals. In discourse, we are not expected to 
perceive our selves or others as stripped of the qualities that 
individuate us and, in fact, there is no reason why these qualities 
cannot be taken into account as morally relevant. For these reasons, 
Habermas's theory does not suffer the shortcomings Sandel describes 
as afflicting deontological theories generally. The ends one chooses 
are not denied their significance and the subject is not shorn of its 
identity. 
There is one aspect of Sandel's critique of deontology which 
strikes me as problematic. Though he calls for a balance between a 
conception of the self that is identical to its ends and a conception of 
a self radically distanced from its ends, it is not clear to me that he 
succeeds in explaining how this can be accomplished. There are 
times when he seems to suggest that reflection itself leads to a self 
separated from its ends. At other times, he recognizes the 
importance of reflection for sorting through our beliefs and 
commitments in a search for self-identity. This confusion is 
compounded by his tendency to talk about the relationship of the 
self to its ends as if all our ends are pre-given by the attachments we 
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have or the aspirations we hold. A self of this sort must search for 
its identity by a reflecting which enables 
the self to turn its lights inward upon 
itself, to inquire into its constituent 
nature, to survey its various 
attachments and acknowledge their 
respective claims, to sort out the bounds 
-- now expansive, now constrained --
between the self and the other, to arrive 
at a subjectivity less opaque if never 
perfectly transparent, a subjectivity less 
fluid if never finally fixed, and so 
gradually, throughout a lifetime, to 
participate in the constitution of its 
identity .3 6 
Despite Sandel's description of the self as never fixed, his image of 
turning inward to discover who we are and what we believe 
underemphasizes the significance of this self's turning outward m an 
engagement with the world or with others and discovering in its 
actions, and in the reactions of others, something new about itself. 
Despite his criticism of the monological nature of the deontological 
self, in passages like the one above, he too has a tendency to describe 
the process of identity-formation as a process undertaken by an 
isolated individual, who constructs its identity not through discourse 
or relationships but by reflecting upon those attachments. In the 
final analysis, Habermas's moral individual whose identity is socially 
constituted all the way down is more defined by its attachments than 
1s the self which Sandel describes. 
There is another aspect of Sandel' s work worth considering m 
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the present context: the place for justice in the pantheon of virtues. 
In his discussion of justice and benevolence, he argues that there are 
circumstances in which benevolence rather than justice is the virtue 
which ought to motivate our behavior. This I think is quite true and 
the example he uses to make his point is an appropriate one: in the 
context of friendship, the exact calculation down to the penny of 
debts owed is inappropriate: 
If, out of a misplaced sense of justice, a 
close friend of long-standing repeatedly 
insists on calculating and paying his 
exact share of every common 
expenditure, or refuses to accept any 
favor or hospitality except at the 
greatest protest and embarrassment, 
not only will I feel compelled to be 
reciprocally scrupulous but at some 
point may begin to wonder whether I 
have not misunderstood our 
relationship. The circumstances of 
benevolence will to this extent have 
diminished, and the circumstances of 
justice grown.3 7 
Sandel concludes this argument by claiming that an increase in 
justice in "inappropriate conditions"38 comes at an unacceptable 
pnce. While it seems true that in the situation he describes justice 
should not be the dominant virtue, he does not specify what are the 
"appropriate conditions" for the exercise of justice. Certainly not all 
of our relationships with others take the form of friendship, and I am 
not suggesting that Sandel claims that they do, but he gives us no 
sense of how and when justice should be the primary virtue, surely a 
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strange shortcoming m a book about the limits of justice. 
My criticisms of Sandel not withstanding, Habermas's moral 
theory does have its own shortcomings, one of which is his failure to 
offer a comprehensive theory of moral character, including an 
account of the variety and complexity of what have been 
traditionally called the virtues, an account of the judgment required 
by a moral agent to recognize the moral nature of a situation, and an 
account of how moral agents decide which virtue should be exercised 
when. In the following chapter, I will discuss this limitation in light 
of critics who argue that a theory of moral character involves far 
more than a reconstruction of our intellectual capacity to reflect upon 
our moral choices and to offer reasons for them 
In summary, I have argued that, with some reworking, 
Habermas's theory of the moral subject avoids the problems that 
MacIntyre and Sandel attribute to the subject of deontological theory 
generally. Habermas's moral individual is ·marked not only by 
attachments and commitments, but also by the ability to reflect upon 
his or her beliefs and offer reasons for them. This process of 
reflection does not bring about the kind of alienation from the self 
and its ends that Sandel points to, for reflection can bring about an 
even stronger commitment to those ends and relationships: as Sandel 
himself recognizes at times, the process of reflection is crucial for the 
integration and reaffirmation of beliefs, and it is essential to the 
always on-going process of identity formation. Habermas's discourse 
theory is also secure against Maclntyre's critique of rights, for like 
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MacIntyre, he grounds his claim in existing social practices, the 
practices of justice, in which reflection and reason-giving play an 
important role. Nor is Habermas's self a disembodied ego without 
connection to friends, family and community. In fact, it is through its 
relationship with others that self-identity is first constituted. 
Habermas's treatment of character and his discussion of the virtues 
is, in the final analysis, radically incomplete. In the following 
chapter, I show how to this shortcoming can be corrected without 
falling prey to a notion of moral identity that is simply a reflection of 
conventional beliefs and attitudes. While it is true that there are 
limits to the appropriateness of the exercise of justice, and while it 1s 
true that the social and political world in which we find ourselves 
informs our conceptions of the right and the good, we are also able to 
transcend our particularity, reflect upon and criticize even those 
beliefs closest to our hearts, and take up a more universal posture. 
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CHAPIER THREE 
Habermas's theory of personal identity lacks the completeness 
necessary if discourse ethics is to account for the full complexity of 
morality. What it lacks is a theory of moral character and an account 
of moral perception, moral judgment and moral emotions. In this 
chapter I will discuss these various aspects of morality not accounted 
for by his theory. Using the works of Lawrence Blum, Martha 
Nussbaum and Carol Gilligan as reference points for my discussion, I 
will underline those aspects of morality which Habermas tends to 
neglect. In the final chapter, I will then sketch how Habermas's 
discourse ethic can be reconstructed to include these other elements. 
This chapter is divided into four parts, each part taking up a 
different set of questions that arise when one considers the 
complicated subject of moral character. The first topic is the 
traditional characterization of thought as rational and emotion as 
irrational. I will argue that the rational and the irrational are not as 
distinct as philosophers take them to be, and that in the sphere of 
ethics, our emotional response is just as morally significant as our 
moral deliberation. That is, our definition of a situation as moral 
involves both moral cognition and moral perception. Separating one 
from the other leads to a severely truncated view of what is in fact 
an enormously complicated process involving far more than 
reasonmg. In particular, Habermas's separation of moral reasoning 
from moral motivation and moral emotions, leads to a theory that 1s 
too limited to account for the multiple complexities of a moral 
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response. We can create the theoretical space he would need to give 
a fuller account of what is involved in thinking, feeling and acting 
morally by developing a theory of moral character that takes into 
account moral perceptiveness, moral motivation and moral emotions 
In the second section, I will consider what motivates us to act 
morally once we have recognized that we are in a moral situation. 
Referring back to my discussion in Chapter One of Habermas's 
appropriation of Mead's theory of socialization, I will argue that just 
as we learn social roles from others, we learn to adopt the role of 
moral agent from others. From this I conclude that Habermas cannot 
ignore the way our motivations are formed, for these motivations 
occur in the same context as the role-playing which leads to our 
ability to reason in terms of the principles of justice. Motivations are 
also intrinsically related to how we justify norms because they 
provide us with an understanding of what morality requires of us 
and the , sensitivity to construct a situation as calling for us to 
respond morally. 
The third section will take up what I consider to be a central 
issue for a theory of moral character, that is, the question of what 
moral judgment is and what it involves. Combining Habermas's 
theory of reasoning with a neo-Aristotelian concept ·of weighing and 
balancing the universal and particular, I will point to what a theory 
of moral judgment should include. While not giving up the notion 
that there are universal moral principles which should guide rational 
moral thinking, I argue that explaining the process of applying 
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universal principles to particular cases requires a theory of judgment 
that cannot itself be explained in terms of those principles. 
In the final section, I will take up Carol Gilligan's "two 
moralities" thesis, arguing that Habermas's theory of identity 
formation can assimilate her description of attachment and 
detachment and the moral attitudes which arise from them. The 
result is an account of morality that can take into account affective 
responses and moral sensitivity as well as moral reasoning. 
A. Rationality and Irrationality: Reasoning and the Emotions 
Since the very beginnings of philosophy, the emotions have 
been held to be the enemy of rationality. From the Pythagorean 
table of opposites to contemporary philosophy, reason has been seen 
as diametrically opposed to the emotions, and has been especially 
associated with women and children. To" give way" to one's emotions 
is to forsake reason, it is to give way to childishness or femininity. 
Plato associated the emotions with madness, and with his 
metaphorical image of the soul as horses guided by a charioteer m 
the Phaedrus, he urged us to control our emotions through the 
exercise of reason. Whereas rationality has been thought to be a 
function of intellect, emotions have been held to be the function of 
appetite. Emotions have been thought to be random, fickle and 
unreliable whereas rationality has been thought to be a secure 
foundation for morality. The association of morality with intellect 
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found its crowning expression m Kant. While Aristotle made the 
cultivation of the emotions an integral part of his moral philosophy, 
Kant located the moral moment in an intellectual act of will 
determined in accordance with a universal principle. For such a 
morality the emotions have no positive function and must be quelled 
at every turn.While Habermas does not specifically take up the 
question of the role of emotions in morality, -by defining morality m 
terms of moral reasoning, he commits himself to the position that 
morality is a question of right thinking. This limiting of morality to 
right reasoning contradicts his own notion of discursive will 
formation which includes the process by which we identify and 
interpret even our needs and desires through moral discourse. Since 
discourse takes place between actual individuals, who bring all parts 
of themselves to the process, it necessarily involves not only their 
reasoned beliefs but also their emotional beliefs and commitments. 
If the will has been held to be the vehicle of the intellect, 
"intuition" has been seen to be the vehicle of the emotions. To intuit 
something, in this sense, is not to have a clear idea about it but 
rather to grasp through the emotions some state of affairs or quality 
that one can't otherwise "put one's finger on." Further, while 
morality is thought to require clear thinking and reasoned decisions, 
emotion is said to lead to impulsivity or contrariness. As reason is 
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opposed to the emotions, so too the public sphere is opposed to the 
private. The private sphere is the appropriate place for our emotions 
and affective attachments, whereas in the public sphere our actions 
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should be marked by rational thought. These simplistic dichotomies 
break down, however, when a phenomenon as complex as morality is 
under consideration; and rather than helping, they only serve to 
confuse. Though we may wish to retain some distinction between 
the private and public spheres, it seems clear that we act or are 
expected to act as moral agents in both and that emotion and 
intuition play some part in constituting the moral character of that 
agency. 
In Frie•ndship, Altruism and Morality. 1, Lawrence Blum takes 
· up the tangled problem of the role of the emotions in moral 
situations. Most moral philosophers since the nineteenth century 
have neglected the role that they play in the formation of moral 
character and in moral action itself. In part, Blum argues, this was 
due to the view of the emotions as capricious and variable: while we 
can control our actions through an act of will, emotions are outside 
the scope of our control -- or, as Blum puts it, we are thought to be 
passive with respect to our emotions and thus they are held to fall 
outside the scope of that for which we can be morally responsible. 2 
Tied to this view is the argument that taking up the moral point of 
view requires impartiality, that is, one must distance oneself from 
one's affective attachments in order to achieve the kind of fairness 
that moral reasoning involves. Within this tradition, in which 
Habermas tends to fall, the scope of morality is exhausted by reason 
and rationality. In the last chapter, I will take up the question of 
whether a theory of moral character can be integrated into 
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Habermas's discourse ethic; at the moment I wish to pursue Blum's 
argument that the emotions are as central to morality as moral 
reasoning 1s. After considering the general role that the emotions 
play in moral responsiveness, I will take up the question of partiality 
and impartiality by further exploring Blum's position, as well as 
those of Carol Gilligan and Martha Nussbaum. 
Blum's first argument~tive strategy is to point to a group of 
emotions that he calls the altruistic emotions and to demonstrate that 
they are not nearly as capricious and unreliable as the Kantian 
tradition has held. Indeed, when they are an aspect of an integrated 
and developed moral character, they are not only a factor in bringing 
about a moral response, they are themselves an integral part of that 
response. One of the reasons for philosophy's neglect of the emotions 
is our overly simplified view of them. In an attempt to correct this, 
Blum describes the content and nature of the altruistic emotions, 
beginning with a brief definition of which kinds of emotions are 
altruistic: 
Altruistic emotions are more than passive 
feeling-states which have a person in a state 
of woe as their object. They involve an active, 
motivational (or "conative") aspect as well, 
. relating to the promotion of beneficent acts 
aimed at helping the other person. In 
general, if person A fails to be motivated to 
h e 1 p B 
( who is suffering), whom he is in a position to 
help at no cost and with minimal 
inconvenience to himself, then A does not 
have concern, compassion or sympathy for B.3 
Blum stresses the importance of recognizing the action that 
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compassion or concern brings about because the activity associated 
with emotions has been underplayed. Emotions have been depicted 
as being states which come upon us and are thus passive. As states 
which just happen to us ( or just don't happen to us ), the altruistic 
emotions have been thought to be too unreliable to function as moral 
motives. "One acts according to how one feels - one's moods, 
impulses and inclination - and not according to the moral 
requirements of the situation." 4 But Blum counters that moral 
emotions are not as capricious, not as dependent upon inclination as 
Kant thought, and hence can be considered to be reliable motives for 
moral action· and also a necessary part of a moral response. 
What makes altruistic emotions different from personal 
affection or impulsive acts of benificence is that they are grounded m 
a moral concern for the welfare of others. "Altruistic feelings have as 
their object another person in light of (and for the sake of) his own 
good."5 It is the good of the other person that makes altruistic 
emotions moral. Personal feelings of affection can be distinguished 
from moral feelings because what motivates them is different. I can 
be drawn to someone because of their nature of their wit, their style 
or their kindness, in other words, because of some personal quality 
they have to which I respond. I may indeed also have altruistic 
feelings for such a person, but these are not necessarily caused by 
the traits which attract me to him or her. Indeed I can have 
altruistic feelings for someone I find quite unpersonable, because 
altruism is grounded in a concern for the other's good, not in a sense 
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of warmth or admiration. 
When I have an altruistic feeling for another, and feel a 
compassionate interest in their weal and woe6 these emotions can 
lead me to act contrary to my own more selfish desires and interests, 
just as a sense of duty can. lead me to act in a moral way when I 
might have preferred to shirk my moral duty. In considering the 
Kantian idea that duty is a dependable motive for moral action and 
altruism is not, Blum points out that Kant's belief in the efficiency of 
duty as a moral motive is not as well grounded as he would like to 
think. There are desires which may be too strong even for duty to 
overcome, ?,nd there is no reason to believe that our compassionate 
commitment to the weal and woe of others is any less of a motivation 
than is our commitment to duty; 
Concern for others can lead me to forgo 
activities which I strongly desire to engage in, 
or to make great sacrifices of my possessions, 
money, even my life, for the sake of the 
object of my concern.7 
Blum's argument here works in two directions: first, he claims that 
duty is not water-tight as a moral motive and thus there 1s no reason 
to privilege it over other motives, and second, he argues that the 
moral emotions are not so easily swayed by inclination as Kant 
believed. 
In making this argument, Blum uses several examples of 
situations in which people act out of a commitment to the good of 
others despite inclinations to ignore that impulse in favor of some 
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other desire. He describes a man, Bob, who recognizes that he ought 
to visit Sue who is in the hospital. He intends to do so but, as the 
working day draws to its end, he is tired and tempted to go for a 
relaxing drink with his colleagues rather than expressing his care for . 
Sue by visiting her. If his commitment to Sue's good is strong 
enough, he will withstand the temptation to give in to his tiredness 
and will visit her, knowing that the visit will cheer her. If he does 
give in to his fatigue or desire for the companionship of his co-
workers, it is appropriate to question the seriousness of his 
commitment to Sue's good, and even to claim that he is guilty of a 
moral failing with respect to her. Blum concludes that it is clear that 
Bob "would be doing the morally better thing by visiting Sue. "8 
This example brings to the fore a difference between 
assessments of moral character and evaluations of the morality of a 
decision. A moral assessment of character can not be based on a 
single action or on a particular failure to act. Take for instance the 
example of Bob's failure to visit Sue in the hospital. Though we 
would want to say that Bob did not act as morally as he could have 
when he chose not to visit Sue, we would have to know more about 
Bob and his moral behavior over time before we could conclude that 
he truly is not a compassionate or moral person. Suppose that Bob 1s 
generally a caring person who goes out of his way to advance the 
good of others, we might want to excuse a single failing, recognizing 
that moral character is rarely evidenced in a single act and is for the 
most part demonstrated over time. 
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One might protest thatthere are actions or responses which are 
so dramatic in scope and consequence that their commission or 
omission can never be rectified, such as the torture of another, or the 
engineering of a genocidal plan, or some other instance of evil so 
great that it is difficult if not impossible to imagine the moral 
redemption of their perpetrators. As Martha Nussbaum notes, there 
are some evils which destroy our humanity in such a way that our 
moral character is shattered. As an example of such a 
transformation, Nussbaum chooses Euripedes' account of the fate of 
Hecuba. When Hecuba's children are slaughtered, her confidence in 
the trust of others collapses and she herself is driven to become less 
than human by revenging their deaths with the bloody assassination 
of both the man responsible for the deaths of her children and his 
two children. As it is a belief in custom and laws which makes us 
human, it is no coincidence that the gods transform Hecuba into a 
dog with blood-red eyes: 
But if being human is a matter of the 
charac.ter of one's trust and commitment, 
rather than an immutable matter of natural 
fact . . . then the human being is also the being 
that can most easily cease to be itself.... The 
events of this play show us that the 
annihilation of convention by another's act 
can destroy the stable character of the 
character who receives it. It can, quite simply 
produce bestiality, the utter lO$S of human 
relatedness and human language. 
Moral failures of a less catastrophic sort impair one's character 
without destroying it, and it is these failures which are more typical 
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than the sort that destroyed Hecuba, and it is to these more limited 
failings that Blum turns his attention. 
Blum is certainly not claiming that having altruistic emotions 1s 
any guarantee that one will follow through and do what is right. He 
does claim that altruistic emotions can often withstand even very 
compelling desires to act less than morally, and, very importantly, he 
suggests that, in some situations, experiencing the appropriate 
emotion is itself morally significant, though one can not actually do 
anything to bring about the good of the other. One of his examples· 
demonstrates the intrinsic value of altruistic emotions, even in 
situations in which one can do nothing to alleviate anothers pain or 
sorrow. Blum asks us to imagine that Joan is an astronaut circling 
the earth in outer space, who due to some technical disaster will die 
in a few hours. Two of her friends, Dave and Manny, do everything 
that can be done to save her, to no avail. She cannot be helped and 
she will die. After Manny has discharged his duty' to her, having 
explored all possibilities and tried every possible scheme to rescue 
her, he realizes that he has fulfilled his obligation to his friend and 
turns to other matters. Dave on the other hand, while recognizing 
that nothing can be done to save Joan's life, continues to think of her, 
imagining what it would be like to die in the way that she will, 
wondering what she is thinking about, hoping that she knows how 
deeply he cares for her. We are not to think that the difference in 
the two men's response is a differen<!e in personal style; Manny's 
actions spring from a sense of obligation so that when his duty is 
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fulfilled he does not have some kind of hidden sorrow, whereas Dave 
acts from a sense of care and concern that lingers even in the face of 
his inability to act on his concern. Blum completes his example by 
asking us to consider how Joan would feel about Manny and Dave's 
response if she were to know of them; 
A good to Joan which both Dave and Manny's 
responses involve is the help which they 
attempt to get for her. But beyond that, 
Dave's response to the situation involves a 
certain good to Joan which Manny's does not, 
namely the good of the emotions of care and 
concern from a friend. This good, then, is a 
good not connected with beneficent action, 
but is involved simply in the emotional 
reaction itself.9 
We might also want to add that the good of Dave's response also 
redounds to his moral character. That is, though both Manny and 
Dave have taken all possible steps to rescue Joan, Dave has acted 
more morally, for he has expressed a moral emotion which Manny 
has not. Though Dave's sympathy can do nothing to rescue Joan, it 
has an intrinsic moral worth that makes Dave a better person for 
having felt it. 
This does not deny that part of the moral significance of the 
altruistic emotions is their impact on moral motivation. Surely a 
compassionate, concerned person is more apt to discern that another 
is in distress and is more inclined to act to alleviate that distress, but 
moral character is not only a matter of action. It is, as Blum writes, 
good to us simply that someone else care 
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about our welfare, be sympathetic to us, have 
compassion for us when we are suffering. 
Concern from another is an affirmation that 
one's well-being matters to that person and 
that therefore one has some kind of 
importance to him. In turn, as James Wallace 
points out, this sense of mattering to another 
serves to affirm one's own sense of self-
worth. "10 
The reason for the failure to take seriously the intrinsic value of an 
emotional response which does not lead to further action is 
complicated. It has two facets. The first lies in the belief that we do 
not have the control over our emotions that we do over our actions 
and thus cannot be obligated to respond in a particular way at a 
particular time. According to this line of thinking, "we can be 
obliged to perform a certain act, and not to have a certain emotion or 
feeling" 11. This is part of the "emotions are fickle" argument. There 1s 
no simple argument to counter this position, considering moral 
examples, however, makes it clear that part of what we take to be a 
moral response is the having and expressing of appropriate emotions. 
In the Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum lays out a moral 
example which makes this point well. When King Agamemnon who 
has been commanded by Zeus to lay siege to Troy to revenge an 
abuse of hospitality, is faced with the news by the prophet Calchas 
that his fleet will be becalmed and all his men will starve if he does 
not sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia, he is a guiltless man faced with 
a tragic situation. No choice he can make will leave him morally 
blameless, and while the chorus recognizes the death of Iphegenia as 
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necessary, they still condemn Agamemnon. As Nussbaum notes, 
critics have typically explained away either the necessity of the act 
or the blame the Chorus levies against Agamemnon, because at first 
glance they seem incompatible. Brilliantly reanalyzing the play, she 
discovers the root of Agamemnon's moral failings which most critics 
have missed. It lies not in the fact that Agamemnon sacrificed his 
child as Zeus commanded him to do, but rather in the feelings or 
rather in the lack of feeling Agamemnon experienced while 
undertaking the necessary sacrifice; for he killed his child " with no 
more agony, no more revulsion of feeling, than if she had indeed 
been an animal of a different species." 12 Clytemnestra, Iphegenia' s 
mother, echoes the condemnation of the Chorus when she cries out 
that Agamemnon had slaughtered his kin: "Holding her in no special 
honor, as if it were the death of a beast where sheep abound in a 
well-fleeced- flock, he sacrificed his child" l3 Faced with a horrifying 
choice, Agamemnon does not protest or lament the decree of the 
prophet. He accepts his fate as if it were already sealed and, as 
Nussbaum points out, rearranges his feelings; 
Voicing no blame of the prophet or his 
terrible message, Agamemnon now begins to 
cooperate inwardly with necessity, arranging 
his feelings to accord with his fortune. From 
the moment he makes his decision, itself the 
best he could have made, he strangely turns 
himself into a collaborator, a willing victim.1 4 
Nussbaum 1s careful to point out that Agamemnon's fault does not lie 
in his choice of action. Tragic as it is, under the circumstances it was 
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the right thing to do. Nor does Aiamemnon fail to recognize the 
horror of what the gods have asked, as he himself says: 
A heavy doom is disobedience, but heavy too, 
if I shall rend my own child, the adornment of 
my house, polluting a father's hands with 
streams of slaughtered maiden's blood close 
by the altar. Which of these is without evils? 
How should I become a deserter, failing in my 
duty to the alliance.15 
Though he recognizes the horror of what is demanded of him, m the 
course of acting he allows the awareness of that horror to slip from 
him, he distorts his action so that it becomes easier to live with. 
Agamemnon fails morally: first, in his lack of appropriate 
feeling for the slaughter of his daughter and, second, when his moral 
cowardice leads him to distort the situation such that he can actually 
say, "For it is right and holy that I should desire with exceedingly 
impassioned passion the sacrifice staying the winds, the maiden's 
blood" 16 As Nussbaum suggests, this speech is a shocking indication 
of the extent to which Agamemnon has become complicitous in the 
crime he must commit. To believe that the slaughter of Iphegenia is 
right and holy is to deny the reality of the situation which demands 
her life, but does not demand that the sacrifice be viewed with 
anything but horror and moral revulsion. By shielding himself from 
the horror of the situation, Agamemnon allows himself to be morally 
duplicitous and protects himself from the moral pain that he ought to · 
feel under the circumstances; it is this that is the source of his 
culpability in the eyes of the Chorus. After the sacrifice of Iphegenia, 
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the king does not utter a single regret or appear to suffer any guilt or 
compassion for the child he slew. 17 Agamemnon on some level was 
able to deny the reality of his act and thus tries to escape 
accountability. His failure lies not in what he did, but in the absence 
of suffering;, it is a failure to experience the emotions appropriate to 
the heinous act he was compelled to commit. 
By not feeling the p~oper emotion, the king becomes 
responsible for Iphegenia's death in a way that he would not if he 
had fought against his fate in a terrible internal struggle. We are left 
to doubt the genuineness of his love for his child and, indeed, to call 
into question his moral character as a whole. What kind of man 
would not suffer horribly if he were the instrument of his child's 
death? By failing to feel the right emotions at the right time, 
Agamemnon's moral stature is radically diminished: 
the good agent will also feel and exhibit the 
feelings appropriate to a person of good 
character caught in such a situation ( i.e. a 
situation where one must undertake an evil 
act). He will not regard the fact of decision as 
licensing feelings of self-congratulations, 
much less feelings of unqualified enthusiasm 
for the act chosen. He will show in his 
emotive behavior, and also genuinely feel, 
that this is an act deeply repellent to him and 
to his character.... And after the action he will 
remember, regret, and, where possible make 
reparations. His emotion, moreover, will not 
be simply regret, which could be felt and 
expressed by an uninvolved spectator and 
does not imply that he has acted badly. It 
will be an emotion more like remorse, closely 
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bound up with acknowledgement of the 
wrong that he has as an agent, however 
reluctantly, done.18 
This example makes clear that the obligations of morality are not 
exhausted by moral acts; feeling the right way at the right time is as 
much a part of morality as is acting in the right way at the right 
time, from the right motives. 
One of the inherent difficulties for a discussion of moral 
character is that moral emotions are tied to moral perceptions and 
ultimately to moral judgement, and it is difficult, if not impossible to 
untangle that which in actual moral character is closely bound 
together. Having argued that morality involves right feeling as well 
as right action, I shall now turn to a discussion of moral judgment 
and moral perception, considering the role moral emotions play both 
in recognizing the moral aspect of situations and in deciding what we 
ought to do in a moral situation. 
Section Two: Moral Perception and Moral Judgment 
Moral perception is the ability to perceive a situation as having 
a moral resonance, as being a situation where a moral response is 
expected. It differs from moral judgment or moral decision-making 
in that it precedes them. If one does not recognize the moral 
potential of a situation, there is no reason for us to bring our moral 
capacity into play. lt is a kind of sensitivity to the weal and woe of 
others made possible by a compassion for others, a sense of being 
somehow responsible for improving their lot. 
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Blum uses a very undramatic but effective example to make 
this point, arguing that altruistically inclined people are more likely 
than their non-altruistically inclined counterparts to have the 
sensitivity to perceive the moral potential in an encounter with 
another. Blum asks us to. imagine ourselves seated on a trolley car 
where we observe a women with several parcels standing nearby. If 
I am not altruistically sensitive, I might describe this event factually 
as a woman with many parcels riding a trolley car. If we are more 
sensitive to the fortunes of others, even the factual description of the 
situation changes. Such a person doesn't simply see another person 
on the trolley, he or she sees someone who is uncomfortably juggling 
heavy packages, looking tired and frazzled. Under such a description, 
accessible only to a certain kind of caring person, my offering her my 
seat becomes clear to me as a moral choice. I "see" her as having a 
need which my altruism leads me to fulfill. In this example, the 
importance of my altruistic emotions is in my perception of the 
situation as having a moral character, which then opens the 
possibility to frame my decision of what to do in a moral way. The 
perception of the situation as one requiring my moral consideration 
must precede the motivation to act with an awareness of the moral 
ramifications of my choice. 
Moral perception differs from person to person and from 
situation to situation. In Sophocles's play Antigone, Creon and 
Antigone read the same situation in a different way, leading them to 
a collision course. Ismene, Antigone's sister, originally fails to "see" 
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the moral import of Creon's interdiction against the burial of her 
brother and it is Antigone who tries to point out the moral 
significance of not burying the bodies of the family's dead: 
0 kindred, own-sisterly head of Ismene, do 
you know that there is not one of the evils 
left by Oedipus that Zeus does not fulfill for us 
while we live? .. Do you grasp anything? Have 
you heard anything? Or has it escaped your 
notice that the evils that belong to enemies 
are advancing against our friends?l 9 
The emotional tone of Antigone's words are no coincidence. Ismene 
must be made to feel the compellingness of the moral insult of 
Creon's decree. In order for her to act as Antigone believes is 
morally appropriate, she must first perceive her moral obligation. 
She must be made to feel the pain that Antigone feels at the thought 
that her brother will be denied a burial that will make it possible for 
his spirits to come to rest in peace. Antigone does not present 
Ismene with logical arguments about what she should think or why 
she should act in a certain way. Her first instinct is to try to affect 
how she perceives the situation, for only then can her arguments 
have a hope of succeeding. This is not to deny that Antigone's action 
is as much motivated by a sense of what is "due" to family as it is by 
her compassion for her dead brothers, but in her attempts to sway 
Ismene (who is someone who acts much more on the basis of 
compassion than she does of duty) Antigone's first step is to make 
Ismene aware that she faces a moral crisis, and she does this by 
calling to mind her love for her brothers and by calling upon her to 
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perceive the situation as having a moral significance. 
In her explanation of why the works of the Greek tragedians 
.should be considered to be important to philosophical accounts of 
morality, Nussbaum argues that one of the things we learn from 
these works is that suffering can make us grow in sensitivity and m 
compassion. This growth is evidenced as a greater moral sensitivity 
to the suffering of others, to a greater awareness of moral which 
once we might never have perceived; 
The poets offer us not simply an route to a 
contemplative or Platonic type of knowing; 
their disagreement with Plato is profound. 
They claim to offer us an occasion for an 
activity of knowing that could not even in 
principle be had by the intellect alone. 20 
The emotions that are involved in the perception of the moral 
character of a problem are the result of education, both in the sense 
of rearing a child so that it comes to feels compassion for the plight 
and distress of others, and in the sense of the moral growth brought 
about by experience. Both are obviously complicated processes that 
begin with learning to respond to others sympathetically, to identify 
with their predicaments emotionally in such a way that we are then 
motivated to act. Perceiving that a situation calls for a moral 
response and the actual motivation to act are obviously closely tied 
together, but can be distinquished so as to better understand their 
relationship. 
Section 3: Moral Motivation 
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Kant argued that the motivation to act morally must be 
grounded in the rational perception of the other as an end and not a 
means. Habermas is careful to talk of morality as a particular kind 
of reasoning. Clearly Blum and Nussbaum would want to leave room 
for the idea that moral motivation can be grounded in a 
compassionate perception of another's plight and in a desire to 
remedy that plight. This emphasizes the emotive aspect of 
motivation, though it does not rule out the possibility of a cognitive 
component. Carol Gilligan's analysis of morality, which argues that 
compassion can and must be considered as essential to morality 
offers us a way to integrate Blum and Nussbaum's insight into the 
significance of emotions for moral theory into a more general theory 
of the development of moral character. 
In her book, In a Different Voice21Carol Gilligan challenges the 
Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning; she adopts a model of moral 
action which does not separate moral judgment from moral 
motivation, but sees judgment, action and emotional response as 
essentially related and of equal significance for morality. Gilligan 
arrives at a discussion of moral motivation by way of her 
observation that men and women respond differently to moral 
situations; men are more inclined to the sort of rights-thinking that 
Habermas and Kohlberg take to be the mark of the moral agent, 
whereas women are more inclined to respond out of sense of care or 
connection with others. Gilligan argues that this other and different 
moral voice has gone unheard; our moral philosophies reflect only 
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the male voice of impartial reason. 
Gilligan's theory was sparked by her observation that 
Kohlberg's female test subjects consistently tested lower than their 
male counterparts despite educations and backgrounds which led 
researches to believe· they would test as well as the male subjects. 
As she began to consider the responses of these female subjects, she 
discovered that the answers they gave to the various moral 
dilemmas posed by the moral psychologists were not couched m a 
language of abstract rights or universal duties and that this was what 
led to their lower scores on Kohlberg's scale of moral maturity. 
Gilligan argues that though. the women's responses did not fit the 
pattern of abstract thinking mapped out by Kohlberg, they reveal a 
coherent moral thread. The point of the most radical differences 
between the responses of men and women is most clearly seen m 
what it is that motivates men and women to act morally. While 
men are motivated to do the right thing because of principles, 
women, Gilligan claims to have discovered. are motivated to prevent 
harm, that is they fear that another will be hurt and act in such a 
way as to avoid that. 22 The best way to demonstrate Gilligan's point 
is once again to consider an example. This time our example 
concerns eleven-year-old male and female children, both presented 
with the Heinz dilemna. 23 Jake at eleven immediately shares 
Kohlberg'.s view of what the problem is, i.e., a question of the value of 
life and the value of property and answers that Heinz should steal 
the drug. Amy, seemingly an equally bright and developed child 
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seems at first glance to fumble in her answer; as Gilligan notes her 
first answer seems evasive and unsure. She says in response to the 
question, "Well I don't think so. I think there might be other ways 
besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan 
or something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug - but his wife 
shouldn't die either. "24 When she is asked why Heinz should not 
steal the drug, she doesn't give an answer that weighs the value of 
life over property, she answers in terms of the hurt that could come 
to Heinz, his wife or to their relationship if he does steal the drug; 
If he stole the drug, he might save his wife 
then, but if he did ,he might have to go to jail, 
and then his wife might get sicker again, and 
he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might 
not be good. So they should really just talk it 
out and find some other way to make the 
money. 25 
Amy's perception of the problem that faces Heinz is not one of 
ordering moral norms into a hierarchy and then acting on the norm 
with tp.e highest priority. Amy views Heinz's relationship with his 
wife which extends over time as what is crucial. Given that this is 
what she sees as his priority, her answer reflects her awareness of 
the complex ramifications the theft of the drug would have over the 
long haul. 
Unlike Jake, who by his own description thinks moral problems 
are like math problems with humans instead of numbers, Amy is 
sensitive to the impact Heinz's actions will have on the continuity of 
his relationship to his wife . In the course of analyzing other parts of 
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Amy's response, Gilligan points out that not only does Amy view the 
relationship between Heinz and his wife as being the essence of the 
dilemma, "she considers the problem in the dilemma to arise not 
from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of 
response. "26 The druggist's failure is in not understanding the 
obligation he has to the sick woman by virtue of knowing of her. For 
Amy, his failure to help someone in obvious need provokes a 
response like Antigone's toward Ismene when she did not perceive 
the moral character of the situation. :Like Antigone, Amy believes 
that by "talking it out" the druggist can be made to see the moral 
relationship he has with this woman and will then respond 
differently. The important question is then not one of rights but of 
the obligations to respond to the needs of others. 
The responsibility that Amy believes falls on one because of 
the need of another is a very clear theme in her response. As part of 
the dilemma she is asked whether Heinz should steal the drug for 
someone who is a stranger to him, her answer is that Heinz ~hould 
not steal the drug, but if there was no one close to the stranger or no 
one that knew it, it was Heinz's responsibility not to let her die. As 
the interviewer presses Amy harder, and it becomes clear that she 
did not give the desired answer, Amy becomes more and more 
unsure of herself, but does not stumble onto Kohlberg's perception of 
what the problem was essentially about; the "right" answer escapes 
her. "Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem in moral 
logic, she does not discern the internal structure of its resolution; as 
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she constructs the problem differently herself. Kohlberg's conception 
completely evades her."27 
For Amy the morality of our world is to be found in our 
relationships with each other and the obligations and needs on which 
they are based. Not seeing the moral world as composed of rules 
which can be logically ordered, and can be used to order actions, 
Amy is at sea in Kohlberg's moral universe, uncertain why her very 
practical answer are so unsatisfactory to the interviewer. She is 
scored a full stage lower than Jake at a level which indicates great 
immaturity, unclarity, lack of logical development etc. But as Gilligan 
states, her self-presentation belies this estimation of her. This pre-
adolescent child seems quite sure of herself, quite confident in her 
abilities, very articulate and, all in all, quite mature. She is someone 
who feels that they have an understanding of the world and how it 
works, but, as Gilligan points out, the world she knows is not 
Kohlberg's world or Jake's world: 
Yet the world she knows is a different world 
from that refracted by Kohlberg's construction 
of Heinz's dilemma. Her world is a world of 
relationship and psychological truths where 
an awareness of the connection between 
people gives rise to a recognition of 
relationship, her belief in communicatic;:m as 
the mode of conflict resolution, and her 
conviction that the solution to the dilemma 
will .follow from its compelling representation 
seem far from naive or cognitively 
immature.28 
What motivates Amy's moral response is clearly not what motivates 
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Jake's response, and yet it seems clear that both of them should be 
classified as moral motivations. 
In some respects, Gilligan's argument m In a Different Voice is 
confused. It is ultimately unclear whether she claims that men and 
women travel on different paths in achieving moral maturity, but in 
the end wind up at a point of convergence; or that the mature moral 
perspectives of women and men always remain distinct; or that 
women are in some sense more mature than men; or that while what 
motivates men and women to act morally is different, their moral 
judgment can be measured on the same scale. In a later article, "The 
Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships", written with 
Grant Wiggins, Gilligan develops her thesis about gender differences 
in moral judgment and perception more clearly. In this paper, 
Gilligan and Wiggins make the argument that the traditional 
understanding of morality which defines moral thinking as justice 
thinking forces morality into a single paradigm that neglects the 
evidence that there are two responses to early childhood 
relationships. How these responses are shaped by the individual 
child will determine whether he or she will be more inclined to adopt 
a moral response in the shape of care and concern or will take up the 
moral outlook marked by impartiality and fairness. Both responses 
are involved in moral behavior and there is an interplay between 
them. In fact, a lack or over-development of either can be an 
indication of psychological dysfunctionality and the stunting of moral 
maturity. 
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Gilligan and Wiggins argue that our early childhood 
relationships are more important to the development and form of 
our moral response than the literature on moral theory would seem 
to indicate. The origins of morality are located in the child's 
awareness of self in relation to others, and this awareness takes two 
different forms. One is the child's awareness of its inequality 
relative to adults and older children. It is this experience that has 
been the central focus of most theories of moral development: 
Focusing of the inequality of early childhood 
relationships, they define morality as justice 
and trace development through the child's 
search for equality and independence.29 
There is, however, a second experience that children have in relation 
to others, an experience which Gilligan and Wiggins call attachment. 
This experience is quite different from the experience of inequality: 
the interdependence of attachment 
relationships creates a very different 
awareness of self -- as capable of having and 
effect on others, as being able to move others 
and to be moved by them. Characteristically 
young children come to love the people who 
care for them -- desiring to be near them, 
wanting to know them, being · able to 
recognize them, and being sad when they 
leave. In the context of attachment, the child 
discovers the patterns of human interaction 
and observes the way in which people care 
for and hurt each one another. Like the 
experience of inequality, although in different 
ways, the experience of attachment 
profoundly affects the child's understanding 
of how one should act toward other people 
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and the child's knowledge of human 
feelings.30 
These two experiences of inequality and attachment lay the basis for 
the two impulses that lead to the development of moral character, an 
understanding of morality as justice in the one case, and care in the 
other: 
The child's experience of inequality and 
attachment or interdependence grounds a 
distinction between the two dimensions of 
inequality/equality and 
attachment/detachment that characterize all 
forms of human connection.... Children test 
them (the standards of care and justice) in a 
variety of different ways, appealing to justice 
in the face of unequal power by claiming " it 
is not fair" or "you have no right" and 
asserting the strength of attachment by 
stating " you do not care" or "I do not love you 
any more." In this way, children discover the 
efficacy of moral standards - the extent to 
which justice offers protection to the unequal 
in the face of oppression and the extent to 
which care protects attachment against the 
threat of abandonment or detachment.3 1 
What children learn in childhood generates expectations about self 
and other. We learn to treat others fairly and to expect such 
treatment in turn. We learn that others will recognize and respond 
to our own needs only if we in turn respond to theirs. These then set 
up two lines of moral development and set up two standards of 
moral assessment. One line follows from the idea of fairness and the 
other from the recognition and acknowledgement of mutual 
dependence, expressed in terms of needs and their fulfillment 
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Gilligan and Wiggins argue that by tracing the intersection and 
interplay of these lines of development, it is possible to point to the 
ways in which the moral understanding of men and women differ 
along gender lines, without ascribing superiority to either path of 
development. Instead, two moral perspectives emerge which "define 
different ways of organizing conflicts in relationship with other 
people. "32 Gilligan hypothesizes that because most childcare is done 
by women, the experience of attachment and separation may be 
different for boys and girls. Because girls are able, as they reach 
adolescence, to continue identifying with their mothers, there is not 
as strong a psychological drive for a detachment from them. The 
experience of inequality is therefore mitigated for them, and the 
experience of attachment remains more important. If boys identity 
with their fathers, who are typically not the primary childcare 
providers, and thus are not as closely attached to them, "concerns 
about equality and justice become more salient. "33 If the experience 
of detachment which boys experience is compounded by norms of 
male superiority and dominance, "feelings of helplessness and 
powerlessness become heightened and potential for violence 
increases."3 4 This explains the gender gap in violence and anti-social 
behavior found in studies of boys and girls, men and women. 
While the reasons women are more easily oriented to a moral 
perspective defined by care and men to one defined by justice are 
not totally clear, it is clear that there are two moral perspectives 
organizing the way people see and describe moral conflicts, often m 
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conflict with one another. In Gilligan and Wiggins' view, moral 
development is the process of recognizing and understanding such 
conflicts. An example of the conflict over which perspective to adopt 
can be seen in the instance of school-age children who are uncertain 
as to whether they ought to help another child on a test because that 
child needs help, while at the same time recognizing that cheating is 
wrong. We have already discussed at length an example of adopting 
different perspectives in understanding a moral problem in our 
discussion of Jake's and Amy's response to Heinz's dilemma. Clearly 
· Amy sees the problem to be the druggists failure to care, whereas 
Jake thinks the dilemma is a question of a violation of the right order 
of norms, which when corrected would value life over property. 
Gilligan and Wiggins maintain that these two different moral 
perspectives are akin to a Gestalt ambiguous-figure perception. "To 
argue whether morality is really a matter of justice or of care is like 
arguing whether the rabbit- duck figure is really a rabbit or a 
duck. "35 
Most of the time Gilligan and Wiggins argue that neither 
organizing response to moral dilemmas can be reduced to the other: 
they remain identifiable as two equally legitimate moral responses. 
There are times, however, when they seem to suggest that justice can 
be understood in terms of care. This is true in the following passage, 
where the two responses are considered in terms of attachment and 
detachment: 
No longer does ~orality pertain to the 
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question of how to live with inequality - that 
is, how to act as if self and other were in fact 
equal or how to impose a rule of equality, 
based on a principle of equal respect. 
Instead, morality pertains to problems of 
inclusion and exclusion - how to live in 
connection with oneself and with others, or 
how to avoid detachment, the temptation to 
turn away from need.3 6 
This collapsing of a justice perspective into an opposition to a care 
perspective undercuts the force of Gilligan's and Wiggins' claim that 
these two responses are separable but equally important. It also 
implies the unfortunate belief that a commitment to a justice 
perspective does not require any sense of attachment to others. As 
Blum has argued, our altruistic responses to others and concern for 
their weal and woe, even when they take the form of a belief in 
fairness, impartiality and· universal principles, is certainly an 
indication of our attachment to others and to the realization of their 
good. If I truly experienced no attachment at all to others, not even 
a sense of our shared humanity, I would not have any inducement at 
all to adopt a justice orientation toward them. 
According to Gilligan and Wiggins, responding out of a concern 
for another is not only to be understood as the motivation for our 
moral action, it is also -- and this is the more controversial part of 
their claim -- a ground for justifying moral actions and decisions. 
This argument moves us from a discussion of moral motivation to a 
discussion of moral judgment. The next section opens with a general 
discussion of moral judgment and then returns to Gilligan and 
,. 
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Wiggins' claim that care can serve as a justification for moral 
rightness. 
Section Three: Moral Judgment 
Neo-Kantian moral theorists have held that the grounds for 
justifying moral decisions or moral acts are cognitively accessible 
moral principles which can be universalized. Often these theorists 
have defined morality in a way that excludes the emotions, 
particular relationships to others, and affective responses in general. 
Even a philosopher such as Habermas, who claims that he does not 
limit the scope of the moral to moral justification, tacitly defines the 
moral in such a way that most of the issues I have taken up in this 
chapter are excluded from the moral. By arguing that moral 
justification is a process of rational reason giving which justifies 
norms of action in accordance with universal principles, any other 
grounds for justifying the rightness of a moral choice are denied. 
The theorists I have discussed in this chapter believe not only that 
action springing from proper emotion is part of a moral response, but 
that a failure to feel in the right way is also an instance of moral 
failure. Because rationality and irrationality have been juxtaposed in 
such a way that morality is associated with rationality and emotions 
are dismissed as irrational, until recently there have been few 
attempts to explain the close connections between moral judgment 
and moral theory. 
I -
178 
In her book, The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum takes 
up the complex issue of moral judgment. She begins her analysis 
with Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical 
reasoning. Practical reasoning, Aristotle argues against Plato, 1s not 
and cannot be scientific. The measure of practical reasoning is a 
person of practical wisdom, rather than the criteria of truth or unity 
which are the measure of scientific reasoning. Rules, Nussbaum 
argues, have two potential functions in ethical deliberation and 
judgment. First, they can serve as guidelines, summaries of 
particular situations which come up frequently and which many 
human beings will have to face. Rules in this asense are summaries 
of the wise decisions of others. The second possibility is to see rules 
as the "ultimate authority against which the correctness of particular 
decisions is to be assessed. "37 This view of rules is the Platonic one 
and it implies that for each particular situation there is a universal 
rule which can be applied in order to reach the "right" decision." 
According to Nussbaum, theproblem with this conception is that 
principles "fail to capture the fine detail of the concrete particular, 
which is the subject matter of ethical choice. "3 8 
One image Nussbaum uses to capture the flexibility required in 
making moral choices is that of an architect using a bendable metal 
strip to measure the grooves of a fluted column. To apply or to try to 
apply a universal principle to a particular situation without adjusting 
to the idiosyncrasies of the situation would be like using a straight 
rule to measure the fluted column: 
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Good deliberation, like this ruler ( the flexible 
one), accommodates itself to what it finds, 
responsively and with respect to complexity. 
It does not assume that the form of the rule 
governs the appearances; it allows the 
appearances to govern themselves and to be 
normative for correctness of the rule.3 9 
Aristotle points to three reasons why questions of practical reason 
require the flexibility of the ruler: because practical issues are 
mu table, indeterminate, and particular, they cannot be decided by 
directly applying a set of universal rules. 
It is judgment which acts as the intermediary between a 
practical conflict and the universal principles we use to. guide our 
actions: "excellent choice cannot be captured in universal rules, 
because it is a matter of fitting one's choice to the complex 
requirements of a concrete situation, taking all of its contextual 
features into account. "40 This fitting of the universal to the 
particular is the result of practical wisdom, which Aristotle describes 
as being like an instinct that one develops over time through 
education and experience. Practical insight, Nussbaum writes, "is the 
ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, [and] pick out certain 
salient features of a complex situtation . [It] is gained only 
through the long process of living and choosing that develops the 
agent's resourcefulness and responsiveness." 41 Practical wisdom is a 
complex faculty. It involves not only the cognitive skills necessary to 
judge what to do m a particular situation but also the ability to 
recognize a situation as calling for a moral response, a knowledge of 
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what is important for right living, and a sensitivity to others which 
will cause us to feel the appropriate emotions as we interact with 
them. 
To argue that practical wisdom is not a simple application of 
universal principles arbitrarily to particular situations is not to deny 
that these principles play an important role for our moral life and for 
practical wisdom in particular. When we act, we bring to our action a 
character that has been formed through education and experience. 
We bring the values we have culled from our families, our 
communities and our states to a situation of practical conflict, and the 
universal principles included in these values have formed our 
characters and have framed our sense of right. These internalized 
values and universal principles will guide our responses to particular 
situations. Indeed, if we have not internalized a certain sense of the 
moral and certain universal principles, it is unlikely that we would 
recognize that a particular situation requires a moral response, we 
would lack the sensitivity necessary for moral "seeing". If Ismene 
had not treasured the values of family and recognized the obligations 
it imposed on kin, Antigone could have argued with her forever 
without being able to show her the horror of Creon's act. 
It is important to see that the connection between the values 
and principles which inform character and their relation to practical 
wisdom does not bind the latter to a set of inflexible rules. Like the 
aoristos ruler, practical wisdom must be free to bend to the ever 
changing idiosyncrasies of particular moral conflicts: 
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Practical wisdom, then, uses rules only as 
summaries and guides; it must itself be 
flexible, ready for surprise, prepared to see, 
resourceful at improvisation. This being so, 
Aristotle stresses that the crucial prerequisite 
for practical wisdom is a long experience of 
life that yields an ability to understand and 
grasp the salient features, the practical 
meaning, of the concrete particulars. This sort 
of insight is altogether different from a 
deductive scientific knowledge, and is, he 
reminds us again, more akin to sense-
perception.42 
To say that practical insight is more akin to sense-perception than to 
scientific knowledge is not to say that it is a "natural" capacity. As 
Aristotle makes clear and Nussbaum emphasizes, practical wisdom 
begins with training in early childhood and depends upon 
reinforcement by a society which shares and demands a certain kind 
of moral behavior from its members. 
Practical wisdom reflects the ongoing moral commitments 
which are central to the formation of moral character. These values 
must be internalized so that they can come into play when a 
situation which demands a moral response arises: 
This continuous basis, internalized and 
embodied in the agent's system of desires, 
goes a long way towards explaining what that 
person can and will see in the new situation: 
an occasion for courage, for generous giving, 
for justice .... [T]he particular case would be 
absurd and unintelligible without the guiding 
and sorting power of the universal.4 3 
Because we have different. relations with people and owe them 
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different things, there can be no universal rule as to what is moral. 
As Aristotle points out, there is an imprecision and vagary of detail 
in actual situations which is not reflected in the law-like form that 
universal norms take. In making practical wisdom the standard of 
assessmg the morality of action and deliberation, we are caught in 
something of a circle, for there is no absolute standard outside that 
wisdom which can serve as its measure. 
Even if we allow that universal norms play a significant part in 
moral action and thinking, they are mediated by a process of 
judgment when applied to particular events. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant names the faculty of practical judgment "Mutterwitz", 
which Charles Larmore translates as "native wit." Having described 
concepts as rules which we use to classify things, Kant argues it 
cannot be the case that knowing how to apply rules is simply a 
matter of following rules, for that would still leave us with the 
question of how to follow these additional rules. The capacity to 
apply rules 
must rest ultimately, he insisted on a 
different kind of ability, itself nor a rule-
governed procedure, but one by which we 
simply see that a thing falls within the scope 
of a rule. This sort of knack Kant called 
judgment. 44 
Larmore rejects Kant's belief that the role of judgment is simply to 
see how particular instances fall under a particular universal 
principle, and argues that while Kant's notion of "native wit" is an 
interesting first step in describing moral judgment, one must go 
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beyond Kant to complete the definition. 
When we apply general moral rules to particular instances, 
moral judgment must go beyond those schematic rules to indicate 
what it is we should do.45 Moreover, in some situations moral 
principles themselves may conflict. The Heinz dilemma is such an 
example, and moral judgment is required to decide which principle 
must be violated and which observed. Larmore agrees with 
Artistotle's and Nussbaum's belief that a discussion of moral 
judgment must be accompanied by a discussion of moral character 
and the virtues which shape such a character. Knowing when to do 
what in order to act morally is a function of internalized virtues 
which make one morally sensitive. They are reflected in the moral 
jud_gments that one makes. In fact, Larmore argues that "the 
exercise of judgment offers the best evidence for virtue. "4 6 
If judgment is crucial as evidence of moral character, it is also 
the source of most moral disagreements. While there are times when 
we may disagree about universal norms, most of the time our moral 
conflicts arise over the judgments we make about applying norms: 
Usually our disagreements fix not upon the 
validity of general moral rules, but rather 
upon whether the rules are being properly 
applied, how they are to be satisfied, and 
what to do when they come into conflict; if 
the disagreement is ~bout some moral rule, it 
centers around whether more general rules , 
when properly applied, entail the validity of 
'the rule. Judgment offers us a way to resolve 
these disagreements by argument, by appeals 
to reason. 4 7 
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Practical reason, unlike technical reason, cannot, pace Plato, be 
learned by learning formal principles. As Aristotle and Nussbaum 
argue, it must be learned through moral practice and by the molding 
of one's character, so that one learns what right action is in learning 
how to value it. It is for this reason that Aristotle argued that we 
become virtuous by engaging in virtuous action. Because training 
and reinforcement are so important to the formation of sound moral 
judgment, the moral ethos of the family and the society are 
especially important. 
What is striking m the work of Nussbaum, Gilligan and Larmore 
is the absence of an explicit description of how moral judgment 
works. For the most part their descriptions of it have been negative. 
They have argued that it is not the simple application of a moral rule 
to particular circumstance; they have pointed out that unlike purely 
cognitive activity, in a moral judgment the whole of one's moral 
character comes into play; they have argued that there is an 
emotional component in moral judgment which functions both as 
moral sensitivity that makes us aware of the moral resonance of a 
situation and as a justification for the rightness of a particular 
judgment. This inability to define moral judgment precisely might 
strike us as disappointing. As Larmore points out, however, this 
disappointment is the result of our erroneous belief that the only 
knowledge that is truly knowledge is scientific knowledge, that 
something can be said to be understood only when we comprehend it 
in terms of universal and empirical rules; 
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To understand some empirical phenomena we 
believe consists in discerning the laws to 
which it is subject. Accordingly, we believe 
we have an adequate theory of some 
intentional human practice if we can 
reconstruct the rules, both explicit and tacit, 
that characterize it (if we are committed 
reductionists, we will look for a non-
intentional, _ e.g., physiological, law-governed 
redescription of it). The distinctive feature of 
moral judgment, however, is the way in which 
(considered as an intentional practice) it 
transcend the explicit or tacit rules upon 
which it only partially depends.4 8 
It is not possible at this point to offer a more precise account of what 
is involved in moral judgment. An approach like Gilligan's or 
Nussbaum's, where accounts of moral decisions are given and 
analyzed, or a negative definition such as the one Larmore offers, is 
as clear as we can presently get. As Aristotle argued, recognizing the 
degree of clarity a subject matter can have is itself a sign of practical 
reason. 
Section Four: A Morality of Care and a Theory of Justice 
We can now consider Carol Gilligan's discussion of the two 
moral responses (leading to an ethics oriented to care and an ethics 
oriented to justice) in light of our more general discussion of moral 
judgment. Gertrud Nunner-Winkler and Habermas have argued that 
Gilligan confuses moral motivation with moral justification. While 
her thesis is not without difficulties, I think their insistence that the 
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different moral stances she characterizes are merely differences m 
what motivates human beings to act morally misses the force of her 
actual argument. She claims that emotions like care not only 
motivate moral action but are also regarded as at least partial 
justifications for action. This stronger argument can be found as a 
thread running through all of Gilligan's writings, but it is perhaps 
most clearly demonstrated by her claim that Kohlberg's stage six 
should be replaced by a stage she calls "contextual relatavism", a 
stage that reflects the contextual response of women in a positive 
way without giving up a positive assessment of moral judgment 
based on principles. 
According to Gilligan, a subject who has reached this stage has 
given up the belief that moral principles can be applied in an 
absolute way and has come to believe that moral values and moral 
judgment must be made relative to the particulars of a given 
situation. At the "postconventional contextual stage," morally mature 
adults balance universal norms and the demands of care and seek a 
course of action that takes account of the contextually relevant 
features of a situation in a way that deontological approaches do not. 
The complexities of actual emotional commitments are taken into 
account in a way that excludes the impartiality of judgment called 
for by a neo-Kantian "moral point of view". It entails a theory of 
personality development more complex than the concept of 
autonomy, i.e., a theory which is organized around the two 
experiences of attachment and detachment and the way they 
187 
organize our moral response. 
Nunner-Winkler and Habermas argue that Gilligan's theory of 
personality development should be viewed as two distinct and 
separate projects: first, a theory of the psychological development of 
the self, i.e., a theory of ego development, and second, a theory of 
moral development. They contend that many of the examples 
Gilligan points to as indicating two moral responses should be 
categorized as gender differentiated ways that personality develops. 
This would then undercut the force of her observations as a source 
for a theory of moral development. While the confusions in Gilligan's 
theory expose her position to such an attack, I think such an attack is 
incorrect and ultimately a way to avoid taking seriously the 
contention that there is or can be a justification for a moral response 
which rests on a ·particular emotion and not on a cognitive argument 
that appeals to universal principles. 
Gilligan believes that moral development and ego development 
can not be so easily separated as Nunner-Winkler and Habermas 
contend . This becomes clear in her discussion of the formation of 
moral identity throughout attachment and detachment in infancy 
and in early childhood. The process by which ego maturity is 
attained has, she argues, a direct effect on whether one's moral 
response will more likely be expressed in an ethic of care or an ethic 
of justice. The significance of her appeal to Piaget's dictum that 
morality is a necessity only because of our relationships with 
others 49, should not be overlooked. The contexts and, to some extent 
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the processes, by which we achieve both ego integration and moral 
character are the same, and it is the way in which the first is 
accomplished that determines the second. Gilligan and Wiggins 
clarify the connection between ego development and moral 
development in the following passage: 
Our relationship-focused perspective on 
morality leads us to trace moral development 
through the transformations of relationships 
_ along the two dimensions of equality and 
attachment and to see both as critical to the 
growth of moral understanding. Looking at 
the dynamics of development, we pay 
particular attention to the interweaving of 
these dimensions and thus to the conflicts 
between concerns about justice and concerns 
about care. Our interest is in the 
between the child's search for equality 
~ffort to become stronger and 
competent, like the adult, and the 
search for responsiveness with others 
the interplay of feelings, thoughts, and 







The reaction to relationships that are constitutive for the 
development of an independent ego are essential to the formation of 
moral character. The process of attachment and detachment is then 
essential to both ego development and moral development. As 
Benhabib points out, the idea that the development of the moral self 
can be considered independently of the ego is itself an interesting 
comment on the shortcomings of theories about justice reasoning: "It 
is as if the moral self in this theory is a disembodied being, who 
develops but does not feel, who reasons but does not act. "5 1 
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If it is correct that Gilligan is not presenting a theory of moral 
motivation , and if she has not simply confused ego development 
with moral development, then we must allow that she presents a 
theory of morality. If this is the case, we must ask what issues her 
theory raises in general for theories which define morality in terms 
of justice. I will consider this in the last section of this chapter. In 
the last chapter, I will reinterpret Habermas's discourse ethic so that 
it can accomodate these insights into moral theory. 
Section Five: Gilligan and Justice 
The best way to understand the theoretical and political import 
of Gilligan's position is to ask why what she calls the "other" ethical 
voice, that is, the voice of care and concern, has not been heard until 
now. A complete answer to this question would require a thorough 
exploration of historical conceptions of gender identity, the definition 
of the private and public sphere, and the historical assigning of the 
realm of the emotions to women and that of intellect to men. Here I 
shall only consider briefly the gender politics that led to the 
exclusion of the private sphere and the emotions from the public 
political sphere and the sphere of the moral. 
As Seyla Benhabib points out,52 modern moral and political 
philosopohy is dominated by the image of the state of nature. 
Whatever the differences between the theories of Locke, Rousseau 
and Hobbes, for all three the state of nature is both a t~rrifying place 
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and a utopia of absolute freedom. In this pre-social world men, and 
I do mean men, are alone. Benhabib points to an image found in 
Hobbes that perhaps best symbolizes the conceptual image of men 
born without attachment to others and thus without obligations to 
them: Hobbes suggests that we think of men in this state as being 
sprung directly from the earth like mushrooms. "The female, the 
mother of whom every ind~vidual _is born, is now replaced by the 
earth. "53 Men in the state of nature are wholly autonomous; they 
are bound by no rules or conventions. The establishment of the 
social-contract is understood as the attempt to maintain the peaceful 
co-existence of brothers. Benhabib argues that this vision of the 
social order as resting upon the newly recognized relationship of 
brothers has had an amazing hold upon the modern world. "From 
Freud to Piaget, the relationship to the brother is viewed as the 
humanizing experience that teaches us to become social, responsible 
adults."5 4 This image has also been the source of a number of 
philosophical biases, for instance, the view the autonomous self in 
contemporary moral theory as: 
disembedded and disembodied moral 
impartiality is learning to recognize the claims 
of the other who is just like oneself; fairness 
is public justice; a public system of rights and 
duties is the best way to arbitrate conflict, to 
distribute rewards and to establish claims.s s 
What 1s strange in this picture of human relations is that detachment 
is prior to attachment. It is a world of men where women and girls 
become invisible. Women's experience of the world and of others, 
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especially of the children they care for and nurture, is not accounted 
for. The qualities of women and the world they live in are defined 
by a series of negations. What women are is what men are not. 
Women's identity "becomes defined by a lack -- the lack of 
autonomy, the lack of independence, the lack of the phallus. "5 6 
Women are relegated to the sphere of the household, which 1s 
outside history and remains in the sphere of nature. While men 
begin to embark on the historical journey to civilization, women 
remain ahistorically rooted to the natural process of the reproduction 
of the species, guided by the values of care and intimacy; 
The dehistoricization of the private realm 
signifies that, as the male ego celebrates his 
passage from nature to culture, from conflict 
to consensus, women remain in a timeless 
uni verse, condemned to repeat the cycles of 
life. Men develop; women simply are.57 
Men do not become simply public selves, they have two identities--
one public and one private--and this dual nature is often in conflict. 
While the autonomous self strives for a unity between its often 
warring parts, "the antagonism -- between autonomy and 
nurturance, independence and bonding, sovereignty of the self and 
relations to others -- remains. "5 8 
Contemporary universalist theories have inherited this vision 
of the dichotomized self; they reflect, however unintentionally, the 
sexual politics that originally relegated women .and what was thought 
to be their universe of concerns --love, affection, care and other 
emotions -- to the private sphere. Central to this unfortunate 
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heritage is the depiction of morality as a public virtue best described 
m terms of justice and a concept of autonomy that views detachment 
as a sign of moral maturity. In limiting the "moral point of view" to 
the impartial and the detached, moral concerns that reflect 
commitment to attachment. and to involvement fall out of the picture. 
The moral point of view characteristic of most contemporary 
universalist theories demands that we assume a standpoint from 
which we view others not as particular beings with individual 
histories, but as abstract entities having a moral character in 
common with us. The norms of these ethics emphasize our 
symmetrical obligations and demand that we reciprocate the rights 
we demand for ourselves. They are primarily the public and 
institutionalizable norms characterized by a theory of justice. What 
is lost in these accounts is the consideration of individuals as 
individuals. We do not view "every individual as being an individual 
with a concrete history, identity and affective- emotional 
constitution" 59 nor do we take into account any special relationships 
we might have with an individual which might rightly effect what is 
to be morally expected of us. 
The norms that would come into play if we were to take up this 
second way of looking at ~he other would be the norms of care and 
concern that Blum, Gilligan and Nussbaum examine. They are not the 
sort of norms that can easily be put in universal form because they 
vary from situation to situation and from relationship to relationship, 
but they are the stuff of which much of our moral life consists. If so 
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many of the moral problems which confront us in our daily lives 
involve this other moral point of view, why isn't that reflected in our 
philosophical theories about morality? In part, the answer is that 
contemporary moral theories have inherited the biases of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. The autonomous self, and hence 
the moral self, is the self that exists independently from attachment 
to others. It is not then surprising that it is in the voice of women, so 
long excluded from this potential for autonomy, that a second and 
different moral voice was discovered which centers around 
attachment and relationships with others. In part, the concern of 
ethics with autonomy, has been the result of a historic tradition 
which leads us to a truncated view of the self, a view that makes our 
humanity unrecognizable. 
When we abstract from all our particular qualities, including 
our view of the good, as Rawls argues we must in order to take up 
the moral point of view, we find that any really useful notion of the 
self disappears behind the veil of ignorance, and we are left with a 
self which could be anyone, but in so being, is no one. Because 
Kohlberg relies on Rawl's veil of ignorance theory to support his 
contention that stage six, the stage at which we appeal to universal 
moral principles, is the highest moral stage, this critique of Rawls 
also calls into question the adequacy of Kohl berg's theory of morality. 
The universality of perspective that Kohlberg defends is, as he 
himself described it, like the ability to play moral musical chairs, I 
take up a position that anyone could take up if they were in the 
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same position. Benhabib raises the question of whether moral 
situations can really be individuated in this way. The question is 
whether it is even possible to understand a situation without 
knowing the character, disposition, affect or history of those 
involved. For example, what might be a hurtful insult from one 
person is, from another with a different relation to me and a 
different affect in delivery, a teasing aside. One must know more 
about the agents involved in a situation in order to make a correct 
moral judgment about them. Knowing a particular person as 
particular may involve having certain feelings which must be taken 
account of when moral issues arise. Care and connection are as 
essential to our moral relations with others as are universal 
principles. 
Benhabib points out that moral situations do not come to us 
labelled with the appropriate universal to apply.60 In short, 
universalistic moral theories ignore the moral conflicts that arise m 
our everyday lives between individuals who share relationships 
which carry with them specific moral expectations and focus instead 
on the public disputes concerning rights which are best described in 
the language of a theory of justice. But if these theories exclude too 
much of what is significant to our moral lives, if they are marred by 
incoherent models of the self, and if they cannot clearly define the 
difference and similarity of moral situations, it seems that it is time 
to abandon the model of autonomy-as-detachment on which they are 
based and turn to an ethical theory which does not suffer from these 
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shortcomings. 
In the chapter which follows, I will argue that if Habermas's 
model of ethics as discourse is modified, it can do justice to both the 
voice of fairness and to that of care. Because it can do so, it offers a 
model of morality which can take into account the whole of our 
moral experience and offer us a meaningful guide to sorting out the 
moral dilemmas which anse in our lives. 
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CHAPIERFOUR 
In Chapter Three. I argued that morality involves a whole 
range of human responses, including reasoning, having and 
demonstrating certain kinds of feelings, intuiting the moral potential 
of a situation, and empathetically viewing the world from the 
perspective of another. It also involves having the character and 
wisdom necessary to make judgments about what kind of action is 
appropriate when, what rule should be the guiding principle m a 
particular case, and how to weigh right and wrong against 
extenuating circumstances and come to a good or just decision. Thus 
a general moral theory has to include a theory of moral character if it 
is to comprehend the complex scope of what is involved in thinking 
and acting morally. While Habermas has not developed such a 
theory, I shall argue in the first section of this chapter that there 1s 
no internal theoretical contradiction which would prevent him from 
adopting one. In the second section, I will take up the question of · 
how needs are defined and interpreted. Habermas tends at times to 
describe needs as if they were naturally given entities rather than 
historical and cultural constructs. This description is at odds with his 
understanding of the significance of the social factors in the 
interpretation of needs. It also undercuts his claim that discourse 
can lead to rational will formation and to a critiques of needs and 
their interpretations. I will suggest that Habermas might adopt 
Nancy Fraser's approach to needs, which focuses clearly on the 
political and social process by which needs are recognized and 
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understood. 
In the third section, I will raise the question of how Habermas's 
discourse theory should be viewed, asking whether it is a theory of 
law, a theory of justice, or a general moral theory. I will argue that 
while a general moral theory and a theory of justice are intimately 
related, and in one sense theoretically inseparable, in a pragmatic 
sense they are separable. Just as we distinguish the public and 
private sphere through political argument, we can decide that m 
what is designated as the public sphere, justice reasoning is 
appropriate. By making the argument that justice reasoning 1s the 
most desirable expression of morality in the public sphere a 
pragmatic one, many of the issues which arise from a theoretical 
distinction between norms and values, between moral reasonmg and 
moral emotions can be avoided. The distinction I make between the 
form of reasoning in the public sphere and what we politically 
designate as the private sphere is not an absolute one; it takes the 
form of an inexact description of the ways justice reasoning is 
distinguished from other forms of moral response. It is important 
here to keep in mind Aristotle's dictum that the degree of clarity we 
can achieve is limited by the preciseness inherent to the subject 
matter, and that it is a sign of wisdom to not try to be more precise 
than the subject matter allows. 
A. Habermas's Theory of the Social Self 
As I explained in Chapters One and Two, Habermas's theory of 
the development of the individual ego and moral a~tonomy relies 
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heavily on Mead's notion of identity, in which identity is arrived at 
through the recognition and adoption of social roles. In learning to 
take up the perspective of the other, the child develops not only the 
intellectual skills which enable him or her as an adult to take part m 
a Habermasian discourse -- the skills which Habermas emphasizes in 
his account -- , but also the more intuitive skills needed for 
empathizing with others, vi.ewing the world from their eyes, 
responding to their needs and caring about them. 
Learn that relationships are socially defined and expectations 
are normatively regulated, -- a step Mead and Habermas insist is 
crucial -- children acquire not only the cognitive skills necessary to 
identify the social expectations and the normative content of 
relations,but also the ability to be emotionally responsive in a way 
appropriate to the role. It is to this aspect of ego development that 
Habermas fails to give adequate consideration, and that results in an 
account which over-emphasizes the cognitive skills the child must 
acquire in order to be able to adopt and exchange social roles. To say 
that Habermas fails to deal adequately with the child's affective 
development does not mean, however, that such an account would be 
at odds with what he does emphasize, i. e. , the development of the 
skills necessary for social perspective taking. Both aspects of the 
development process are necessary for children to develop the ties 
and attachments that are the first step in the long process of 
psychological development leading to moral maturity. 
Habermas and Mead argue that a child's self-identity is formed 
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m the context of social relationships wi'th others; it is within the 
context of such relation.ships that children first learn to identify, 
articulate and interpret their needs. Without the loving relationship 
between child and caretaker, there would be no basis on which to 
build the complex skills required to move in a social world composed 
of a complex web of relations regulated by love, care, convention and 
normativity. It is in these first relationships that Habermas and 
Mead locate the origins of the ability to join in, and then to 
conceptualize, the give and take that makes up the fabric of social 
roles. It it also in the context of these relationships that children 
learn to express emotions, to identify them and to modify them 
according to the conventional and normative values which, at least 
initially, are a reflection of the values of the social world of which the 
child is a member. 
In Chapter Three, I examined Gilligan's claim that the basis for 
the formation of a moral ego identity lay in the processes of 
attachment and detachment that a child experiences in its early 
relationships with others. She argued that without the original 
experience of attachment and care a child cannot learn to respond to 
others morally. Her emphasis on the affective relationship between 
a child and others as the crucial element in the formation of moral 
character can be used to complete the theory of moral development 
that Habermas puts forward. Conversely, Habermas's account of role 
taking and of the process by which the child learns to take the 
attitude of the generalized other can be used to fill in Gilligan's 
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account, explicating the cognitive stages which accompany the 
affective processes of attachment and detachment in the course of a 
child's development to moral maturity. 
In Habermas's more recent work, one can find evidence of an 
increased recognition of the significance of social attachments, their 
affective components, and the role they play in psychological and 
moral development. The article, "Justice and Solidarity," 1 is a good 
example of this. There, Habermas argues that justice thinking has its 
roots in our sense of being members of a social community. Our 
ability to take the perspective of others in adopting the moral point 
of view requires us not only to grasp the elements of the social roles 
they occupy, but to sympathetically identify with them "in order to 
be able to take up the precise perspective from which alter could 
bring his expectations, interests, value-orientations, and so forth to 
bear in the case of a moral conflict. "2 In other words, the process of 
social perspective-taking that leads to the ability to engage in justice 
thinking cannot be completely accounted for without understanding 
the dynamics of interpersonal response which, Gilligan argues, derive 
from attachment. 
To be sure, Habermas's recognition of the significance of 
empathetic responseis not without reservations. He reminds us agam 
and again that when we reach the stage of actual justice thinking 
what is originally experienced as feeling must be sublimated, making 
discourse a purely cognitive achievement. This causes problems. 
Habermas acknowledges that the ability to take the attitude of the 
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other, which is central to the moral point of view, requires that we 
perceive the other as a particular individual with certain emotions, 
needs and desires. To do this successfully, one has to be willing to 
empathetically connect with this person so that one intuits, for 
however short a time, how the world looks from their perspective, 
how it feels to have those particular needs. To the extent that it is 
empathetically possible, ideal role taking asks us to become at least 
momentarily, someone else. While this requires the cognitive skills 
of recognizing the other as other and understanding what it is to 
have a social role, as well as the ability to abstract from the identity 
of that role and adopt the identity of the other, it seems clear that 
the ability to intuitively connect with another and to glimpse their 
life as they experience it is no less essential. Habermas's 
unwillingness to follow through on this insight indicates that he has 
not fully recognized the moral and psychological significance of 
emotions. 
His ambivalence on this point is clearly visible in the discussion 
of the emotional phenomenon he calls solidarity. In order to 
understand Habermas's rather bloodless conception of our sense of 
social solidarity, it might be helpful to consider first the notion of 
socio-political vulnerability that he identifies as the motivation for 
morality. To be a socialized individual is to be dependent for one's 
very identity on a social world composed of many selves. This brings 
with it a peculiar vulnerability of the ego; the destruction of the 
social world and the norms that originate in it threaten ·not only our 
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physical preservation but the fragile personal identity that this 
world makes possible. Morality, Habermas argues is a compensation 
required to protect ourselves in the face of this vulnerability: 
Because discourses rest, so to speak, as a 
reflective form, on action oriented to 
understanding, they . can derive their central 
perspective on moral compensation for the 
deepseated weaknesses of vulnerable 
individuals from the very medium of 
linguistically mediated interactions to which 
socialized individuals owe that vulnerability. 3 
Moral~ty is our way of seeking to compensate for vulnerabilities to 
which linguistically based relationships open us; moral discourse 1s a 
distillation of the reciprocity and mutual recognition that permits us 
to define and pursue our own needs while protecting and enhancing 
our social bonds with others. As Habermas puts it, "The pragmatic 
features of discourse make possible a discerning will-formation that 
permits the interests of each individual to be taken into account 
without destroying the social bonds that link each individual with all 
others. "4 Morality is not the result of a coming together of pre--
constituted "natural" selves; it springs from the mutual recognition of 
identities formed in the context of social relations, the protection of 
which is essential for the continued well being of the group and the 
individuals which constitute it and are at the same time constituted 
by it. 
Most importantly for my current discussion, Habermas 
acknowledges, in effect, that the impetus behind morality requires a 
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connection to others not captured by the universalizability 
requirements of justice. In order for this impetus to be strong 
enough to make itself felt, there must first be a felt sense of a 
solidarity with others, a sense of belonging to a community. 
[E]very requirement. of universalization must 
remain powerless unless there arises in 
addition from membership in an ideal 
communication community, a consciousness of 
irrevocable solidarity, the certainty of 
intimate relatedness in a shared life context.5 
In a sense, Habermas argues, the archaic bonds of kinship remam 
intact as they are transformed into a universalistic relationship of 
solidarity. 
The extent of this universalism is not clear from Habermas's 
writing. Quoting from Shiller's "Ode to Joy," he insinuates that 
modern solidarity extends to all human beings. On the other hand, 
he also seems to suggest that we experience solidarity with those 
who make up the web of social relationships of which we are a part, 
which would include only in a very abstract way all members of the 
moral community. This confusion is, I would argue, the necessary 
result of Habermas's deep unwillingness to assign significant moral 
worth to the experience of an emotional bonding with others. This 
reluctance on his part results in a notion of solidarity which is _ 
bloodless. On the one hand, he uses the· term to denote the force of 
emotional and political ties we share with those members of our 
moral community. This usage carries with it implications of powerful 
emotional and social ties bred in the context of political struggle, of 
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an identification with others that calls for unity and sacrifice in the 
name of the group. On the other hand, he wants to sever the word 
from its emotional roots and recast it as an intellectual recognition of 
the importance of others for the preservation of morality. As a 
result, the significance of the experience of solidarity and the role it 
plays in politics is almost entirely occluded. It becomes difficult to 
determine what makes solidarity, as Habermas defines it, an 
experience which affects us in any important way, despite his 
insistence that without some experience of solidarity there is no 
possible way to arrive at consensus.6 
Habermas denies that he introduced the notion of solidarity to 
_ bring about a compromise between the identification with 
community that Aristotle saw as essential to morality and the 
Kantian image of a kingdom of ends peopled by rational intellects. 
His notion of solidarity is, he argues, thoroughly modern and thus 
does not call for the ancient idea of a community that exhaustively 
defines identity. While I think it fair to say that he does not fall into 
the parochialism of Aristotelianism, it is not as clear to me that he 
escapes from the abstraction of Kantianism. Though feelings of 
solidarity are said to arise from a concern for the welfare of those to 
whom we are intimately linked m our life-world, the concern they 
express amounts to an intellectual appreciation of the role others 
play m our social world, rather than to any emotional identification 
with the weal and woe of others. In short, while Habermas's 
discussion of solidarity 1s an interesting indication of his recognition 
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of the importance of our emotional connection with others for 
morality, he is unwilling to give it any real significance in his theory 
of justice. If Habermas were to incorporate a theory of affective 
attachment into his theory of social role-taking, I think he would be 
able to grant that solidarity involves a commitment, even a 
passionate commitment, to others with whom one defines oneself as 
a community, without threatening his conviction that in the public 
sphere morality is most appropriately expressed by justice relations 
defined by abstract principles of justice. 
In the following section, I want to take up another 
Habermasian theme marked by tensions stemming from his 
unwillingness to concede a significant role to the emotions. His 
theory of generalizable interests emphasizes that needs must be 
rationally negotiated in order to be recognized as morally legitimate. 
His acknowledgement that consensus is impossible without solidarity 
reveals a chink in this rationalistic armor, for it indicates that a 
certain communal relationship is as much a condition of the 
legitimation of needs as are the arguments used to persuade us of 
their validity. One is left to ask why a sense of connection to others 
is necessary if rationality is the sole determining criterion of the 
legitimacy of need. 
B. Needs and Generalizable Interests 
Habermas's account of discourse has two essential moments: 
first, discourse is a setting which permits the free and rational 
exchange of ideas under procedural conditions that must be met if 
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norms are to be justified; second, it is through discourse that we 
decide whether needs are generalizable, and only generalizable 
needs can figure in normatively valid presuppositions. Habermas 
often presents discourse as if these two elements were identical. 
When he collapses the distinction between the procedural rules of 
discourse and the notion of generalizable interests and needs, the 
way in which interests and needs become legitimated is distorted, as 
the hist_ory of their gradual acceptance as normative is concealed. In 
addition, the relation between needs and values is ignored: needs 
come to be exclusively associated with norms. 
The first question that must be asked is what Habermas means 
by needs and generalizable interests. Interestingly enough, the 
answer to this question has to be reconstructed from his general 
discussions of needs, for he never takes it up specifically. Central to 
these descussions is the belief that practical questions admit of a 
truth analogous to the truth of theoretical issues. Practical truth 
emerges from a procedurally regulated discourse that aims to 
maximize the possibility of rationally resolving conflicting claims 
about justice and, in particular, conflicting claims that are made 
about the legitimacy of needs. Habermas defines the word "needs" m 
terms of interest; he distinguishes generalizable needs from 
particular needs according to whether they could be agreed to by all 
participants under the ideal conditions of discourse. These conditions 
guarantee that needs which are found to be generalizable will 
thereby satisfy the conditions of justice. 
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As I mentioned in Chapter Two, there are some serious 
problems with thsi approach, particularly Habermas's overly 
simplistic distinction between norms and values. Habermas contends 
that only conflicts between norms are open to rational debate and 
consensual resolution. Values, on the other hand, are too much part 
of the fabric of our identity to allow for the distantiation from them 
that normative debate calls for. But if value conflicts are not open to 
rational resolution, then neither are debates about needs for, as 
Habermas admits, our conceptions of needs. are informed by our 
values. As long as needs are not taken to be naturally given but as 
culturally informed, socially influenced and politically manipulated, 
it is difficult to see how needs could be severed from the values that 
figure in the struggles to have them either politically recognized or 
politically suppressed. 
1 Fraser and Habermas: Needs 
In Chapter Two, I used the example of the women's movement 
and the impact it had on our perception of needs which should be 
socially recognized. I argued that Habermas's current discussion of 
needs and interests shortchanges both the history of our changing 
beliefs in what counts as a need and the political processes by which 
we are persuaded of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of those needs. 
Nancy Fraser has written extensively on this topic and her position 
provides a useful counterpart to Habermas's. In late-capitalist 
societies, Fraser claims, talk about needs has come to function as a 
medium for putting forth and the contesting political claims. The 
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significance of needs-talk in the public sphere is a new development. 
There have been cultures, for example the ancient Greeks, where 
needs talk was minimaF. In Greece, the realm of need was not 
considered the appropriate subject matter for discussion about 
justice and it was relegated, for the most part, to the sphere of the 
household; 
In welfare-capitalist societies, on the other 
hand, need-talk has been institutionalized as 
a major vocabulary of political discourse. It 
coexists, albeit often uneasily, with talk about 
rights and interests at the very center of 
political life.8 
Two stories could be told about the rise of needs talk in society; on 
one hand, it could be viewed as Hannah Arendt viewed it, that is as 
distorting and corrupting the political sphere with matters which are 
not intrinsically political; on the other hand, vocalizing needs and 
arguing about them could be viewed as a sign of social progress, as 
an indication that needs are intrinsically political and thus belong m 
the sphere of political parlance. In this latter view, making them 
part of political discourse from which they had been previously 
excluded is a rectification of a incorrect view of what is to be 
included in the sphere of politics. 
Fraser rejects both of these interpretations because they both 
construe needs as natural entities whose internal nature indicates 
the rightness or wrongness of including them in political discourse. 
Her rejection of these two narratives about rights rests on a 
Foucaultian interpretation of needs which holds that needs are not 
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givens existing externally to discourse or history. Such an 
interpretation precludes accepting that there is a factual truth about 
whether needs should be included or excluded from the political 
sphere.9 A "Foucaultian story would narrate the emergence of 
political needs-talk as the invention or creation of a new political 
vocabulary." IO Any evaluations of needs-talk that such an 
interpretation would allow would have to be pragmatic, couched m 
terms of the utility of needs-talk for the successful realization of 
political goals; 
For example, it could evaluate the various 
strands of contemporary needs-talk in terms 
of their tendency to promote and/or inhibit 
the realization of such ( independently 
established) political values as equality, 
democracy, empowerment and 
participation. I I 
Since needs according to this position are not natural givens 
but arise in the context of a social world, the essential question to ask 
is not which needs are true needs and which are mere wants, but 
rather how these distinctions are made and by whom. Since 
neediness 1s socially produced and socially interpreted, what counts 
as a need m one time and place may not count as a need in another; " 
Thus what one needs in order to appear in public unashamed will 
differ for the displaced Eritrean woman and for the unemployed 
adult teen-ager." 12 This shift in focus from the legitimacy of needs 
to the social production and interpretation of needs results in a shift 
of focus to issues of how discursive practices result in the 
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institutionalization of needs. The most important question is no 
longer the issue of the distribution of some mutually agreed upon 
satisfaction of needs, but on who interprets needs and who decides 
whether they have been satisfied. 
This focus , unlike Habermas's, points to the political process of 
needs interpretation, a process through which values may come to be 
socially recognized as legitimate, and underscores the politics of who 
speaks and whose message comes to be heard. What is central to the 
politics of needs is not just the question of whether needs are met or 
unmet, legitimate or legitimate, but rather the question of 
interpretation. The questions to ask is who decides how a need 
should be presented and who decides whether a need has been met. 
These questions are intrinsically social in the sense that our ideas 
about what needs are and how they should be fulfilled arise in social 
contexts. There is a history which precedes the raising of needs 
claims and which affects their chances of either being taken seriously 
or of being dismissed. Fraser argues that a tripartite model can be 
employed to trace the role of needs in political life. It contains three 
distinct though interrelated moments: the first is the moment of 
struggle to establish or refute the legitimacy of a certain need ; the 
second is the moment of struggle over the interpretation of the 
meaning of that need; and the third is the moment of struggle to 
attain or deny the provision of that need. These elements of needs-
conflict are found at every level of the social world. Thus, m late-
capitalist societies, there exist a plurality of competing needs 
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discourses. 
In order for these needs debates to enter the political arena, 
they must be be heard in the context of socially institutionalized 
discursive practice. In other words, they must enter the public arena 
in one form or another. What it means to enter the public arena and 
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what it means to be discursively expressed is quite complex. For 
example, one can raise a claim or deny the right to a need either by 
using or challenging the already established and politically accepted 
idiom. Arguments about needs can be discursively settled in a 
variety of ways, including majority vote, compromise or the grant of 
authoritative status to those who claim the need. Prior to the entry 
of needs in the official sphere of politics, they enter the cultural 
sphere by way of narratives which structure the telling of the story 
of individuals and collectives. These narratives are guided by 
conventions "governing, for example, tragic, romantic, dialectical, 
psychoanalytic, evolutionary, and teleological narratives." 13 Needs 
are attributed to subjects according to social perception and, thus, the 
subjects arguing for or against them are seen as "normal" or 
"deviant" as "powerful" or "powerless". 
These are only some of the discursive features with which 
needs-talk resonates. But they suugest the many ways i~ which 
needs-talk is culturally and historically mediated and they point to 
the importance of politics itself as the central vehicle in which needs 
and arguments against them come eventually to take place. 
Discourses within the officially sanctioned realm of the political can 
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be distinguished from those which are not yet part of the officially 
recognized political idiom. These latter discourses, Fraser argues, 
may be "normally excluded from the central discursive arena." 14 
This is not to say that in time they may not come to have a place 
within that idiom. With the success of the social movement that 
raises them, these discourses may eventually become the subject of 
organized political discourse. 
The model of needs-talk that Fraser develops not only allows 
us to view needs-talk in the context of language, it also allows us to 
discuss the distinction between the public and the private sphere. 
This follows because the debate over needs focuses on establishing 
the validity of the public concern and provision for what is argued to 
be a need; if successful, political struggle moves a perceived need 
from the private to the public sphere: 
It is worth noting that the boundary between 
public and private in the discourse sense is 
culturally and historically constituted. There 
do not seem to be any a priori constraints 
dictating that some matters are simply 
intrinsically private in this sense and others 
simply are intrinsically public. As a matter of 
fact, the boundary is drawn differently from 
culture to culture and from historical period 
to historical period. Moreover, the very 
possibility of any boundary at all depends on 
the existence of some degree of institutional 
differentiation; there must be an arena of 
some sort for collective discourse and 
argument as distinct from spaces in society 
which are shielded from the latter.I 5 
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To a degree, political conflicts over needs are always conflicts 
over the distinction between the public and private sphere, for to be 
a publicly recognized need, in the strongest sense of that term, 
means to be a need that the body politic holds to be a citizen's right; 
having accepted the legitimacy· of the need, the body politic accepts 
the responsibility of providing for that need. The phrase " in the 
strongest sense of the term_" is important here. There are needs that 
cannot reasonalby be denied the need for medical care when one 
is ill for instance -- but for which not all states, even supposedly 
welfare states such as our own, accept responsibility. In denying the 
legitimacy of a claim for public payment of medical services, those 
services are relegated to the responsibility of the private citizen and 
denied as a public right. If medical care were conceived to be a 
public need, the public would have to accept responsibility for 
footing the bill when citizens cannot pay for these services, just as 
we do for public education, which is considered such a right, at least 
m the United States. 
Fraser's thesis allows us to reinterpret the distinctions 
between norms and values and between public and private which 
are, in my view, inadequately treated in Habermas's discourse 
theory. In addition to establishing the relationship between values 
and norms, it also gives the appropriate pride of place to the political 
process which determines whether needs are to be assigned 
legitimate political status. What Fraser does not do is to distinguish 
what should count as an argument, nor does she raise the question of 
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whether some distinction between public and private 1s desirable 
and for what reasons. To be fair, such a task lies outside the scope of 
her project as she defines it, which is to ask how needs-talk 
functions, not how it ought to function. Nonetheless these are 
important questions and they motivate much of Habermas's work. 
In the section that follows, I will argue that Habermas's attempt to 
pre-define what should and should not be included in discourse, 
leads him into a number of difficulties which could be avoided if he 
were to adopt an interpretation of needs along the lines that Fraser 
suggests. 
C Normativity, Needs, and Rational Will-Formation 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Habermas conceives subjectivity to 
be socially constituted and linguistically mediated. This results in a 
notion of the self that comes to be what it is, and to recognize its 
needs and desires, in the context of linguistically mediated social 
interaction Discourse, as Habermas defines it, creates the 
opportunity reflectively to examine our beliefs and values and our 
reasons for holding them to be valid. Because beliefs and values are 
socially and linguistically mediated "all the way down," any and all 
aspects of them should be open to the kind of scrutiny that discourse 
involves. Indeed, since Habermas claims that the rules of discourse 
are merely the conscious expression of the norms inherent in all 
communication, and since it is through communication and the social 
role-playing that it involves that we learn to identify our selves as 
selves, it is difficult to conceive of a theoretical ground for excluding 
217 
any aspect of our identity from discussion in the context of discourse. 
That there is no theoretical reason forhis excluding claims from the 
arena of public discourse, does not mean that there may not be some 
very persuasive political or pragmatic grounds for limiting political 
discourse to particular subjects, leaving others to be taken up in the 
social or private sphere. If one were to work with Fraser's analysis 
of needs, it would be clear that the question of what should or should 
not be the subject of political discourse is itself a political decision, 
which in an ideal democracy could only be decided by discourse. 
Habermas often describes discourse as a process resulting m 
rational will formation. In his early essay "Moral Development and 
Ego Identity," 16 ,he argued that the formation of ego identity requires 
not only the mastery of the cognitive skills involved in speech, or the 
social skills involved in interaction, but also the ability to understand 
one's own needs and to have these needs counted in the context of 
discourse: 
ego identity requires not only cognitive 
mastery of general levels of communication 
but also the ability to give one's own needs 
their due in these communicative structures; 
as long as the ego is cut off from its internal 
nature and disavows the dependency on 
needs that still await suitable interpretations, 
freedom no matter how much it is guided by 
principles, remains in truth unfree in relation 
to existing systems of norms.! 7 
In this passage, Habermas clearly states that needs are interpreted 
and the privileged place for such interpretation in the Habermasian 
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scheme of things is obviously discourse. This m itself might not 
present an immediate problem for his notion of the appropriate 
restrictions of discourse. He might specify that the needs he is 
talking about are expressions of generalizable interests and thus are 
appropriately taken up in discourse; but there are several flaws with 
this reading. First, the needs that Habermas refers to in the passage 
above are needs that have not yet been "suitably" interpreted; in fact 
they may not yet be experienced by ego as needs at all, since 
discourse is required if ego is properly to identify the needs and 
desires which constitute its "nature." Second, as I have argued 
elsewhere, there is no mechanism internal to Habermas's theory of 
communicative ethics that can distinguish generalizable from non-
generalizable interests outside discourse itself. Third, as I have 
pointed out several times, needs are informed by values; therefore, 
including even generalizable needs in discourse contradicts 
Habermas's own insistence that discussions of values have no place 
in discourse. Fourth, and finally, in his description of discourse as a 
place where "suitable" interpretations can be found for needs, 
Habermas underestimates the significance that discourse has for 
creating new needs; discourse makes the interpretation of needs 
possible but it is also a breeding ground for the discovery of new 
needs, and in its moral transformatory moment, it functions as an 
impetus for recreating ourselves through the recognition and 
articulation of needs and desires. 
Habermas would not be happy with this reconstruction of his · 
219 
discourse ethic for several reasons, not the least of which is that it 
eradicates the distinction between norms and values which in turn 
serves as the basis for his distinction between what can be rationally 
clarified and defended and what cannot. Suggesting that this 
distinction should be abolished means one of two things: that I 
believe there are no rational grounds for our beliefs, desires and 
needs, or that I believe that just as norms can be argued to be more 
or less rational, so too can the values and the emotions from which 
they arise. It is this latter belief which motivates my criticism of 
Habermas's position, but it is a point not entirely foreign to him. 
When he refers to the process of discourse as one of rational will 
formation, I think it becomes clear that he himself sees discourse as 
a continuous social process of self-discovery and clarification, one 
that leads to an understanding of the reasons for one's desires, 
values, and beliefs. Because needs are informed by values, it is 
inevitable that these values themselves will become the subject of 
controversy when there exists disagreement about needs. 
While there 1s no deductive model of truth to determine the 
rightness and wrongness of values, we can and do offer arguments to 
support them. As Blum argues, emotions are not inherently 
irrational, we can in fact sensibly speak of rational as well as 
irrational emotions. We can give an account of rational emotions that 
will make sense of why we feel the· way we do towards a certain 
person, place or thing. On the other hand, irrational emotions strike 
us as indecipherable, or unaccountable, and we cannot give any 
220 
adequate reasons for having them. As Nussbaum might say, there is 
no narrative which will make the experience of them make sense. 
In Chapter Three, I pointed out that Habermas tends to define 
argument very narrowly, as if what should count as an argument had 
to take the form of typical philosophical or legal discourse. However, 
political argument comes in many guises; art, music, drama, fiction 
and film all can act as veh~cles for persuading us to shift our views 
on problematic moral claims. Indeed, some of these non-traditional 
forms of "argument" may be more successful in forcing us to confront 
the world from another perspective, precisely because they touch 
our emotions, causing us to identify with their point of view in a way 
that a linear argument cannot do. Of course, at a given time it may 
be impossible to shift the traditional beliefs of a population so that 
they can recognize the cogency of a claim; that is surely one of the 
inherent frustrations of politics. 
I noted above that political discourse may not be the best or 
most appropriate form of discourse in which to raise certain issues, 
even ones that require clarification and argument. Nor does 
discourse eradicate the need for associations in the form of family, 
friendships, neighborhoods, or political groups. There are issues that 
are best taken up in the context of these other forms of association, 
but when controversy arises there is no way to determine prior to 
public discusiion which issues should be taken up or in what kind of 
discourse. Obviously, there are cultural traditions which influence 
our perceptions about what is properly a public topic and what is a 
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topic for the private sphere. Just as obviously, it is often in the 
interests of political movements to influence and change those 
traditions, so that what was once seen as a private matter comes to 
be viewed as a public concern and vice versa. If such a movement is 
successful, an issue will come to be perceived in a new way and 
either become part of public discourse or be excluded from it. In 
Chapter Two, I pointed to wife battering as an example of this kind 
of movement. In the United States, as the result of feminist activism, 
it has come to be seen as a public problem, and not just an 
unfortunate domestic, and thus private, one. This is one example of 
many, and all point to a similar phenomenon: if political claims are 
successfully acted upon, they bring with them changes in our 
perceptions of what should count as private and what as public. 
Having argued that needs are appropriately taken up in 
discourse, and having also argued that needs are informed by values, 
we can conclude that discourses will have to deal, at least indirectly, 
with clashing values. Habermas acknowledges some relationship 
between values and discourse when he writes: 
Any universalistic morality is dependent 
upon a form of life that meets it halfway. 
There has to be a modicum of congruence 
between morality and the practices of 
socialization and education. The latter must 
be such as to promote the requisite 
internalization of superego controls and 
abstractness of ego-identities. In addition 
there must be a modicum of fit between 
morality and sociopolitical institutions. Not 
just any[ institution ·will do. Morality thrives 
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only in an environment 1n which 
postconventional ideas about law and 
morality have already been institutionalized 
to a certain extent 18 . 
The moral point of view cannot exist on its own, it requires 
commitment to certain values and corresponding political and 
bureaucratic structures. Because of this entwining of the moral point 
of view with the structures and elements of ethical life, there cannot 
be a radical disjunction between the sphere of morality and that of 
values. Habermas recognizes, as the quote above indicates, that the 
moral point of view does not develop in a moral vacuum., however, 
he pushes the distinction between norms and values so far that it is 
hard to see how norms and values can be reconnected. If this 
distinction is invalid, it raises the question of whether the moral 
point of view, as Habermas defines it, can be defended without also 
defending justice as a value constitutive of the good life? 
Section Four: Justice and The Good Life 
In order to avoid the relativism associated with theories of the 
good life, Habermas limits the subject matter of moral discourse to 
norms that can meet the test of the universalization principle, "U". In 
this section, I will argue that the success of this strategy is limited by 
three considerations: first, the difficulties I have discussed above in 
distinguishing norms from values; second, the role that values play in 
arguments about needs, which make up most of the grist for the mill 
of political debate, and in the constitution of individual and collective 
identities; and third, because participants in discourse must 
minimally agree to the value of. rational consensus if discourse is to 
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be established as a viable political institution. In the course of 
addressing these specific problems, I will clarify a more general 
confusion about the status of Habermas's discourse ethics. 
This confusion can be brought to light by asking whether 
Habermas' s discourse ethic is a theory of justice, a theory of law, or a 
general moral theory. There is adequate evidence to rule out 
understanding the discourse ethic as a theory of law. In his writing 
on Weber, which I analyzed in Chapter One, Habermas makes it quite 
clear that the legitimacy of law rests on a theory of morality that can 
provide moral justification for laws. 19 Whether Habermas's 
discourse ethic is a theory of justice or a general moral theory is a 
harder question to answer, and there is the additional question of 
whether it is .possible to offer even a proceduralist theory of justice 
without also offering a general moral theory. More often than not 
Habermas does describe discourse ethics as a theory of justice, thus 
limiting the kinds of questions it can answer. This stance raises 
several problems. First, when Habermas defines justice, he• does it m 
terms of taking up what he calls the moral point of view. This 
suggests that the moral point of view is exhausted by justice thinking 
which leaves vast areas of our ethical life unaddressed. As I argued 
in Chapter Three, defining the moral point of view in terms of justice 
reasoning excludes the possibility of accounting for moral perception 
and moral emotions and therefore fails to fully describe aspects of 
moral accountability and moral character. 
Even if there were no independent reasons for arguing against 
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Habermas's tendency to define morality as justice reasoning, this 
definition contradicts the spirit if not the letter of his own approach. 
His individual is not an abstraction, not a self that, as Sandel would 
say ,possesses its ends rather then being identified with them. 
Rather, his individual is concrete and particular, located in a 
historical time and place that affect the determination of self-
identity> But this means that we bring a whole range of problems 
and issues to moral discourse, only part of which are rightly resolved 
by justice thinking. We come to discourse as whole people 
embedded in a social world which constitutes our identity. Our 
relationships are regulated by custom, by values, and by norms. The 
needs we experience, the values we believe in, the rules we follow, 
and the norms we observe can at any mom·ent come into question. 
In political discourse we can begin to work out which kinds of 
discourse can be used to solve which kind of problems.Some of these 
discourses will be discourses about the norms we associate with 
justice; they will most often take place in a political arena where the 
resulting decision is expressed in terms of some law or legislation. 
Other moral discourses will take place in a sphere we might, 
following Hannah Arendt, designate as the social. They might include 
debates, letters and articles in newspapers and journals, as well as all 
possible forms of creative expression from sculpture to books. 
Where and how a discourse should evolve is partly a political 
question; it will be determined by access to media, by funds for 
publishing or producing, by available space, by the interests of those 
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affected and by a myriad of other things. Should a discourse be a 
legislative one?, should it take place in the community, or in the 
state, but not the federal government?, or should the debate to take 
place privately between individuals? These are questions which can 
' 
only be answered through discourse. Norms are distinguished from 
values through a process of political struggle. If enough people can 
be persuaded of the validity of a value claim, it becomes established 
as normative. If the discourse in which this debate takes place is a 
legislative one, this will be expressed in a law, legal principle or a 
legal statute. It becomes universal in the sense that we no longer 
regard it to be simply one option among many. It takes the form of a 
Kantian command. 
Procedural considerations such as the ones Habermas 
establishes, help to ensure that norms represent the will of the 
people while protecting the minority. But establishing a claim as a 
norm does not guarantee its validity, this is because norms can never 
be wholly sifted free from values. What we recognize today as a 
generalizable interest may_ be different than what we come to see as 
generalizable in the future. In time, often due to the pressure of 
political movements, we may come to reverse our earlier beliefs, 
deciding that what we once believed to be true or just is no longer so. 
It is for this reason that Habermas insists that no discourse can ever 
be final. As long as we remain human beings, we remain historical 
beings and our views must be open to change. 
Those beliefs which discourse decides cannot be put m the 
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form of a moral command retain the status of values. They are 
important; in fact, I have argued they are essential to the possibility 
and process of morality; but they remain open in a way that norms 
do not. This is not to say that violating moral values does not lead to 
moral censure; because it does. But the value aspect of morality does 
not lend itself to general legislation, for there are great differences of 
opinion about what values are legitimate, and which are not --
modern society is characterized by a pluralism of gods and demons. 20 
Despite this, we do argue about values; and even if closure in the 
sense of arriving at a general norm is not possible at a given time, 
our arguments are not therefore morally nugatory or irrational. It 1s 
through these discourses that we change our views and re-interpret 
our needs and desires. It is these discourses which make political 
and moral progress possible. 
We seem to be slowly but inexorably movu~g toward a 
recognition of basic human rights. Today's disenfranchised, whose 
unequal status is often defended by appeal to arguments today 
regarded valid, may be at the forefront of tomorrow's struggle to 
persuade us that we have committed a moral and political wrong. 
This struggle for rights begins at the level of discourses about values., 
When a movement has gained a certain momentum, it can demand 
that its concerns be taken up in a legislative discourse to legitimate 
claims on the grounds of their normative rightness. This is not a first 
step, but rather an achievement that comes after a long hard struggle 
to force individuals to recogmze the wrongness of their earlier views. 
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The current impassioned debate in the United States over a 
woman's right to an abortion is an example of the role political 
struggle plays m demanding that a claim be legitimated as 
normative. When the Supreme Court federally legalized abortion in 
the land-mark Roe v. Wade decision, it concluded a debate about 
abortion rights and in so doing expressly made abortion a publicly 
recognized right which was supported by normative arguments made 
in the public sphere of politics, and finally resolved in the legislative 
sphere. Abortion was then held to a public right and a private 
decision. Recently, the Court has reversed itself to the extent that it 
denies that a definitive legal argument can be made to justify that 
right, and it has thrown the issue back to a more local level of 
politics, i.e., to public discourse at the state level. In making this 
move, the ultimate stamp of normative legitimacy has been removed 
and the issue comes to appear once more as a clash of values to be 
discussed at the state level and resolved by the decisions of the 
voters, as they express their opinions through their votes for or 
against those who support or do not support a woman's right to 
choose. The change in the Court's opinion reflects the changing status 
of the discourse about abortion and reflects a political shift to the 
right brought about by the success of the Republican party and the 
pressure of the new Right upon it. It also reflects an uncertainty on 
the part of the population at large about whether abortion can be 
normatively defended or should be normatively condemned, or 
whether it isn't better left a question over which the Supreme Court 
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,as the absolute arbiter of norms in our society, should have no 
jurisdiction because it is an issue of values and not of norms. 
If the discussion about abortion is relegated to the sphere of 
values rather than norms, given the way our political system 
functions, it cannot take place in the courts, which only settle 
normative question,2 1 but must take place at the level of the states, 
influenced by what I have called the social sphere of discourse. 
MacIntyre has used the issue of abortion as an example of a 
breakdown in a shared sense of values, and to some extent he is 
right. The conflict over abortion certainly indicates a plurality of 
values; but the very fact that that the Supreme Court ruling is 
acknowledged as binding indicates a shared belief in the moral and 
legal legitimacy of the courts. Except for a small minority of citizens 
who are willing to take the law into their own hands, political groups 
who support the right to abortion and those who do not have begun 
discussions in the last few weeks about how best to carry on the 
debate about abortion outside the jurisdiction of the courts. This 1s 
an indication of a widespread belief in the legitimacy of the courts 
and in the process of argumentation and persuasion to bring about 
change. In addition, I think it can be argued that the Court's change 
of mind about this important right reflects an uneasmess on the part 
of the majority of citizens about the status of the arguments 
supporting or denying a right to legalized abortion. The claim that 
abortion should be the legal right of all women is an idea whose time 
has not yet come, and there is a great deal of confusion and 
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uncertainty about its legitimacy in the minds of many people. Only 
in the future will we know whether the claim to legal abortion will 
ever come to have the status of a norm. 
For the time being, the struggle to legalize abortion will be 
carried on as a value struggle which will be resolved in different 
ways by different states, reflecting the values of the majority of 
voters in those states. Several conclusions can be gleaned from this 
state of affairs. The first is that the struggle over norms and values 
is a political one. The second concerns the association of norms with 
public rights and obligations, and values with personal choice and 
belief. Once abortion is no longer considered an absolute right, i. e., it 
is not held to be normatively legitimate, the decision to favor 
abortion rights or to argue against them becomes more of a private 
one springing from one's personal values. Thirdly, when a claim is 
not held to be normatively defensible, its status as a legitimate need 
is rejected. Thus, if abortion is not held to be normatively defensible, 
neither can the claim that abortion is a need that the public should 
fund if the affected individual cannot fund it themselve~ be accepted. 
The scenario I have just presented reflects the United States as 
it is, not the country it would be if Habermas's moral discourse were 
actual, for given his assurance that those most affected by the 
implementation of a norm must agree to its acceptance, the voice of 
women, and especially poor women, would be most forceful in this 
case. Since there is no reliable survey of what all women, and 
particularly poor women would have to say about the abortion issue, 
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it is not clear at this time what impact this voice would have on the 
discourse. In fact, the whole issue of who is most affected by the 
implementation of a norm raises more political issues than it 
resolves. Indeed, the question of who is most affected by the 
implementation of a norm is itself a question to be resolved by 
discourse, despite the fact that Habermas presents it as a stipulation 
of something which is obvi?us at first glance. But then again it must 
be remembered that Habermas is writing about a moral world that 
as yet has not been made actual. Current political discourses fall far 
short of the normative outlines of his ideal discourse. 
There is in fact a tens.ion in Habermas's theory between his 
reliance on the phenomenon of contemporary law as an example of 
the embodiment of abstract morality, and the ideal character of his 
own description of moral discourse. It would be easy to confuse the 
discussions of how contemporary morality is expressed with a 
description of how it ought to be expressed given its own normative 
assumptions. What Habermas is offering in some sense is an 
immanent critique of the morality expressed in our concept of law 
and our ideals of liberty and equality and the actual expression of 
that morality in the political and legislative sphere. When I use the 
current debate over abortion in the United States to illustrate the 
role of the public and private sphere and the political struggle to 
distinguish norms from values, my example is flawed insofar as the 
contemporary discourse situation is not the ideal one Habermas 
describes. On the other hand, insofar as Habermas relies on the 
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model of justice reasoning provided by the norms of universal law as 
it is actually embodied in our notion of equality and freedom, he 
gives us tacit permission to move from the conceptual to the actual 
sphere, finding in the latter instances which illustrate the former. In 
fact, Habermas's derivation of the norms of discourse from the 
presuppositions of communication encourage an understanding of the 
ideal in terms of the actual. At the same time, he recognizes that 
though certain norms may be presupposed by communication, actual 
discourse more often than not is distorted. 
The last issue I wish to take up in this chapter is whether a 
commitment to the norms of justice rests on valuing justice as part of 
what we take to be the good life. In other words,is it possible to 
defend a universalistic concept of justice without presupposing some 
historically specific and culturally substantive notion of the good? I 
think the answer to this question is both yes and no. It is neither 
possible nor desirable to set forth one version of the good life as the 
morally definitive one. It is not possible to do so because of the 
_ plurality of values that Weber diagnosed and MacIntyre deplores. 
To choose to elevate one set of values over another would be at best 
to fall into an arbitrary decisionism and at worst to fall into a kind of 
moral and social facism. Another reason for the impossibility of 
articulating a definitive notion of ethical life is the process of 
modernization, which causes different spheres of values to be 
differentiated with their own canons of legitimacy. Finally, as 
Habermas has pointed out, modernity brings with it and expansion of 
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what is subject to the critical scrutiny of reason. This forces values 
which cannot be defended by appeals to universally acceptable 
grounds into the private realm, undercutting their ability to ground a 
commonly shared conception of the good. 
This last development means that only norms which give equal 
weight to all values and preft?rence to none can be universally 
grounded. 22 Consequently, norms become more abstract than a 
substantive concept of the good would call for, abstract norms are 
superordinated to values as the final arbiters of morality. There are 
some theorists Amy Gutman, for example -- who conclude that, 
because of the pluralism of values in a modernized world, the task of 
a liberal theory of justice is limited to arbitrating between 
universalizable norms. "Liberal justice therefore does not provide us 
with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions not 
our entire lives. "23 
While it may be true that the scope of justice is limited to our 
public lives and social institutions, the theory of justice must be 
made a part of a more comprehensive theory of morality. The liberal 
tendency to conceive of ~oral subjects as identical moral entities not 
defined by any particularity makes it possible to put forth a theory 
of justice that does not take into account those very value conflicts it 
seeks to remedy through the application of norms. Once this abstract 
notion of the individuals involved in political discourse is rejected, as 
Habermas has rejected it, the model of the abstract individual must 
be replaced with a more complex vision of actual individuals who 
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bring themselves and all their particularity into actual political 
discussions 24 . Because these individuals will come to discourse as 
whole persons, bringing with them the full range of their moral 
commitments, personal beliefs, desires and ideals, there must be a 
moral norm that can be used to make sense of our commitment to 
discourse. 
Such a moral meta-norm would also allow us to make sense of 
the degree to which a commitment to the norms of justice represents 
a value choice about the kind of life we wish to lead. While we might 
wish to distinguish norms from values in order to allow for a 
plurality in the ways of life our society permits, surely we would not 
wish to say that justice does not involve a notion of the good. Even if 
we avoid adopting any particular notion of the good as definitive, 
that choice in itself reflects what we take to be a good, i.e., the 
possibility of exercising a wide degree of freedom in choosing the 
kind of life one wishes to pursue. In was in this sense that I argued 
that norms cannot be absolutely distinguished from values. We can 
make a distinction between norms and values only according to 
formal principles which we agree to adopt to regulate our public life. 
In this sense Gutman is right; justice speaks to only a part of our life. 
But if a theory of justice is to recognize our concrete particularity it 
has to be a part of a larger theory of morality which can take into 
account the full range of our values, beliefs, character, emotional 
commitments and needs. Habermas seems to recognize that the 
belief in the significance of justice springs from a perception of it as 
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part of what is good or necessary to life. This is clear in his view that 
justice serves to maintain the social relationships necessary for 
preserving our identities. Inherent in Habermas's discourse ethic is 
the notion of symmetric reciprocity 25 which can, as Jean Cohen points 
out, provide us with a meta-norm against which norms and values 
alike can be tested. 26 The ideal of reciprocity could guide not only 
public behavior but also relations between individuals at the most 
personal level. It could serve not only as a guide to cognitively 
mediated interaction but for affective attachment as well. It can 
serve as a meta-norm for discourse and as a guideline for a notion of 
moral character. 
Since it is through linguistically mediated social interaction that 
we come to collectively define our identities, needs and desires, 
discourse can aid us in negotioating our way through conflicts over 
what values lead to human flourishing, what is to be publicly 
regulated by norms, and what values should be open to personal 
choice. Discourse regulated by the ideal of symmetric reciprocity can 
serve as the arena in which we work out the details of what we 
commonly view as the good, the just, and the true. Through 
discourse we define ourselves as beings who share at least the 
outlines of a common way of life, and through discourse that we can 
decide the extent to which we will encourage the plurality of choices 
which mark our difference. As Jean Cohen notes, 
The discursive process constitutes what 1s 
shared, it creates or reaffirms a "we", a 
common identity and a new or reinforced 
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solidarity based on shared norms and opens 
the way for the recognition of common 
interests with respect to the preservation of 
that commonality . . In a pluralistic 
universe comprised of individuals with 
different forms of life, participation in 
discourse on norms implicitly commits the 
participant to the metanorms of symmetric 
reciprocity - as principles we can come to 
embrace in and through discussing our 
differences and discursively settling our 
conflicts.27 
While Cohen emphasizes the discovery of commonality, it is just as 
true that discourses reveal to us differences which we may choose to 
preserve. A choice to preserve the plurality of our ways of life is 
just as morally significant as is the discovery of the bonds that make 
us alike. 
If we take seriously Habermas's claim that personal identity is 
linguistically mediated, it becomes clear that only through discourse 
can we define the boundaries of public and, private and negotiate the 
distinction between norms and values. What I am proposing is a 
discursive theory of morality rather than a discourse theory of 
justice. Habermas must widen the scope of his exploration in order 
to locate his theory of justice in a general theory of morality which 
can take into account human universality and human particularity. 
The ideal of symmetrical reciprocity may just be the key to such an 
exploration. Derived from the ideal conditions of discourse, it offers 
a way to assess norms and values without resorting to a historically 
specific notion of the good. It provides us with a standard of critique 
which can itself be grounded in· discourse, while at the same time 
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bridging the gap between norms and values, as it is itself both a 
norm and a value. It is a norm insofar as it a necessary condition for 
discourse and thus universally implied and justified; it is a value 
insofar as it offers us some vision of a way of life where all could be 
valued and respected as particular individuals. While it contains no 
blueprints for a future social order.--.in keeping with Habermas's 
repetition of the dictum against worshipping graven images.--
symmetrical reciprocity provides an ideal which can be used to 
evaluate social planning or projected utopias. 
There are,of course, problems with using symmetrical 
reciprocity as a moral standard in the establishment of othermoral 
standards. Among them is the question of whether symmetrical 
reciprocity can be derived from ideal discourse without appealing to 
other norms, such as equality, respect and solidarity. In other words, 
is symmetrical reciprocity any more independent from values which 
cannot be ultimately grounded in rationality than are norms 
generally? Another problem which comes to mind is that, while 
symmetrical reciprocity may be an ideal for citizens in a republic, 
can all moral relationships be said to share the same ideal? Are the 
relationships between parent and child or child and teacher, for 
example, ideally characterized by symmetrical reciprocity? Perhaps 
one might argue that these relationships should be arranged with a 
moral eye to a future when the child will become an adult and enter 
fully into the moral community, thus becoming entitled to 
symmetrically reciprocal relationships with all other members. 
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While I can see potential problems with accepting symmetrical 
reciprocity as an ideal to which both norms and values should 
conform, it would help to ease many of the difficulties with 
Habermas's position. While norms and values would still remain 
related to one another, one might accept my suggestion that they be 
pragmatically distinguished through discourse. We could then insist 
that in the public sphere, reasoning should be more abstract, more 
easily universalized in principle, if not in application, that it should 
be able to be normed in the form of which law is the paradigmatic 
expression. Reasoning of this sort could be distinguished from 
reasoning guided by non-obligatory values in the private sphere, and 
both forms of reasoning could be regulated by the meta-norm of 
symmetrical reciprocity. A commitment to the norms of justice 
would not then be a commitment to the absolute privileging of norms 
over values; for while symmetrical reciprocity is a norm, it is a norm 
that serves to create a bridge to the good. It connects the abstract 
with the particular by suggesting an approach to the good life 
without outlining it and without privileging one particular concept of 
the good over any other. In the public sphere, the right would be 
privileged over any particular notion of the good; but choosing to 
adopt the standpoint of justice would involve a commitment to a way 
of life that values each individual. Justice would then be valued 
because of our commitment to creating a public world in which the 
values implied by the notion of symmetrical reciprocity would be 
realized through non-coercive discourse. 
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